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This document updates and replaces all previously published guidelines for the pre-
vention of Mycobacterium tuberculosis transmission in health-care facilities. The
purpose of this revision is to emphasize the importance of a) the hierarchy of control
measures, including administrative and engineering controls and personal respiratory
protection; b) the use of risk assessments for developing a written tuberculosis (TB)
control plan; c) early identification and management of persons who have TB; d) TB
screening programs for health-care workers (HCWs); e) HCW training and education;
and f) the evaluation of TB infection-control programs.
Transmission of M. tuberculosis is a recognized risk to patients and HCWs in health-
care facilities. Transmission is most likely to occur from patients who have un-
recognized pulmonary or laryngeal TB, are not on effective anti-TB therapy, and have
not been placed in TB isolation. Several recent TB outbreaks in health-care facilities,
including outbreaks of multidrug-resistant TB, have heightened concern about noso-
comial transmission. Patients who have multidrug-resistant TB can remain infectious
for prolonged periods, which increases the risk for nosocomial and/or occupational
transmission of M. tuberculosis. Increases in the incidence of TB have been observed
in some geographic areas; these increases are related partially to the high risk for TB
among immunosuppressed persons, particularly those infected with human immu-
nodeficiency virus (HIV). Transmission of M. tuberculosis to HIV-infected persons is of
particular concern because these persons are at high risk for developing active TB if
they become infected with the bacteria. Thus, health-care facilities should be particu-
larly alert to the need for preventing transmission of M. tuberculosis in settings in
which HIV-infected persons work or receive care.
Supervisory responsibility for the TB infection-control program should be assigned to
a designated person or group of persons who should be given the authority to imple-
ment and enforce TB infection-control policies. An effective TB infection-control
program requires early identification, isolation, and treatment of persons who have
active TB. The primary emphasis of TB infection-control plans in health-care facilities
should be achieving these three goals by the application of a hierarchy of control
measures, including a) the use of administrative measures to reduce the risk for expo-
sure to persons who have infectious TB, b) the use of engineering controls to prevent
the spread and reduce the concentration of infectious droplet nuclei, and c) the use of
personal respiratory protective equipment in areas where there is still a risk for expo-
sure to M. tuberculosis (e.g., TB isolation rooms). Implementation of a TB infection-
control program requires risk assessment and development of a TB infection-control
plan; early identification, treatment, and isolation of infectious TB patients; effective
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engineering controls; an appropriate respiratory protection program; HCW TB train-
ing, education, counseling, and screening; and evaluation of the program’s effective-
ness.
Although completely eliminating the risk for transmission of M. tuberculosis in all
health-care facilities may not be possible at the present time, adherence to these
guidelines should reduce the risk to persons in these settings. Recently, nosocomial
TB outbreaks have demonstrated the substantial morbidity and mortality among pa-
tients and HCWs that have been associated with incomplete implementation of CDC’s
Guidelines for Preventing the Transmission of Tuberculosis in Health-Care Facilities,
with Special Focus on HIV-Related Issues published in 1990.* Follow-up investigations
at some of these hospitals have documented that complete implementation of meas-
ures similar or identical to those in the 1990 TB Guidelines significantly reduced or
eliminated nosocomial transmission of M. tuberculosis to patients and/or HCWs.
I. Introduction
A. Purpose of Document
In April 1992, the National MDR-TB Task Force published the National Action
Plan to Combat Multidrug-Resistant Tuberculosis (1 ). The publication was a
response to reported nosocomial outbreaks of tuberculosis (TB), including
outbreaks of multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-TB), and the increasing incidence
of TB in some geographic areas. The plan called for the update and revision
of the guidelines for preventing nosocomial transmission of Mycobacterium
tuberculosis published December 7, 1990 (2 ).
Public meetings were held in October 1992 and January 1993 to discuss revi-
sion of the 1990 TB Guidelines (2 ). CDC received considerable input on
various aspects of infection control, including health-care worker (HCW) edu-
cation; administrative controls (e.g., having protocols for the early
identification and management of patients who have TB); the need for more
specific recommendations regarding ventilation; and clarification on the use
of respiratory protection in health-care settings. On the basis of these events
and the input received, on October 12, 1993, CDC published in the Federal
Register the Draft Guidelines For Preventing the Transmission of Tuberculosis
in Health-Care Facilities, Second Edition (3 ). During and after the 90-day com-
ment period following publication of this draft, CDC’s TB Infection-Control
Guidelines Work Group received and reviewed more than 2,500 comments.
The purpose of this document is to make recommendations for reducing the
risk for transmitting M. tuberculosis to HCWs, patients, volunteers, visitors,
and other persons in these settings. The information also may serve as a use-
ful resource for educating HCWs about TB.
*CDC. Guidelines for Preventing the Transmission of Tuberculosis in Health-Care Facilities, with
Special Focus on HIV-Related Issues. MMWR 1990;39(No. RR-17). 
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These recommendations update and replace all previously published CDC
recommendations for TB infection control in health-care facilities (2,4 ). The
recommendations in this document are applicable primarily to inpatient fa-
cilities in which health care is provided (e.g., hospitals, medical wards in
correctional facilities, nursing homes, and hospices). Recommendations ap-
plicable to ambulatory-care facilities, emergency departments, home-
health–care settings, emergency medical services, medical offices, dental set-
tings, and other facilities or residential settings that provide medical care are
provided in separate sections, with cross-references to other sections of the
guidelines if appropriate.
Designated personnel at health-care facilities should conduct a risk assess-
ment for the entire facility and for each area* and occupational group,
determine the risk for nosocomial or occupational transmission of M. tuber-
culosis, and implement an appropriate TB infection-control program. The
extent of the TB infection-control program may range from a simple program
emphasizing administrative controls in settings where there is minimal risk
for exposure to M. tuberculosis, to a comprehensive program that includes
administrative controls, engineering controls, and respiratory protection in
settings where the risk for exposure is high. In all settings, administrative
measures should be used to minimize the number of HCWs exposed to M. tu-
berculosis while still providing optimal care for TB patients. HCWs providing
care to patients who have TB should be informed about the level of risk for
transmission of M. tuberculosis and the appropriate control measures to
minimize that risk.
In this document, the term “HCWs” refers to all the paid and unpaid persons
working in health-care settings who have the potential for exposure to M. tu-
berculosis. This may include, but is not limited to, physicians; nurses; aides;
dental workers; technicians; workers in laboratories and morgues; emer-
gency medical service (EMS) personnel; students; part-time personnel;
temporary staff not employed by the health-care facility; and persons not in-
volved directly in patient care but who are potentially at risk for occupational
exposure to M. tuberculosis (e.g., volunteer workers and dietary, housekeep-
ing, maintenance, clerical, and janitorial staff).
Although the purpose of this document is to make recommendations for re-
ducing the risk for transmission of M. tuberculosis in health-care facilities, the
process of implementing these recommendations must safeguard, in accord-
ance with applicable state and federal laws, the confidentiality and civil rights
of persons who have TB.
*Area: a structural unit (e.g., a hospital ward or laboratory) or functional unit (e.g., an internal
medicine service) in which HCWs provide services to and share air with a specific patient
population or work with clinical specimens that may contain viable M. tuberculosis organisms.
The risk for exposure to M. tuberculosis in a given area depends on the prevalence of TB in
the population served and the characteristics of the environment.
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B. Epidemiology, Transmission, and Pathogenesis of TB
The prevalence of TB is not distributed evenly throughout all segments of the
U.S. population. Some subgroups or persons have a higher risk for TB either
because they are more likely than other persons in the general population to
have been exposed to and infected with M. tuberculosis or because their in-
fection is more likely to progress to active TB after they have been infected
(5 ). In some cases, both of these factors may be present. Groups of persons
known to have a higher prevalence of TB infection include contacts of per-
sons who have active TB, foreign-born persons from areas of the world with
a high prevalence of TB (e.g., Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America),
medically underserved populations (e.g., some African-Americans, Hispan-
ics, Asians and Pacific Islanders, American Indians, and Alaskan Natives),
homeless persons, current or former correctional-facility inmates, alcoholics,
injecting-drug users, and the elderly. Groups with a higher risk for progres-
sion from latent TB infection to active disease include persons who have been
infected recently (i.e., within the previous 2 years), children <4 years of age,
persons with fibrotic lesions on chest radiographs, and persons with certain
medical conditions (i.e., human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] infection, sili-
cosis, gastrectomy or jejuno-ileal bypass, being ≥10% below ideal body
weight, chronic renal failure with renal dialysis, diabetes mellitus, immuno-
suppression resulting from receipt of high-dose corticosteroid or other
immunosuppressive therapy, and some malignancies) (5 ).
M. tuberculosis is carried in airborne particles, or droplet nuclei, that can be
generated when persons who have pulmonary or laryngeal TB sneeze,
cough, speak, or sing (6 ). The particles are an estimated 1–5 µm in size, and
normal air currents can keep them airborne for prolonged time periods and
spread them throughout a room or building (7 ). Infection occurs when a sus-
ceptible person inhales droplet nuclei containing M. tuberculosis, and these
droplet nuclei traverse the mouth or nasal passages, upper respiratory tract,
and bronchi to reach the alveoli of the lungs. Once in the alveoli, the organ-
isms are taken up by alveolar macrophages and spread throughout the body.
Usually within 2–10 weeks after initial infection with M. tuberculosis, the im-
mune response limits further multiplication and spread of the tubercle bacilli;
however, some of the bacilli remain dormant and viable for many years. This
condition is referred to as latent TB infection. Persons with latent TB infection
usually have positive purified protein derivative (PPD)-tuberculin skin-test
results, but they do not have symptoms of active TB, and they are not infec-
tious.
In general, persons who become infected with M. tuberculosis have approxi-
mately a 10% risk for developing active TB during their lifetimes. This risk is
greatest during the first 2 years after infection. Immunocompromised per-
sons have a greater risk for the progression of latent TB infection to active TB
disease; HIV infection is the strongest known risk factor for this progression.
Persons with latent TB infection who become coinfected with HIV have ap-
proximately an 8%–10% risk per year for developing active TB (8 ).
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HIV-infected persons who are already severely immunosuppressed and who
become newly infected with M. tuberculosis have an even greater risk for
developing active TB (9–12 ).
The probability that a person who is exposed to M. tuberculosis will become
infected depends primarily on the concentration of infectious droplet nuclei in
the air and the duration of exposure. Characteristics of the TB patient that
enhance transmission include a) disease in the lungs, airways, or larynx;
b) presence of cough or other forceful expiratory measures; c) presence of
acid-fast bacilli (AFB) in the sputum; d) failure of the patient to cover the
mouth and nose when coughing or sneezing; e) presence of cavitation on
chest radiograph; f) inappropriate or short duration of chemotherapy; and
g) administration of procedures that can induce coughing or cause aerosoli-
zation of M. tuberculosis (e.g., sputum induction). Environmental factors that
enhance the likelihood of transmission include a) exposure in relatively small,
enclosed spaces; b) inadequate local or general ventilation that results in in-
sufficient dilution and/or removal of infectious droplet nuclei; and
c) recirculation of air containing infectious droplet nuclei. Characteristics of
the persons exposed to M. tuberculosis that may affect the risk for becoming
infected are not as well defined. In general, persons who have been infected
previously with M. tuberculosis may be less susceptible to subsequent infec-
tion. However, reinfection can occur among previously infected persons,
especially if they are severely immunocompromised. Vaccination with Bacille
of Calmette and Guérin (BCG) probably does not affect the risk for infection;
rather, it decreases the risk for progressing from latent TB infection to active
TB (13 ). Finally, although it is well established that HIV infection increases the
likelihood of progressing from latent TB infection to active TB, it is unknown
whether HIV infection increases the risk for becoming infected if exposed to
M. tuberculosis. 
C. Risk for Nosocomial Transmission of M. tuberculosis
Transmission of M. tuberculosis is a recognized risk in health-care facilities
(14–22 ). The magnitude of the risk varies considerably by the type of health-
care facility, the prevalence of TB in the community, the patient population
served, the HCW’s occupational group, the area of the health-care facility in
which the HCW works, and the effectiveness of TB infection-control interven-
tions. The risk may be higher in areas where patients with TB are provided
care before diagnosis and initiation of TB treatment and isolation precautions
(e.g., in clinic waiting areas and emergency departments) or where diagnostic
or treatment procedures that stimulate coughing are performed. Nosocomial
transmission of M. tuberculosis has been associated with close contact with
persons who have infectious TB and with the performance of certain proce-
dures (e.g., bronchoscopy [17 ], endotracheal intubation and suctioning [18 ],
open abscess irrigation [20 ], and autopsy [21,22 ]). Sputum induction and
aerosol treatments that induce coughing may also increase the potential for
transmission of M. tuberculosis (23,24 ). Personnel of health-care facilities
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should be particularly alert to the need for preventing transmission of M. tu-
berculosis in those facilities in which immunocompromised persons (e.g.,
HIV-infected persons) work or receive care—especially if cough-inducing pro-
cedures, such as sputum induction and aerosolized pentamidine treatments,
are being performed.
Several TB outbreaks among persons in health-care facilities have been re-
ported recently (11,24–28 ; CDC, unpublished data). Many of these outbreaks
involved transmission of multidrug-resistant strains of M. tuberculosis to
both patients and HCWs. Most of the patients and some of the HCWs were
HIV-infected persons in whom new infection progressed rapidly to active dis-
ease. Mortality associated with those outbreaks was high (range: 43%–93%).
Furthermore, the interval between diagnosis and death was brief (range of
median intervals: 4–16 weeks). Factors contributing to these outbreaks in-
cluded delayed diagnosis of TB, delayed recognition of drug resistance, and
delayed initiation of effective therapy—all of which resulted in prolonged in-
fectiousness, delayed initiation and inadequate duration of TB isolation,
inadequate ventilation in TB isolation rooms, lapses in TB isolation practices
and inadequate precautions for cough-inducing procedures, and lack of ade-
quate respiratory protection. Analysis of data collected from three of the
health-care facilities involved in the outbreaks indicates that transmission of
M. tuberculosis decreased significantly or ceased entirely in areas where
measures similar to those in the 1990 TB Guidelines were implemented (2,29–
32 ). However, several interventions were implemented simultaneously, and
the effectiveness of the separate interventions could not be determined.
D. Fundamentals of TB Infection Control
An effective TB infection-control program requires early identification, isola-
tion, and effective treatment of persons who have active TB. The primary
emphasis of the TB infection-control plan should be on achieving these three
goals. In all health-care facilities, particularly those in which persons who are
at high risk for TB work or receive care, policies and procedures for TB control
should be developed, reviewed periodically, and evaluated for effectiveness
to determine the actions necessary to minimize the risk for transmission of
M. tuberculosis.
The TB infection-control program should be based on a hierarchy of control
measures. The first level of the hierarchy, and that which affects the largest
number of persons, is using administrative measures intended primarily to
reduce the risk for exposing uninfected persons to persons who have infec-
tious TB. These measures include a) developing and implementing effective
written policies and protocols to ensure the rapid identification, isolation,
diagnostic evaluation, and treatment of persons likely to have TB; b) imple-
menting effective work practices among HCWs in the health-care facility (e.g.,
correctly wearing respiratory protection and keeping doors to isolation
rooms closed); c) educating, training, and counseling HCWs about TB; and
d) screening HCWs for TB infection and disease.
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The second level of the hierarchy is the use of engineering controls to prevent
the spread and reduce the concentration of infectious droplet nuclei. These
controls include a) direct source control using local exhaust ventilation,
b) controlling direction of airflow to prevent contamination of air in areas ad-
jacent to the infectious source, c) diluting and removing contaminated air via
general ventilation, and d) air cleaning via air filtration or ultraviolet germi-
cidal irradiation (UVGI).
The first two levels of the hierarchy minimize the number of areas in the
health-care facility where exposure to infectious TB may occur, and they re-
duce, but do not eliminate, the risk in those few areas where exposure to
M. tuberculosis can still occur (e.g., rooms in which patients with known or
suspected infectious TB are being isolated and treatment rooms in which
cough-inducing or aerosol-generating procedures are performed on such pa-
tients). Because persons entering such rooms may be exposed to M.
tuberculosis, the third level of the hierarchy is the use of personal respiratory
protective equipment in these and certain other situations in which the risk
for infection with M. tuberculosis may be relatively higher.
Specific measures to reduce the risk for transmission of M. tuberculosis in-
clude the following:
• Assigning to specific persons in the health-care facility the supervisory re-
sponsibility for designing, implementing, evaluating, and maintaining the
TB infection-control program (Section II.A).
• Conducting a risk assessment to evaluate the risk for transmission of
M. tuberculosis in all areas of the health-care facility, developing a written
TB infection-control program based on the risk assessment, and peri-
odically repeating the risk assessment to evaluate the effectiveness of the
TB infection-control program (Section II.B).
• Developing, implementing, and enforcing policies and protocols to ensure
early identification, diagnostic evaluation, and effective treatment of pa-
tients who may have infectious TB (Section II.C; Suppl. 2).
• Providing prompt triage for and appropriate management of patients in
the outpatient setting who may have infectious TB (Section II.D).
• Promptly initiating and maintaining TB isolation for persons who may
have infectious TB and who are admitted to the inpatient setting (Sec-
tion II.E; Suppl. 1).
• Effectively planning arrangements for discharge (Section II.E).
• Developing, installing, maintaining, and evaluating ventilation and other
engineering controls to reduce the potential for airborne exposure to
M. tuberculosis (Section II.F; Suppl. 3).
• Developing, implementing, maintaining, and evaluating a respiratory pro-
tection program (Section II.G; Suppl. 4).
• Using precautions while performing cough-inducing procedures (Sec-
tion II.H; Suppl. 3).
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• Educating and training HCWs about TB, effective methods for preventing
transmission of M. tuberculosis, and the benefits of medical screening pro-
grams (Section II.I).
• Developing and implementing a program for routine periodic counseling
and screening of HCWs for active TB and latent TB infection (Section II.J;
Suppl. 2).
• Promptly evaluating possible episodes of M. tuberculosis transmission in
health-care facilities, including PPD skin-test conversions among HCWs,
epidemiologically associated cases among HCWs or patients, and contacts
of patients or HCWs who have TB and who were not promptly identified
and isolated (Section II.K).
• Coordinating activities with the local public health department, emphasiz-
ing reporting, and ensuring adequate discharge follow-up and the
continuation and completion of therapy (Section II.L).
II. Recommendations
A. Assignment of Responsibility
• Supervisory responsibility for the TB infection-control program should be
assigned to a designated person or group of persons with expertise in in-
fection control, occupational health, and engineering. These persons
should be given the authority to implement and enforce TB infection-
control policies.
• If supervisory responsibility is assigned to a committee, one person
should be designated as the TB contact person. Questions and problems
can then be addressed to this person.




• TB infection-control measures for each health-care facility should be
based on a careful assessment of the risk for transmission of M. tu-
berculosis in that particular setting. The first step in developing the
TB infection-control program should be to conduct a baseline risk
assessment to evaluate the risk for transmission of M. tuberculosis in
each area and occupational group in the facility (Table 1, Figure 1).
Appropriate infection-control interventions can then be developed
on the basis of actual risk. Risk assessments should be performed for
all inpatient and outpatient settings (e.g., medical and dental offices).
• Regardless of risk level, the management of patients with known or
suspected infectious TB should not vary. However, the index of sus-
picion for infectious TB among patients, the frequency of HCW PPD
skin testing, the number of TB isolation rooms, and other factors will
depend on whether the risk for transmission of M. tuberculosis in the
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facility, area, or occupational group is high, intermediate, low, very
low, or minimal.
• The risk assessment should be conducted by a qualified person or
group of persons (e.g., hospital epidemiologists, infectious disease
specialists, pulmonary disease specialists, infection-control practi-
tioners, health-care administrators, occupational health personnel,
engineers, HCWs, or local public health personnel).
• The risk assessment should be conducted for the entire facility and
for specific areas within the facility (e.g., medical, TB, pulmonary, or
HIV wards; HIV, infectious disease, or pulmonary clinics; and emer-
gency departments or other areas where TB patients might receive
1. Review the community TB profile (from public health department data).
2. Review the number of TB patients who were treated in each area of the facility (both
inpatient and outpatient). (This information can be obtained by analyzing laboratory
surveillance data and by reviewing discharge diagnoses or medical and infection-
control records.)
3. Review the drug-susceptibility patterns of TB isolates of patients who were treated at
the facility.
4. Analyze purified protein derivative (PPD)-tuberculin skin-test results of health-care
workers (HCWs), by area or by occupational group for HCWs not assigned to a specific
area (e.g., respiratory therapists).
5. To evaluate infection-control parameters, review medical records of a sample of TB
patients seen at the facility.
Calculate intervals from:
• admission until TB suspected;
• admission until TB evaluation performed;
• admission until acid-fast bacilli (AFB) specimens ordered;
• AFB specimens ordered until AFB specimens collected;
• AFB specimens collected until AFB smears performed and reported;
• AFB specimens collected until cultures performed and reported;
• AFB specimens collected until species identification conducted and reported;
• AFB specimens collected until drug-susceptibility tests performed and reported;
• admission until TB isolation initiated;
• admission until TB treatment initiated; and
• duration of TB isolation.
Obtain the following additional information:
• Were appropriate criteria used for discontinuing isolation?
• Did the patient have a history of prior admission to the facility?
• Was the TB treatment regimen adequate?
• Were follow-up sputum specimens collected properly?
• Was appropriate discharge planning conducted?
6. Perform an observational review of TB infection control practices.
7. Review the most recent environmental evaluation and maintenance procedures.
TABLE 1. Elements of a risk assessment for tuberculosis (TB) in health-care facilities
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No TB patients in
facility or community.
Minimal risk
Analyze (by area* and occupational group)
purified protein derivative (PPD) test data,
number of TB patients, and other risk factors.
TB patients in
facility or community.
Review community TB profile
and
Review number of TB patients examined
as inpatients or outpatients at the facility.
HCW PPD conversion rate in area or group significantly higher than rates for
areas or groups in which occupational exposure to Mycobacterium tuberculosis
is unlikely, or than previous rate in same area or group?†
or
Cluster§ of HCW PPD conversions?
or


















Very low risk †††§§§

















Repeat PPDs and risk
assessment at 3 mos.
Reassess interventions.
Repeat PPDs and risk
assessment at 3 mos.
PPD conversions or other
evidence of transmission?


















FIGURE 1. Protocol for conducting a tuberculosis (TB) risk assessment in a health-care
facility
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care or where cough-inducing procedures are performed). This
should include both inpatient and outpatient areas. In addition, risk
assessments should be conducted for groups of HCWs who work
throughout the facility rather than in a specific area (e.g., respiratory
therapists; bronchoscopists; environmental services, dietary, and
maintenance personnel; and students, interns, residents, and fel-
lows).
• Classification of risk for a facility, for a specific area, and for a specific
occupational group should be based on a) the profile of TB in the
community; b) the number of infectious TB patients admitted to the
area or ward, or the estimated number of infectious TB patients to
whom HCWs in an occupational group may be exposed; and c) the
results of analysis of HCW PPD test conversions (where applicable)
and possible person-to-person transmission of M. tuberculosis (Fig-
ure 1).
• All TB infection-control programs should include periodic reassess-
ments of risk. The frequency of repeat risk assessments should be
based on the results of the most recent risk assessment (Table 2,
Figure 1).
• The “minimal-risk” category applies only to an entire facility. A
“minimal-risk” facility does not admit TB patients to inpatient or out-
patient areas and is not located in a community with TB (i.e.,
  *Area: a structural unit (e.g., a hospital ward or laboratory) or functional unit (e.g., an internal
medicine service) in which HCWs provide services to and share air with a specific patient
population or work with clinical specimens that may contain viable M. tuberculosis
organisms. The risk for exposure to M. tuberculosis  in a given area depends on the
prevalence of TB in the population served and the characteristics of the environment.
†With epidemiologic evaluation suggestive of occupational (nosocomial) transmission (see
Problem Evaluation section in the text).
§Cluster: two or more PPD skin-test conversions occurring within a 3-month period among
HCWs in a specific area or occupational group, and epidemiologic evidence suggests
occupational (nosocomial) transmission.
¶For example, clusters of M. tuberculosis  isolates with identical DNA fingerprint (RFLP)
patterns or drug-resistance patterns, with epidemiologic evaluation suggestive of
nosocomial transmission (see Problem Evaluation section in the text).
 **Does not include patients identified in triage system and referred to a collaborating facility
or patients being managed in outpatient areas.
††To prevent inappropriate management and potential loss to follow-up of patients identified
in the triage system of a very low-risk facility as having suspected TB, an agreement should
exist for referral between the referring and receiving facilities.
§§Or, for occupational groups, exposure to fewer than six TB patients for HCWs in the
particular occupational group during the preceding year.
¶¶Or, for occupational groups, exposure to six or more TB patients for HCWs in the particular
occupational group during the preceding year.
 ***See Problem Evaluation section in the text.
†††Occurrence of drug-resistant TB in the facility or community, or a relatively high prevalence
of HIV infection among patients or HCWs in the area, may warrant a higher risk rating.
§§§For outpatient facilities, if TB cases have been documented in the community but no TB
patients have been examined in the outpatient area during the preceding year, the area
can be designated as very low risk.
FIGURE 1. Protocol for conducting a TB risk assessment in a health-care facility —
Continued









Element Minimal Very low Low Intermediate High
Assigning responsibility (Section II.A)
Designated TB control officer or commit-
tee R R R R R
Conducting a risk assessment 
(Section II.B.1)
Baseline risk assessment R R R R R
Community TB profile: incidence,
prevalence, and drug-susceptibility
patterns Y Y Y Y Y
Facility case surveillance (laboratory-
and discharge-diagnosis–based) C C C C C
Analysis of purified protein derivative
(PPD) test results among health-care
workers (HCWs) N/A V* Y every 6–12 mos every 3 mos
Review of TB patient medical records N/A O† Y every 6–12 mos every 3 mos
Observation of infection-control practices N/A N/A Y every 6–12 mos every 3 mos
Evaluation of engineering control
maintenance O§ O§ Y every 6–12 mos every 3 mos
Developing a TB infection control plan
(Section II.B.2)
Written TB infection control plan R R R R R
Periodically reassessing risk 
(Section II.B.3)
Reassessment of risk Y Y Y every 6–12 mos every 3 mos
Identifying, evaluating, and initiating
treatment for patients who may have
active TB (Section II.C)
Protocol (clinical prediction rules)¶ for
identifying patients who may have
active TB R R R R R
Protocol for diagnostic evaluation of
patients who may have active TB** N/A R R R R
TABLE 2. Elements of a tuberculosis (TB) infection-control program
R=recommended; Y=yearly; C=continual; N/A=not applicable; O=optional; V=variable.
V










Element Minimal Very low Low Intermediate High
Protocol for reporting laboratory results
to clinicians, infection-control
practitioners, collaborating referral
facilities, and appropriate health
department(s) N/A R R R R
Protocol for initiating treatment of
patients who may have active TB** N/A R R R R
Managing patients who may have TB in
ambulatory-care settings and emergency
departments (Section II.D)
Triage system for identifying patients
who have active TB in emergency
departments and ambulatory-care
settings R R R R R
Protocol for managing patients who may
have active TB in emergency
departments and ambulatory-care
settings R R R R R
Protocol for referring patients who may
have active TB to collaborating facility R R N/A†† N/A†† N/A††
Managing hospitalized patients who may
have TB (Section II.E)
Appropriate number of TB isolation
rooms§§ N/A N/A R R R
Protocol for initiating TB isolation N/A N/A R R R
Protocol for TB isolation practices N/A N/A R R R
Protocol for discontinuing TB isolation N/A N/A R R R
Protocol for discharge planning N/A N/A R R R
Engineering controls (Suppl. 3, Section II.F)
Protocol(s) for maintenance of
engineering controls O§ O§ R R R
Respiratory protection (Suppl. 4, 
Section II.G)
Respiratory protection program N/A V* R R R
TABLE 2. Elements of a TB infection-control program — Continued










Element Minimal Very low Low Intermediate High
Cough-inducing and aerosol-generating
procedures (Section II.H)
Protocol(s) for performing cough-
inducing or aerosol-generating
procedures O O¶¶ R R R
Engineering controls for performing
cough-inducing or aerosol-generating
procedures O§ O¶¶ R R R
Educating and Training HCWs
(Section II.I)
Educating and training HCWs regarding
TB R R R R R
Counseling and screening HCWs
(Section II.J)
Counseling HCWs regarding TB R R R R R
Protocol for identifying and evaluating
HCWs who have signs or symptoms of
active TB R R R R R
Baseline PPD testing of HCWs O*** R R R R
Routine periodic PPD screening of HCWs
for latent TB infection N/A V* Y every 6–12 mos every 3 mos
Protocol for evaluating and managing
HCWs who have positive PPD tests R R R R R
Protocol for managing HCWs who have
active TB R R R R R
Conducting a problem evaluation 
(Section II.K)
Protocol for investigating PPD
conversions and active TB in HCWs R R R R R
Protocol for investigating possible
patient-to-patient transmission of
Mycobacterium tuberculosis R R R R R
TABLE 2. Elements of a TB infection-control program — Continued
R=recommended; Y=yearly; C=continual; N/A=not applicable; O=optional; V=variable.
V










Element Minimal Very low Low Intermediate High
Protocol for investigating possible
contacts of TB patients who were not
diagnosed initially as having TB and
were not placed in isolation R R R R R
Coordination with the public health
department (Section II.L)
Effective system for reporting patients
who have suspected or confirmed TB
to appropriate health department(s) R R R R R
TABLE 2. Elements of a TB infection-control program — Continued
R=recommended; Y=yearly; C=continual; N/A=not applicable; O=optional; V=variable.
  *Because very low-risk facilities do not admit patients who may have active TB to inpatient areas, most HCWs in such facilities do
not need routine follow-up PPD screening after baseline PPD testing is done. However, those who are involved in the initial
assessment and diagnostic evaluation of patients in the ambulatory-care, emergency, and admitting departments of such facilities
or in the outpatient management of patients with active TB could be exposed potentially to a patient who has active TB. These
HCWs may need to receive routine periodic PPD screening. Similarly, these HCWs may need to be included in a respiratory protection
program.
† Because very low-risk facilities do not admit patients suspected of having active TB, review of TB patient medical records is not
applicable. However, follow-up of patients who were identified during triage as possibly having active TB and referred to another
institution for further evaluation and management may be useful in evaluating the effectiveness of the triage system. 
§ Some minimal or very low-risk facilities may elect to use engineering controls (e.g., booths for cough-inducing procedures, portable
high-efficiency particulate [HEPA] filtration units, ultraviolet germicidal irradiation units) in triage/waiting areas. In such situations,
appropriate protocols for maintaining this equipment should be in place, and this maintenance should be evaluated periodically.
¶ The criteria used in clinical prediction rules will probably vary from facility to facility depending on the prevalence of TB in the
population served by the facility and on the clinical, radiographic, and laboratory characteristics of TB patients examined in the
facility.
 **The protocols should be consistent with CDC/American Thoracic Society recommendations (33 ).
†† Protocols for referring patients who require specialized treatment (e.g., patients with multidrug-resistant TB) may be appropriate.
§§ Based on maximum daily number of patients requiring TB isolation for suspected or confirmed active TB. Isolation rooms should
meet the performance criteria specified in these guidelines.
¶¶ If such procedures are used in the triage protocol(s) for identifying patients who may have active TB.
*** Minimal-risk facilities do not need to maintain an ongoing PPD skin-testing program. However, baseline PPD testing of HCWs may
be advisable so that if an unexpected exposure does occur, conversions can be distinguished from positive PPD test results caused
by previous exposures.
counties or communities in which TB cases have not been reported
during the previous year). Thus, there is essentially no risk for expo-
sure to TB patients in the facility. This category may also apply to
many outpatient settings (e.g., many medical and dental offices).
• The “very low-risk” category generally applies only to an entire facil-
ity. A very low-risk facility is one in which a) patients with active TB
are not admitted to inpatient areas but may receive initial assess-
ment and diagnostic evaluation or outpatient management in
outpatient areas (e.g., ambulatory-care and emergency depart-
ments) and b) patients who may have active TB and need inpatient
care are promptly referred to a collaborating facility. In such facilities,
the outpatient areas in which exposure to patients with active TB
could occur should be assessed and assigned to the appropriate
low-, intermediate-, or high-risk category. Categorical assignment
will depend on the number of TB patients examined in the area dur-
ing the preceding year and whether there is evidence of nosocomial
transmission of M. tuberculosis in the area. If TB cases have been
reported in the community, but no patients with active TB have been
examined in the outpatient area during the preceding year, the area
can be designated as very low risk (e.g., many medical offices).
The referring and receiving facilities should establish a referral
agreement to prevent inappropriate management and potential loss
to follow-up of patients suspected of having TB during evaluation in
the triage system of a very low-risk facility.
In some facilities in which TB patients are admitted to inpatient ar-
eas, a very low-risk protocol may be appropriate for areas (e.g.,
administrative areas) or occupational groups that have only a very
remote possibility of exposure to M. tuberculosis.
The very low-risk category may also be appropriate for outpatient
facilities that do not provide initial assessment of persons who may
have TB, but do screen patients for active TB as part of a limited
medical screening before undertaking specialty care (e.g., dental set-
tings).
• “Low-risk” areas or occupational groups are those in which a) the
PPD test conversion rate is not greater than that for areas or groups
in which occupational exposure to M. tuberculosis is unlikely or than
previous conversion rates for the same area or group, b) no clusters*
of PPD test conversions have occurred, c) person-to-person trans-
mission of M. tuberculosis has not been detected, and d) fewer than
six TB patients are examined or treated per year.
• “Intermediate-risk” areas or occupational groups are those in which
a) the PPD test conversion rate is not greater than that for areas or
groups in which occupational exposure to M. tuberculosis is unlikely
or than previous conversion rates for the same area or group, b) no
clusters of PPD test conversions have occurred, c) person-to-person
transmission of M. tuberculosis has not been detected, and d) six or
*Cluster: two or more PPD skin-test conversions occurring within a 3-month period among
HCWs in a specific area or occupational group, and epidemiologic evidence suggests occupa-
tional (nosocomial) transmission.
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more patients with active TB are examined or treated each year. Sur-
vey data suggest that facilities in which six or more TB patients are
examined or treated each year may have an increased risk for trans-
mission of M. tuberculosis (CDC, unpublished data); thus, areas in
which six or more patients with active TB are examined or treated
each year (or occupational groups in which HCWs are likely to be
exposed to six or more TB patients per year) should be classified as
“intermediate risk.”
• “High-risk” areas or occupational groups are those in which a) the
PPD test conversion rate is significantly greater than for areas or
groups in which occupational exposure to M. tuberculosis is unlikely
or than previous conversion rates for the same area or group, and
epidemiologic evaluation suggests nosocomial transmission; or b) a
cluster of PPD test conversions has occurred, and epidemiologic
evaluation suggests nosocomial transmission of M. tuberculosis; or
c) possible person-to-person transmission of M. tuberculosis has
been detected.
• If no data or insufficient data for adequate determination of risk have
been collected, such data should be compiled, analyzed, and re-
viewed expeditiously.
b. Community TB profile
• A profile of TB in the community that is served by the facility should
be obtained from the public health department. This profile should
include, at a minimum, the incidence (and prevalence, if available) of
active TB in the community and the drug-susceptibility patterns of M.
tuberculosis isolates (i.e., the antituberculous agents to which each
isolate is susceptible and those to which it is resistant) from patients
in the community.
c. Case surveillance
• Data concerning the number of suspected and confirmed active TB
cases among patients and HCWs in the facility should be systemati-
cally collected, reviewed, and used to estimate the number of TB
isolation rooms needed, to recognize possible clusters of noso-
comial transmission, and to assess the level of potential occu-
pational risk. The number of TB patients in specific areas of a facility
can be obtained from laboratory surveillance data on specimens
positive for AFB smears or M. tuberculosis cultures, from infection-
control records, and from databases containing information about
hospital discharge diagnoses.
• Drug-susceptibility patterns of M. tuberculosis isolates from TB pa-
tients treated in the facility should be reviewed to identify the
frequency and patterns of drug resistance. This information may in-
dicate a need to modify the initial treatment regimen or may suggest
possible nosocomial transmission or increased occupational risk.
d. Analysis of HCW PPD test screening data
• Results of HCW PPD testing should be recorded in the individual
HCW’s employee health record and in a retrievable aggregate data-
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base of all HCW PPD test results. Personal identifying information
should be handled confidentially. PPD test conversion rates should
be calculated at appropriate intervals to estimate the risk for PPD test
conversions for each area of the facility and for each specific occupa-
tional group not assigned to a specific area (Table 2). To calculate
PPD test conversion rates, the total number of previously PPD-
negative HCWs tested in each area or group (i.e., the denominator)
and the number of PPD test conversions among HCWs in each area
or group (the numerator) must be obtained.
• PPD test conversion rates for each area or occupational group should
be compared with rates for areas or groups in which occupational
exposure to M. tuberculosis is unlikely and with previous conversion
rates in the same area or group to identify areas or groups where the
risk for occupational PPD test conversions may be increased. A low
number of HCWs in a specific area may result in a greatly increased
rate of conversion for that area, although the actual risk may not be
significantly greater than that for other areas. Testing for statistical
significance (e.g., Fisher’s exact test or chi square test) may assist
interpretation; however, lack of statistical significance may not rule
out a problem (i.e., if the number of HCWs tested is low, there may
not be adequate statistical power to detect a significant difference).
Thus, interpretation of individual situations is necessary.
• An epidemiologic investigation to evaluate the likelihood of noso-
comial transmission should be conducted if PPD test conversions are
noted (Section II.K.1).
• The frequency and comprehensiveness of the HCW PPD testing pro-
gram should be evaluated periodically to ensure that all HCWs who
should be included in the program are being tested at appropriate
intervals. For surveillance purposes, earlier detection of transmis-
sion may be enhanced if HCWs in a given area or occupational group
are tested on different scheduled dates rather than all being tested
on the same date (Section II.J.3).
e. Review of TB patient medical records
• The medical records of a sample of TB patients examined at the facil-
ity can be reviewed periodically to evaluate infection-control
parameters (Table 1). Parameters to examine may include the inter-
vals from date of admission until a) TB was suspected, b) specimens
for AFB smears were ordered, c) these specimens were collected,
d) tests were performed, and e) results were reported. Moreover, the
adequacy of the TB treatment regimens that were used should be
evaluated.
• Medical record reviews should note previous hospital admissions of
TB patients before the onset of TB symptoms. Patient-to-patient
transmission may be suspected if active TB occurs in a patient who
had a prior hospitalization during which exposure to another TB pa-
tient occurred or if isolates from two or more TB patients have
identical characteristic drug-susceptibility or DNA fingerprint pat-
terns.
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• Data from the case review should be used to determine if there is a
need to modify a) protocols for identifying and isolating patients
who may have infectious TB, b) laboratory procedures, c) adminis-
trative policies and practices, or d) protocols for patient manage-
ment.
f. Observation of TB infection-control practices
• Assessing adherence to the policies of the TB infection-control pro-
gram should be part of the evaluation process. This assessment
should be performed on a regular basis and whenever an increase
occurs in the number of TB patients or HCW PPD test conversions.
Areas at high risk for transmission of M. tuberculosis should be
monitored more frequently than other areas. The review of patient
medical records provides information on HCW adherence to some of
the policies of the TB infection-control program. In addition, work
practices related to TB isolation (e.g., keeping doors to isolation
rooms closed) should be observed to determine if employers are en-
forcing, and HCWs are adhering to, these policies and if patient
adherence is being enforced. If these policies are not being enforced
or adhered to, appropriate education and other corrective action
should be implemented.
g. Engineering evaluation
• Results of engineering maintenance measures should be reviewed at
regular intervals (Table 3). Data from the most recent evaluation and
from maintenance procedures and logs should be reviewed carefully
as part of the risk assessment.
2. Development of the TB Infection-Control Plan
• Based on the results of the risk assessment, a written TB infection-
control plan should be developed and implemented for each area of the
facility and for each occupational group of HCWs not assigned to a spe-
cific area of the facility (Table 2; Table 3).
• The occurrence of drug-resistant TB in the facility or the community, or
a relatively high prevalence of HIV infection among patients or HCWs in
the community, may increase the concern about transmission of M. tu-
berculosis and may influence the decision regarding which protocol to
follow (i.e., a higher-risk classification may be selected).
• Health-care facilities are likely to have a combination of low-, intermedi-
ate-, and high-risk areas or occupational groups during the same time
period. The appropriate protocol should be implemented for each area
or group.
• Areas in which cough-inducing procedures are performed on patients
who may have active TB should, at the minimum, implement the
intermediate-risk protocol.
3. Periodic Reassessment
• Follow-up risk assessment should be performed at the interval indi-
cated by the most recent risk assessment (Figure 1; Table 2). Based on
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I. Assignment of responsibility
A. Assign responsibility for the TB infection-control program to qualified person(s).
B. Ensure that persons with expertise in infection control, occupational health, and
engineering are identified and included.
II. Risk assessment, TB infection-control plan, and periodic reassessment
A. Initial risk assessments
1. Obtain information concerning TB in the community.
2. Evaluate data concerning TB patients in the facility.
3. Evaluate data concerning purified protein derivative (PPD)-tuberculin skin-test
conversions among health-care workers (HCWs) in the facility.
4. Rule out evidence of person-to-person transmission.
B. Written TB infection-control program
1. Select initial risk protocol(s).
2. Develop written TB infection-control protocols.
C. Repeat risk assessment at appropriate intervals.
1. Review current community and facility surveillance data and PPD-tuberculin
skin-test results.
2. Review records of TB patients.
3. Observe HCW infection-control practices.
4. Evaluate maintenance of engineering controls.
III. Identification, evaluation, and treatment of patients who have TB
A. Screen patients for signs and symptoms of active TB:
1. On initial encounter in emergency department or ambulatory-care setting.
2. Before or at the time of admission.
B. Perform radiologic and bacteriologic evaluation of patients who have signs and
symptoms suggestive of TB.
C. Promptly initiate treatment.
IV. Managing outpatients who have possible infectious TB
A. Promptly initiate TB precautions.
B. Place patients in separate waiting areas or TB isolation rooms.
C. Give patients a surgical mask, a box of tissues, and instructions regarding the use
of these items.
V. Managing inpatients who have possible infectious TB
A. Promptly isolate patients who have suspected or known infectious TB.
B. Monitor the response to treatment.
C. Follow appropriate criteria for discontinuing isolation.
VI. Engineering recommendations
A. Design local exhaust and general ventilation in collaboration with persons who
have expertise in ventilation engineering.
B. Use a single-pass air system or air recirculation after high-efficiency particulate air
(HEPA) filtration in areas where infectious TB patients receive care.
C. Use additional measures, if needed, in areas where TB patients may receive care.
*A program such as this is appropriate for health-care facilities in which there is a high risk
for transmission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis.
TABLE 3. Characteristics of an effective tuberculosis (TB) infection-control program*
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D. Design TB isolation rooms in health-care facilities to achieve ≥6 air changes per
hour (ACH) for existing facilities and ≥12 ACH for new or renovated facilities.
E. Regularly monitor and maintain engineering controls.
F. TB isolation rooms that are being used should  be monitored daily to ensure they
maintain negative pressure relative to the hallway and all surrounding areas.
G. Exhaust TB isolation room air to outside or, if absolutely unavoidable, recirculate
after HEPA filtration.
VII. Respiratory protection
A. Respiratory protective devices should meet recommended performance criteria.
B. Repiratory protection should be used by persons entering rooms in which
patients with known or suspected infectious TB are being isolated, by HCWs when
performing cough-inducing or aerosol-generating procedures on such patients,
and by persons in other settings where administrative and engineering controls
are not likely to protect them from inhaling infectious airborne droplet nuclei.
C. A respiratory protection program is required at all facilities in which respiratory
protection is used.
VIII. Cough-inducing procedures
A. Do not perform such procedures on TB patients unless absolutely necessary.
B. Perform such procedures in areas that have local exhaust ventilation devices
(e.g., booths or special enclosures) or, if this is not feasible, in a room that meets
the ventilation requirements for TB isolation.
C. After completion of procedures, TB patients should remain in the booth or special
enclosure until their coughing subsides.
IX. HCW TB training and education
A. All HCWs should receive periodic TB education appropriate for their work respon-
sibilities and duties.
B. Training should include the epidemiology of TB in the facility.
C. TB education should emphasize concepts of the pathogenesis of and occupational
risk for TB.
D. Training should describe work practices that reduce the likelihood of transmitting
M. tuberculosis.
X. HCW counseling and screening
A. Counsel all HCWs regarding TB and TB infection.
B. Counsel all HCWs about the increased risk to immunocompromised persons for
developing active TB.
C. Perform PPD skin tests on HCWs at the beginning of their employment, and re-
peat PPD tests at periodic intervals.
D. Evaluate symptomatic HCWs for active TB.
XI. Evaluate HCW PPD test conversions and possible nosocomial transmission of
M. tuberculosis.
XII. Coordinate efforts with public health department(s)
TABLE 3. Characteristics of an effective TB infection-control program — Continued
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the results of the follow-up assessment, problem evaluation may need
to be conducted or the protocol may need to be modified to a higher- or
lower-risk level.
• After each risk assessment, the staff responsible for TB control, in con-
junction with other appropriate HCWs, should review all TB control
policies to ensure that they are effective and meet current needs.
4. Examples of Risk Assessment
Examples of six hypothetical situations and the means by which surveil-
lance data are used to select a TB control protocol are described as
follows:
Hospital A. The overall HCW PPD test conversion rate in the facility is 1.6%.
No areas or HCW occupational groups have a significantly greater PPD test
conversion rate than areas or groups in which occupational exposure to
M. tuberculosis is unlikely (or than previous rates for the same area or
group). No clusters of PPD test conversions have occurred. Patient-to-
patient transmission has not been detected. Patients who have TB are ad-
mitted to the facility, but no area admits six or more TB patients per year.
The low-risk protocol will be followed in all areas.
Hospital B. The overall HCW PPD test conversion rate in the facility is 1.8%.
The PPD test conversion rate for the medical intensive-care unit rate is
significantly higher than all other areas in the facility. The problem identifi-
cation process is initiated (Section II.K). It is determined that all TB patients
have been isolated appropriately. Other potential problems are then evalu-
ated, and the cause for the higher rate is not identified. After consulting the
public health department TB infection-control program, the high-risk pro-
tocol is followed in the unit until the PPD test conversion rate is similar to
areas of the facility in which occupational exposure to TB patients is un-
likely. If the rate remains significantly higher than other areas, further
evaluation, including environmental and procedural studies, will be per-
formed to identify possible reasons for the high conversion rate.
Hospital C. The overall HCW PPD test conversion rate in the facility is 2.4%.
Rates range from 0 to 2.6% for the individual areas and occupational
groups. None of these rates is significantly higher than rates for areas in
which occupational exposure to M. tuberculosis is unlikely. No particular
HCW group has higher conversion rates than the other groups. No clusters
of HCW PPD test conversions have occurred. In two of the areas, HCWs
cared for more than six TB patients during the preceding year. These two
areas will follow the intermediate-risk protocol, and all other areas will fol-
low the low-risk protocol. This hospital is located in the southeastern
United States, and these conversion rates may reflect cross-reactivity with
nontuberculous mycobacteria.
Hospital D. The overall HCW PPD test conversion rate in the facility is 1.2%.
In no area did HCWs care for six or more TB patients during the preceding
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year. Three of the 20 respiratory therapists tested had PPD conversions, for
a rate of 15%. The respiratory therapists who had PPD test conversions
had spent all or part of their time in the pulmonary function laboratory,
where induced sputum specimens were obtained. A low-risk protocol is
maintained for all areas and occupational groups in the facility except for
respiratory therapists. A problem evaluation is conducted in the pulmo-
nary function laboratory (Section II.K). It is determined that the ventilation
in this area is inadequate. Booths are installed for sputum induction. PPD
testing and the risk assessment are repeated 3 months later. If the repeat
testing at 3 months indicates that no more conversions have occurred, the
respiratory therapists will return to the low-risk protocol.
Hospital E. Hospital E is located in a community that has a relatively low
incidence of TB. To optimize TB services in the community, the four hospi-
tals in the community have developed an agreement that one of them
(e.g., Hospital G) will provide all inpatient services to persons who have
suspected or confirmed TB. The other hospitals have implemented proto-
cols in their ambulatory-care clinics and emergency departments to
identify patients who may have active TB. These patients are then trans-
ferred to Hospital G for inpatient care if such care is considered necessary.
After discharge from Hospital G, they receive follow-up care in the public
health department’s TB clinic. During the preceding year, Hospital E has
identified fewer than six TB patients in its ambulatory-care and emergency
departments and has had no PPD test conversions or other evidence of
M. tuberculosis transmission among HCWs or patients in these areas.
These areas are classified as low risk, and all other areas are classified as
very low risk.
Hospital F. Hospital F is located in a county in which no TB cases have
been reported during the preceding 2 years. A risk assessment conducted
at the facility did not identify any patients who had suspected or confirmed
TB during the preceding year. The facility is classified as minimal risk.
C. Identifying, Evaluating, and Initiating Treatment for Patients Who
May Have Active TB
The most important factors in preventing transmission of M. tuberculosis are
the early identification of patients who may have infectious TB, prompt im-
plementation of TB precautions for such patients, and prompt initiation of
effective treatment for those who are likely to have TB.
1. Identifying patients who may have active TB
• Health-care personnel who are assigned responsibility for TB infection
control in ambulatory-care and inpatient settings should develop, im-
plement, and enforce protocols for the early identification of patients
who may have infectious TB.
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• The criteria used in these protocols should be based on the prevalence
and characteristics of TB in the population served by the specific facility.
These protocols should be evaluated periodically and revised according
to the results of the evaluation. Review of medical records of patients
who were examined in the facility and diagnosed as having TB may
serve as a guide for developing or revising these protocols.
• A diagnosis of TB may be considered for any patient who has a per-
sistent cough (i.e., a cough lasting for ≥3 weeks) or other signs or symp-
toms compatible with active TB (e.g., bloody sputum, night sweats,
weight loss, anorexia, or fever). However, the index of suspicion for TB
will vary in different geographic areas and will depend on the preva-
lence of TB and other characteristics of the population served by the
facility. The index of suspicion for TB should be very high in geographic
areas or among groups of patients in which the prevalence of TB is high
(Section I.B). Appropriate diagnostic measures should be conducted
and TB precautions implemented for patients in whom active TB is sus-
pected.
2. Diagnostic evaluation for active TB
• Diagnostic measures for identifying TB should be conducted for pa-
tients in whom active TB is being considered. These measures include
obtaining a medical history and performing a physical examination,
PPD skin test, chest radiograph, and microscopic examination and cul-
ture of sputum or other appropriate specimens (6,34,35 ). Other
diagnostic procedures (e.g., bronchoscopy or biopsy) may be indicated
for some patients (36,37 ).
• Prompt laboratory results are crucial to the proper treatment of the TB
patient and to early initiation of infection control. To ensure timely re-
sults, laboratories performing mycobacteriologic tests should be
proficient at both the laboratory and administrative aspects of speci-
men processing. Laboratories should use the most rapid methods
available (e.g., fluorescent microscopy for AFB smears; radiometric cul-
ture methods for isolation of mycobacteria; ρ-nitro-α-acetylamino-
β-hydroxy-proprophenone [NAP] test, nucleic acid probes, or high-
pressure liquid chromatography [HPLC] for species identification; and
radiometric methods for drug-susceptibility testing). As other more
rapid or sensitive tests become available, practical, and affordable, such
tests should be incorporated promptly into the mycobacteriology
laboratory. Laboratories that rarely receive specimens for mycobacteri-
ologic analysis should refer the specimens to a laboratory that more
frequently performs these tests.
• Results of AFB sputum smears should be available within 24 hours of
specimen collection (38 ).
• The probability of TB is greater among patients who have positive PPD
test results or a history of positive PPD test results, who have previously
had TB or have been exposed to M. tuberculosis, or who belong to a
group at high risk for TB (Section I.B). Active TB is strongly suggested if
the diagnostic evaluation reveals AFB in sputum, a chest radiograph
suggestive of TB, or symptoms highly suggestive of TB. TB can occur
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simultaneously in immunosuppressed persons who have pulmonary
infections caused by other organisms (e.g., Pneumocystis carinii or
Mycobacterium avium complex) and should be considered in the diag-
nostic evaluation of all patients who have symptoms compatible with
TB (Suppl. 1; Suppl. 2).
• TB may be more difficult to diagnose among persons who have HIV
infection (or other conditions associated with severe suppression of
cell-mediated immunity) because of a nonclassical clinical or radio-
graphic presentation and/or the simultaneous occurrence of other
pulmonary infections (e.g., P. carinii pneumonia and M. avium com-
plex). The difficulty in diagnosing TB in HIV-infected persons may be
further compounded by impaired responses to PPD skin tests (39,40 ),
the possibly lower sensitivity of sputum smears for detecting AFB (41 ),
or the overgrowth of cultures with M. avium complex in specimens
from patients infected with both M. avium complex and M. tuberculo-
sis (42 ).
• Immunosuppressed patients who have pulmonary signs or symptoms
that are ascribed initially to infections or conditions other than TB
should be evaluated initially for coexisting TB. The evaluation for TB
should be repeated if the patient does not respond to appropriate
therapy for the presumed cause(s) of the pulmonary abnormalities
(Suppl. 1; Suppl. 2).
• Patients with suspected or confirmed TB should be reported immedi-
ately to the appropriate public health department so that standard
procedures for identifying and evaluating TB contacts can be initiated.
3. Initiation of treatment for suspected or confirmed TB
• Patients who have confirmed active TB or who are considered highly
likely to have active TB should be started promptly on appropriate treat-
ment in accordance with current guidelines (Suppl. 2) (43 ). In geo-
graphic areas or facilities that have a high prevalence of MDR-TB, the
initial regimen used may need to be enhanced while the results of drug-
susceptibility tests are pending. The decision should be based on
analysis of surveillance data.
• While the patient is in the health-care facility, anti-TB drugs should be
administered by directly observed therapy (DOT), the process by which
an HCW observes the patient swallowing the medications. Continuing
DOT after the patient is discharged should be strongly considered. This
decision and the arrangements for providing outpatient DOT should be
made in collaboration with the public health department.
D. Management of Patients Who May Have Active TB in
Ambulatory-Care Settings and Emergency Departments
• Triage of patients in ambulatory-care settings and emergency departments
should include vigorous efforts to promptly identify patients who have ac-
tive TB. HCWs who are the first points of contact in facilities that serve
populations at risk for TB should be trained to ask questions that will facili-
tate identification of patients with signs and symptoms suggestive of TB.
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• Patients with signs or symptoms suggestive of TB should be evaluated
promptly to minimize the amount of time they are in ambulatory-care ar-
eas. TB precautions should be followed while the diagnostic evaluation is
being conducted for these patients.
• TB precautions in the ambulatory-care setting should include a) placing
these patients in a separate area apart from other patients, and not in open
waiting areas (ideally, in a room or enclosure meeting TB isolation require-
ments); b) giving these patients surgical masks* to wear and instructing
them to keep their masks on; and c) giving these patients tissues and in-
structing them to cover their mouths and noses with the tissues when
coughing or sneezing.
• TB precautions should be followed for patients who are known to have
active TB and who have not completed therapy until a determination has
been made that they are noninfectious (Suppl. 1).
• Patients with active TB who need to attend a health-care clinic should have
appointments scheduled to avoid exposing HIV-infected or otherwise
severely immunocompromised persons to M. tuberculosis. This recom-
mendation could be accomplished by designating certain times of the day
for appointments for these patients or by treating them in areas where
immunocompromised persons are not treated.
• Ventilation in ambulatory-care areas where patients at high risk for TB are
treated should be designed and maintained to reduce the risk for transmis-
sion of M. tuberculosis. General-use areas (e.g., waiting rooms) and
special areas (e.g., treatment or TB isolation rooms in ambulatory areas)
should be ventilated in the same manner as described for similar inpatient
areas (Sections II.E.3, II.F; Suppl. 3). Enhanced general ventilation or the
use of air-disinfection techniques (e.g., UVGI or recirculation of air within
the room through high-efficiency particulate air [HEPA] filters) may be use-
ful in general-use areas of facilities where many infectious TB patients
receive care (Section II.F; Suppl. 3).
• Ideally, ambulatory-care settings in which patients with TB are frequently
examined or treated should have a TB isolation room(s) available. Such
rooms are not necessary in ambulatory-care settings in which patients
who have confirmed or suspected TB are seen infrequently. However,
these facilities should have a written protocol for early identification of pa-
tients with TB symptoms and referral to an area or a collaborating facility
where the patient can be evaluated and managed appropriately. These
protocols should be reviewed on a regular basis and revised as necessary.
The additional guidelines in Section II.H should be followed in ambulatory-
care settings where cough-inducing procedures are performed on patients
who may have active TB.
*Surgical masks are designed to prevent the respiratory secretions of the person wearing the
mask from entering the air. When not in a TB isolation room, patients suspected of having TB
should wear surgical masks to reduce the expulsion of droplet nuclei into the air. These patients
do not need to wear particulate respirators, which are designed to filter the air before it is
inhaled by the person wearing the mask. Patients suspected of having or known to have TB
should never wear a respirator that has an exhalation valve, because the device would provide
no barrier to the expulsion of droplet nuclei into the air.
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E. Management of Hospitalized Patients Who Have Confirmed or
Suspected TB
1. Initiation of isolation for TB
• In hospitals and other inpatient facilities, any patient suspected of hav-
ing or known to have infectious TB should be placed in a TB isolation
room that has currently recommended ventilation characteristics (Sec-
tion II.E.3; Suppl. 3). Written policies for initiating isolation should
specify a) the indications for isolation, b) the person(s) authorized to in-
itiate and discontinue isolation, c) the isolation practices to follow,
d) the monitoring of isolation, e) the management of patients who do
not adhere to isolation practices, and f) the criteria for discontinuing
isolation.
• In rare circumstances, placing more than one TB patient together in the
same room may be acceptable. This practice is sometimes referred to
as “cohorting.” Because of the risk for patients becoming superinfected
with drug-resistant organisms, patients with TB should be placed in the
same room only if all patients involved a) have culture-confirmed TB,
b) have drug-susceptibility test results available on a current specimen
obtained during the present hospitalization, c) have identical drug-
susceptibility patterns on these specimens, and d) are on effective ther-
apy. Having isolates with identical DNA fingerprint patterns is not
adequate evidence for placing two TB patients together in the same
room, because isolates with the same DNA fingerprint pattern can have
different drug-susceptibility patterns.
• Pediatric patients with suspected or confirmed TB should be evaluated
for potential infectiousness according to the same criteria as are adults
(i.e., on the basis of symptoms, sputum AFB smears, radiologic find-
ings, and other criteria) (Suppl. 1). Children who may be infectious
should be placed in isolation until they are determined to be noninfec-
tious. Pediatric patients who may be infectious include those who have
laryngeal or extensive pulmonary involvement, pronounced cough,
positive sputum AFB smears, or cavitary TB or those for whom cough-
inducing procedures are performed (44 ).
• The source of infection for a child with TB is often a member of the
child’s family (45 ). Therefore, parents and other visitors of all pediatric
TB patients should be evaluated for TB as soon as possible. Until they
have been evaluated, or the source case is identified, they should wear
surgical masks when in areas of the facility outside of the child’s room,
and they should refrain from visiting common areas in the facility (e.g.,
the cafeteria or lounge areas).
• TB patients in intensive-care units should be treated the same as pa-
tients in noncritical-care settings. They should be placed in TB isolation
and have respiratory secretions submitted for AFB smear and culture if
they have undiagnosed pulmonary symptoms suggestive of TB.
• If readmitted to a health-care facility, patients who are known to have
active TB and who have not completed therapy should have TB
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precautions applied until a determination has been made that they are
noninfectious (Suppl. 1).
2. TB isolation practices
• Patients who are placed in TB isolation should be educated about the
mechanisms of M. tuberculosis transmission and the reasons for their
being placed in isolation. They should be taught to cover their mouths
and noses with a tissue when coughing or sneezing, even while in the
isolation room, to contain liquid drops and droplets before they are ex-
pelled into the air (46 ).
• Efforts should be made to facilitate patient adherence to isolation meas-
ures (e.g., staying in the TB isolation room). Such efforts might include
the use of incentives (e.g., providing them with telephones, televisions,
or radios in their rooms or allowing special dietary requests). Efforts
should also be made to address other problems that could interfere
with adherence to isolation (e.g., management of the patient’s with-
drawal from addictive substances [including tobacco]).
• Patients placed in isolation should remain in their isolation rooms with
the door closed. If possible, diagnostic and treatment procedures
should be performed in the isolation rooms to avoid transporting pa-
tients through other areas of the facility. If patients who may have
infectious TB must be transported outside their isolation rooms for
medically essential procedures that cannot be performed in the isola-
tion rooms, they should wear surgical masks that cover their mouths
and noses during transport. Persons transporting the patients do not
need to wear respiratory protection outside the TB isolation rooms. Pro-
cedures for these patients should be scheduled at times when they can
be performed rapidly and when waiting areas are less crowded.
• Treatment and procedure rooms in which patients who have infectious
TB or who have an undiagnosed pulmonary disease and are at high risk
for active TB receive care should meet the ventilation recommendations
for isolation rooms (Section II.E.3; Suppl. 3). Ideally, facilities in which
TB patients are frequently treated should have an area in the radiology
department that is ventilated separately for TB patients. If this is not
possible, TB patients should wear surgical masks and should stay in the
radiology suite the minimum amount of time possible, then be returned
promptly to their isolation rooms.
• The number of persons entering an isolation room should be minimal.
All persons who enter an isolation room should wear respiratory pro-
tection (Section II.G; Suppl. 4). The patient’s visitors should be given
respirators to wear while in the isolation room, and they should be
given general instructions on how to use their respirators.
• Disposable items contaminated with respiratory secretions are not as-
sociated with transmission of M. tuberculosis. However, for general
infection-control purposes, these items should be handled and trans-
ported in a manner that reduces the risk for transmitting other
microorganisms to patients, HCWs, and visitors and that decreases en-
vironmental contamination in the health-care facility. Such items
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should be disposed of in accordance with hospital policy and applicable
regulations (Suppl. 5).
3. The TB isolation room
• TB isolation rooms should be single-patient rooms with special ventila-
tion characteristics appropriate for the purposes of isolation (Suppl. 3).
The primary purposes of TB isolation rooms are to a) separate patients
who are likely to have infectious TB from other persons; b) provide an
environment that will allow reduction of the concentration of droplet
nuclei through various engineering methods; and c) prevent the escape
of droplet nuclei from the TB isolation room and treatment room, thus
preventing entry of M. tuberculosis into the corridor and other areas of
the facility.
• To prevent the escape of droplet nuclei, the TB isolation room should be
maintained under negative pressure (Suppl. 3). Doors to isolation
rooms should be kept closed, except when patients or personnel must
enter or exit the room, so that negative pressure can be maintained.
• Negative pressure in the room should be monitored daily while the
room is being used for TB isolation.
• The American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning
Engineers, Inc. (ASHRAE) (47 ), the American Institute of Architects
(AIA) (48 ), and the Health Resources and Services Administration (49 )
recommend a minimum of 6 air changes per hour (ACH) for TB isolation
and treatment rooms. This ventilation rate is based on comfort and
odor control considerations. The effectiveness of this level of airflow in
reducing the concentration of droplet nuclei in the room, thus reducing
the transmission of airborne pathogens, has not been evaluated directly
or adequately.
Ventilation rates of >6 ACH are likely to produce an incrementally
greater reduction in the concentration of bacteria in a room than are
lower rates (50–52 ). However, accurate quantitation of decreases in risk
that would result from specific increases in general ventilation levels
has not been performed and may not be possible. 
For the purposes of reducing the concentration of droplet nuclei, TB iso-
lation and treatment rooms in existing health-care facilities should have
an airflow of ≥6 ACH. Where feasible, this airflow rate should be in-
creased to ≥12 ACH by adjusting or modifying the ventilation system or
by using auxiliary means (e.g., recirculation of air through fixed HEPA
filtration systems or portable air cleaners) (Suppl. 3, Section II.B.5.a)
(53 ). New construction or renovation of existing health-care facilities
should be designed so that TB isolation rooms achieve an airflow of
≥12 ACH.
• Air from TB isolation rooms and treatment rooms used to treat patients
who have known or suspected infectious TB should be exhausted to the
outside in accordance with applicable federal, state, and local regula-
tions. The air should not be recirculated into the general ventilation. In
some instances, recirculation of air into the general ventilation system
from such rooms is unavoidable (i.e., in existing facilities in which the
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ventilation system or facility configuration makes venting the exhaust
to the outside impossible). In such cases, HEPA filters should be in-
stalled in the exhaust duct leading from the room to the general
ventilation system to remove infectious organisms and particulates the
size of droplet nuclei from the air before it is returned to the general
ventilation system (Section II.F; Suppl. 3). Air from TB isolation and
treatment rooms in new or renovated facilities should not be recircu-
lated into the general ventilation system.
• Although not required, an anteroom may increase the effectiveness of
the isolation room by minimizing the potential escape of droplet nuclei
into the corridor when the door is opened. To work effectively, the ante-
room should have positive air pressure in relation to the isolation room.
The pressure relationship between the anteroom and the corridor may
vary according to ventilation design.
• Upper-room air UVGI may be used as an adjunct to general ventilation
in the isolation room (Section II.F; Suppl. 3). Air in the isolation room
may be recirculated within the room through HEPA filters or UVGI de-
vices to increase the effective ACH and to increase thermal efficiency.
• Health-care facilities should have enough isolation rooms to appropri-
ately isolate all patients who have suspected or confirmed active TB.
This number should be estimated using the results of the risk assess-
ment of the health-care facility. Except for minimal- and very low-risk
health-care facilities, all acute-care inpatient facilities should have at
least one TB isolation room (Section II.B).
• Grouping isolation rooms together in one area of the facility may re-
duce the possibility of transmitting M. tuberculosis to other patients
and may facilitate care of TB patients and the installation and mainte-
nance of optimal engineering (particularly ventilation) controls.
4. Discontinuation of TB isolation
• TB isolation can be discontinued if the diagnosis of TB is ruled out. For
some patients, TB can be ruled out when another diagnosis is con-
firmed. If a diagnosis of TB cannot be ruled out, the patient should
remain in isolation until a determination has been made that the patient
is noninfectious. However, patients can be discharged from the health-
care facility while still potentially infectious if appropriate postdischarge
arrangements can be ensured (Section II.E.5).
• The length of time required for a TB patient to become noninfectious
after starting anti-TB therapy varies considerably (Suppl. 1). Isolation
should be discontinued only when the patient is on effective therapy, is
improving clinically, and has had three consecutive negative sputum
AFB smears collected on different days.
• Hospitalized patients who have active TB should be monitored for re-
lapse by having sputum AFB smears examined regularly (e.g., every
2 weeks). Nonadherence to therapy (i.e., failure to take medications as
prescribed) and the presence of drug-resistant organisms are the two
most common reasons why patients remain infectious despite treat-
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ment. These reasons should be considered if a patient does not respond
clinically to therapy within 2–3 weeks.
• Continued isolation throughout the hospitalization should be strongly
considered for patients who have MDR-TB because of the tendency for
treatment failure or relapse (i.e., difficulty in maintaining noninfectious-
ness) that has been observed in such cases.
5. Discharge planning
• Before a TB patient is discharged from the health-care facility, the facil-
ity’s staff and public health authorities should collaborate to ensure
continuation of therapy. Discharge planning in the health-care facility
should include, at a minimum, a) a confirmed outpatient appointment
with the provider who will manage the patient until the patient is cured,
b) sufficient medication to take until the outpatient appointment, and
c) placement into case management (e.g., DOT) or outreach programs
of the public health department. These plans should be initiated and in
place before the patient’s discharge.
• Patients who may be infectious at the time of discharge should only be
discharged to facilities that have isolation capability or to their homes.
Plans for discharging a patient who will return home must consider
whether all the household members were infected previously and
whether any uninfected household members are at very high risk for
active TB if infected (e.g., children <4 years of age or persons infected
with HIV or otherwise severely immunocompromised). If the household
does include such persons, arrangements should be made to prevent
them from being exposed to the TB patient until a determination has
been made that the patient is noninfectious.
F. Engineering Control Recommendations
1. General ventilation
This section deals only with engineering controls for general-use areas of
health-care facilities (e.g., waiting-room areas and emergency depart-
ments). Recommendations for engineering controls for specific areas of
the facility (e.g., TB isolation rooms) are contained in the sections encom-
passing those areas. Details regarding ventilation design, evaluation, and
supplemental approaches are described in Supplement 3.
• Health-care facilities should either a) include as part of their staff an en-
gineer or other professional with expertise in ventilation or b) have this
expertise available from a consultant who is an expert in ventilation en-
gineering and who also has hospital experience. These persons should
work closely with infection-control staff to assist in controlling airborne
infections.
• Ventilation system designs in health-care facilities should meet any ap-
plicable federal, state, and local requirements.
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• The direction of airflow in health-care facilities should be designed, con-
structed, and maintained so that air flows from clean areas to less-clean
areas.
• Health-care facilities serving populations that have a high prevalence of
TB may need to supplement the general ventilation or use additional
engineering approaches (i.e., HEPA filtration or UVGI) in general-use ar-
eas where TB patients are likely to go (e.g., waiting-room areas,
emergency departments, and radiology suites). A single-pass, nonrecir-
culating system that exhausts air to the outside, a recirculation system
that passes air through HEPA filters before recirculating it to the general
ventilation system, or upper air UVGI may be used in such areas.
2. Additional engineering control approaches
a. HEPA filtration
HEPA filters may be used in a number of ways to reduce or eliminate
infectious droplet nuclei from room air or exhaust (Suppl. 3). These
methods include placement of HEPA filters a) in exhaust ducts discharg-
ing air from booths or enclosures into the surrounding room; b) in ducts
or in ceiling- or wall-mounted units, for recirculation of air within an
individual room (fixed recirculation systems); c) in portable air cleaners;
d) in exhaust ducts to remove droplet nuclei from air being discharged
to the outside, either directly or through ventilation equipment; and
e) in ducts discharging air from the TB isolation room into the general
ventilation system. In any application, HEPA filters should be installed
carefully and maintained meticulously to ensure adequate functioning.
The manufacturers of in-room air cleaning equipment should provide
documentation of the HEPA filter efficiency and the efficiency of the de-
vice in lowering room air contaminant levels.
b. UVGI
For general-use areas in which the risk for transmission of M. tubercu-
losis is relatively high, UVGI lamps may be used as an adjunct to
ventilation for reducing the concentration of infectious droplet nuclei
(Suppl. 3), although the effectiveness of such units has not been evalu-
ated adequately. Ultraviolet (UV) units can be installed in a room or
corridor to irradiate the air in the upper portion of the room (i.e., upper-
room air irradiation), or they can be installed in ducts to irradiate air
passing through the ducts. UV units installed in ducts should not be
substituted for HEPA filters in ducts that discharge air from TB isolation
rooms into the general ventilation system. However, UV units can be
used in ducts that recirculate air back into the same room.
To function properly and decrease hazards to HCWs and others in the
health-care facility, UV lamps should be installed properly and main-
tained adequately, which includes the monitoring of irradiance levels.
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UV tubes should be changed according to the manufacturer’s instruc-
tions or when meter readings indicate tube failure. An employee trained
in the use and handling of UV lamps should be responsible for these
measures and for keeping maintenance records. Applicable safety
guidelines should be followed. Caution should be exercised to protect
HCWs, patients, visitors, and others from excessive exposure to UV ra-
diation.
G. Respiratory Protection
• Personal respiratory protection should be used by a) persons entering
rooms in which patients with known or suspected infectious TB are being
isolated, b) persons present during cough-inducing or aerosol-generating
procedures performed on such patients, and c) persons in other settings
where administrative and engineering controls are not likely to protect
them from inhaling infectious airborne droplet nuclei (Suppl. 4). These
other settings include transporting patients who may have infectious TB in
emergency transport vehicles and providing urgent surgical or dental care
to patients who may have infectious TB before a determination has been
made that the patient is noninfectious (Suppl. 1).
• Respiratory protective devices used in health-care settings for protection
against M. tuberculosis should meet the following standard performance
criteria:
1. The ability to filter particles 1 µm in size in the unloaded* state with a
filter efficiency of ≥95% (i.e., filter leakage of ≤5%), given flow rates of up
to 50 L per minute.
2. The ability to be qualitatively or quantitatively fit tested in a reliable way
to obtain a face-seal leakage of ≤10% (54,55 ).
3. The ability to fit the different facial sizes and characteristics of HCWs,
which can usually be met by making the respirators available in at least
three sizes.
4. The ability to be checked for facepiece fit, in accordance with standards
established by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
and good industrial hygiene practice, by HCWs each time they put on their
respirators (54,55 ).
• The facility’s risk assessment may identify a limited number of selected
settings (e.g., bronchoscopy performed on patients suspected of having
TB or autopsy performed on deceased persons suspected of having had
active TB at the time of death) where the estimated risk for transmission of
M. tuberculosis may be such that a level of respiratory protection exceed-
ing the standard performance criteria is appropriate. In such circum-
stances, a level of respiratory protection exceeding the standard criteria
and compatible with patient-care delivery (e.g., more protective negative-
pressure respirators; powered air-purifying particulate respirators
[PAPRs]; or positive-pressure air-line, half-mask respirators) should be
*Some filters become more efficient as they become loaded with dust. Health-care settings do
not have enough dust in the air to load a filter on a respirator. Therefore, the filter efficiency
for respirators used in health-care settings must be determined in the unloaded state.
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provided by employers to HCWs who are exposed to M. tuberculosis. In-
formation on these and other respirators is in the NIOSH Guide to
Industrial Respiratory Protection (55 ) and in Supplement 4 of this docu-
ment.
• In some settings, HCWs may be at risk for two types of exposure: a) inha-
lation of M. tuberculosis and b) mucous membrane exposure to fluids that
may contain bloodborne pathogens. In these settings, protection against
both types of exposure should be used.
• When operative procedures (or other procedures requiring a sterile field)
are performed on patients who may have infectious TB, respiratory protec-
tion worn by the HCW should serve two functions: a) it should protect the
surgical field from the respiratory secretions of the HCW, and b) it should
protect the HCW from infectious droplet nuclei that may be expelled by the
patient or generated by the procedure. Respirators with exhalation valves
and most positive-pressure respirators do not protect the sterile field.
• Health-care facilities in which respiratory protection is used to prevent in-
halation of M. tuberculosis are required by OSHA to develop, implement,
and maintain a respiratory protection program (Suppl. 4). All HCWs who
use respiratory protection should be included in this program. Visitors to
TB patients should be given respirators to wear while in isolation rooms,
and they should be given general instructions on how to use their respira-
tors.
• Facilities that do not have isolation rooms and do not perform cough-
inducing procedures on patients who may have TB may not need to have
a respiratory protection program for TB. However, such facilities should
have written protocols for the early identification of patients who have
signs or symptoms of TB and procedures for referring these patients to a
facility where they can be evaluated and managed appropriately. These
protocols should be evaluated regularly and revised as needed.
• Surgical masks are designed to prevent the respiratory secretions of the
person wearing the mask from entering the air. To reduce the expulsion of
droplet nuclei into the air, patients suspected of having TB should wear
surgical masks when not in TB isolation rooms. These patients do not need
to wear particulate respirators, which are designed to filter the air before it
is inhaled by the person wearing the respirator. Patients suspected of hav-
ing or known to have TB should never wear a respirator that has an
exhalation valve, because this type of respirator does not prevent expul-
sion of droplet nuclei into the air.
H. Cough-Inducing and Aerosol-Generating Procedures
1. General guidelines
Procedures that involve instrumentation of the lower respiratory tract or
induce coughing can increase the likelihood of droplet nuclei being ex-
pelled into the air. These cough-inducing procedures include endotracheal
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intubation and suctioning, diagnostic sputum induction, aerosol treat-
ments (e.g., pentamidine therapy), and bronchoscopy. Other procedures
that can generate aerosols (e.g., irrigation of tuberculous abscesses, ho-
mogenizing or lyophilizing tissue, or other processing of tissue that may
contain tubercle bacilli) are also covered by these recommendations.
• Cough-inducing procedures should not be performed on patients who
may have infectious TB unless the procedures are absolutely necessary
and can be performed with appropriate precautions.
• All cough-inducing procedures performed on patients who may have
infectious TB should be performed using local exhaust ventilation de-
vices (e.g., booths or special enclosures) or, if this is not feasible, in a
room that meets the ventilation requirements for TB isolation.
• HCWs should wear respiratory protection when present in rooms or en-
closures in which cough-inducing procedures are being performed on
patients who may have infectious TB.
• After completion of cough-inducing procedures, patients who may
have infectious TB should remain in their isolation rooms or enclosures
and not return to common waiting areas until coughing subsides. They
should be given tissues and instructed to cover their mouths and noses
with the tissues when coughing. If TB patients must recover from seda-
tives or anesthesia after a procedure (e.g, after a bronchoscopy), they
should be placed in separate isolation rooms (and not in recovery
rooms with other patients) while they are being monitored.
• Before the booth, enclosure, or room is used for another patient,
enough time should be allowed to pass for at least 99% of airborne con-
taminants to be removed. This time will vary according to the efficiency
of the ventilation or filtration used (Suppl. 3, Table S3-1).
2. Special considerations for bronchoscopy
• If performing bronchoscopy in positive-pressure rooms (e.g., operating
rooms) is unavoidable, TB should be ruled out as a diagnosis before the
procedure is performed. If the bronchoscopy is being performed for the
purpose of diagnosing pulmonary disease and that diagnosis could in-
clude TB, the procedure should be performed in a room that meets TB
isolation ventilation requirements.
3. Special considerations for the administration of aerosolized pentamidine
• Patients should be screened for active TB before prophylactic therapy
with aerosolized pentamidine is initiated. Screening should include ob-
taining a medical history and performing skin testing and chest
radiography.
• Before each subsequent treatment with aerosolized pentamidine, pa-
tients should be screened for symptoms suggestive of TB (e.g.,
development of a productive cough). If such symptoms are elicited, a
diagnostic evaluation for TB should be initiated.
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• Patients who have suspected or confirmed active TB should take, if
clinically practical, oral prophylaxis for P. carinii pneumonia.
I. Education and Training of HCWs
All HCWs, including physicians, should receive education regarding TB that is
relevant to persons in their particular occupational group. Ideally, training
should be conducted before initial assignment, and the need for additional
training should be reevaluated periodically (e.g., once a year). The level and
detail of this education will vary according to the HCW’s work responsibilities
and the level of risk in the facility (or area of the facility) in which the HCW
works. However, the program may include the following elements: 
• The basic concepts of M. tuberculosis transmission, pathogenesis, and di-
agnosis, including information concerning the difference between latent
TB infection and active TB disease, the signs and symptoms of TB, and the
possibility of reinfection.
• The potential for occupational exposure to persons who have infectious
TB in the health-care facility, including information concerning the preva-
lence of TB in the community and facility, the ability of the facility to
properly isolate patients who have active TB, and situations with increased
risk for exposure to M. tuberculosis.
• The principles and practices of infection control that reduce the risk for
transmission of M. tuberculosis, including information concerning the hi-
erarchy of TB infection-control measures and the written policies and
procedures of the facility. Site-specific control measures should be pro-
vided to HCWs working in areas that require control measures in addition
to those of the basic TB infection-control program.
• The purpose of PPD skin testing, the significance of a positive PPD test
result, and the importance of participating in the skin-test program.
• The principles of preventive therapy for latent TB infection. These princi-
ples include the indications, use, effectiveness, and the potential adverse
effects of the drugs (Suppl. 2).
• The HCW’s responsibility to seek prompt medical evaluation if a PPD test
conversion occurs or if symptoms develop that could be caused by TB.
Medical evaluation will enable HCWs who have TB to receive appropriate
therapy and will help to prevent transmission of M. tuberculosis to pa-
tients and other HCWs.
• The principles of drug therapy for active TB.
• The importance of notifying the facility if the HCW is diagnosed with active
TB so that contact investigation procedures can be initiated.
• The responsibilities of the facility to maintain the confidentiality of the
HCW while ensuring that the HCW who has TB receives appropriate ther-
apy and is noninfectious before returning to duty.
• The higher risks associated with TB infection in persons who have HIV in-
fection or other causes of severely impaired cell-mediated immunity,
including a) the more frequent and rapid development of clinical TB after
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infection with M. tuberculosis, b) the differences in the clinical presenta-
tion of disease, and c) the high mortality rate associated with MDR-TB in
such persons.
• The potential development of cutaneous anergy as immune function (as
measured by CD4+ T-lymphocyte counts) declines.
• Information regarding the efficacy and safety of BCG vaccination and the
principles of PPD screening among BCG recipients.
• The facility’s policy on voluntary work reassignment options for immuno-
compromised HCWs.
J. HCW Counseling, Screening, and Evaluation
A TB counseling, screening, and prevention program for HCWs should be es-
tablished to protect both HCWs and patients. HCWs who have positive PPD
test results, PPD test conversions, or symptoms suggestive of TB should be
identified, evaluated to rule out a diagnosis of active TB, and started on ther-
apy or preventive therapy if indicated (5 ). In addition, the results of the HCW
PPD screening program will contribute to evaluation of the effectiveness of
current infection-control practices.
1. Counseling HCWs regarding TB
• Because of the increased risk for rapid progression from latent TB infec-
tion to active TB in HIV-infected or otherwise severely immuno-
compromised persons, all HCWs should know if they have a medical
condition or are receiving a medical treatment that may lead to severely
impaired cell-mediated immunity. HCWs who may be at risk for HIV in-
fection should know their HIV status (i.e., they should be encouraged to
voluntarily seek counseling and testing for HIV antibody status). Exist-
ing guidelines for counseling and testing should be followed
routinely (56 ). Knowledge of these conditions allows the HCW to seek
the appropriate preventive measures outlined in this document and to
consider voluntary work reassignments. Of particular importance is that
HCWs need to know their HIV status if they are at risk for HIV infection
and they work in settings where patients who have drug-resistant TB
may be encountered.
• All HCWs should be informed about the need to follow existing recom-
mendations for infection control to minimize the risk for exposure to
infectious agents; implementation of these recommendations will
greatly reduce the risk for occupational infections among HCWs (57 ).
All HCWs should also be informed about the potential risks to severely
immunocompromised persons associated with caring for patients who
have some infectious diseases, including TB. It should be emphasized
that limiting exposure to TB patients is the most protective measure
that severely immunosuppressed HCWs can take to avoid becoming in-
fected with M. tuberculosis. HCWs who have severely impaired
cell-mediated immunity and who may be exposed to M. tuberculosis
may consider a change in job setting to avoid such exposure. HCWs
should be advised of the option that severely immunocompromised
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HCWs can choose to transfer voluntarily to areas and work activities in
which there is the lowest possible risk for exposure to M. tuberculosis.
This choice should be a personal decision for HCWs after they have
been informed of the risks to their health.
• Employers should make reasonable accommodations (e.g., alternative
job assignments) for employees who have a health condition that com-
promises cell-mediated immunity and who work in settings where they
may be exposed to M. tuberculosis. HCWs who are known to be immu-
nocompromised should be referred to employee health professionals
who can individually counsel the employees regarding their risk for TB.
Upon the request of the immunocompromised HCW, employers should
offer, but not compel, a work setting in which the HCW would have the
lowest possible risk for occupational exposure to M. tuberculosis.
Evaluation of these situations should also include consideration of the
provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990* and other
applicable federal, state, and local laws.
• All HCWs should be informed that immunosuppressed HCWs should
have appropriate follow-up and screening for infectious diseases, in-
cluding TB, provided by their medical practitioner. HCWs who are
known to be HIV-infected or otherwise severely immunosuppressed
should be tested for cutaneous anergy at the time of PPD testing
(Suppl. 2). Consideration should be given to retesting, at least every 6
months, those immunocompromised HCWs who are potentially ex-
posed to M. tuberculosis because of the high risk for rapid progression
to active TB if they become infected.
• Information provided by HCWs regarding their immune status should
be treated confidentially. If the HCW requests voluntary job reassign-
ment, the confidentiality of the HCW should be maintained. Facilities
should have written procedures on confidential handling of such infor-
mation.
2. Screening HCWs for active TB
• Any HCW who has a persistent cough (i.e., a cough lasting ≥3 weeks),
especially in the presence of other signs or symptoms compatible with
active TB (e.g., weight loss, night sweats, bloody sputum, anorexia, or
fever), should be evaluated promptly for TB. The HCW should not return
to the workplace until a diagnosis of TB has been excluded or until the
HCW is on therapy and a determination has been made that the HCW is
noninfectious.
3. Screening HCWs for latent TB infection
• The risk assessment should identify which HCWs have potential for ex-
posure to M. tuberculosis and the frequency with which the exposure
may occur. This information is used to determine which HCWs to in-
clude in the skin-testing program and the frequency with which they
should be tested (Table 2).
*Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990. PL 101-336, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.
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• If HCWs are from risks groups with increased prevalence of TB, consid-
eration may be given to including them in the skin-testing program,
even if they do not have potential occupational exposure to M. tubercu-
losis, so that converters can be identified and preventive therapy
offered.
• Administrators of health-care facilities should ensure that physicians
and other personnel not paid by, but working in, the facility receive skin
testing at appropriate intervals for their occupational group and work
location.
• During the pre-employment physical or when applying for hospital
privileges, HCWs who have potential for exposure to M. tuberculosis
(Table 2), including those with a history of BCG vaccination, should
have baseline PPD skin testing performed (Suppl. 2). For HCWs who
have not had a documented negative PPD test result during the preced-
ing 12 months, the baseline PPD testing should employ the two-step
method; this will detect boosting phenomena that might be misinter-
preted as a skin-test conversion. Decisions concerning the use of the
two-step procedure for baseline testing in a particular facility should be
based on the frequency of boosting in that facility.
• HCWs who have a documented history of a positive PPD test, adequate
treatment for disease, or adequate preventive therapy for infection,
should be exempt from further PPD screening unless they develop
signs or symptoms suggestive of TB.
• PPD-negative HCWs should undergo repeat PPD testing at regular inter-
vals as determined by the risk assessment (Section II.B). In addition,
these HCWs should be tested whenever they have been exposed to a
TB patient and appropriate precautions were not observed at the time
of exposure (Section II.K.3). Performing PPD testing of HCWs who work
in the same area or occupational group on different scheduled dates
(e.g., test them on their birthdays or on their employment anniversary
dates), rather than testing all HCWs in the area or group on the same
day, may lead to earlier detection of M. tuberculosis transmission.
• All PPD tests should be administered, read, and interpreted in accord-
ance with current guidelines by specified trained personnel (Suppl. 2).
At the time their test results are read, HCWs should be informed about
the interpretation of both positive and negative PPD test results. This
information should indicate that the interpretation of an induration that
is 5–9 mm in diameter depends on the HCW’s immune status and his-
tory of exposure to persons who have infectious TB. Specifically, HCWs
who have indurations of 5–9 mm in diameter should be advised that
such results may be considered positive for HCWs who are contacts of
persons with infectious TB or who have HIV infection or other causes of
severe immunosuppression (e.g., immunosuppressive therapy for or-
gan transplantation). 
• When an HCW who is not assigned regularly to a single work area has
a PPD test conversion, appropriate personnel should identify the areas
where the HCW worked during the time when infection was likely to
have occurred. This information can then be considered in analyzing
the risk for transmission in those areas.
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• In any area of the facility where transmission of M. tuberculosis is
known to have occurred, a problem evaluation should be conducted
(Section II.K), and the frequency of skin testing should be determined
according to the applicable risk category (Section II.B).
• PPD test results should be recorded confidentially in the individual
HCW’s employee health record and in an aggregate database of all
HCW PPD test results. The database can be analyzed periodically to es-
timate the risk for acquiring new infection in specific areas or
occupational groups in the facility.
4. Evaluation and management of HCWs who have positive PPD test
results or active TB
a. Evaluation
• All HCWs with newly recognized positive PPD test results or PPD test
conversions should be evaluated promptly for active TB. This evalu-
ation should include a clinical examination and a chest radiograph. If
the history, clinical examination, or chest radiograph is compatible
with active TB, additional tests should be performed (Section II.C.2).
If symptoms compatible with TB are present, the HCW should be ex-
cluded from the workplace until either a) a diagnosis of active TB is
ruled out or b) a diagnosis of active TB was established, the HCW is
being treated, and a determination has been made that the HCW
is noninfectious (Suppl. 2). HCWs who do not have active TB should
be evaluated for preventive therapy according to published guide-
lines (Suppl. 2).
• If an HCW’s PPD test result converts to positive, a history of con-
firmed or suspected TB exposure should be obtained in an attempt
to determine the potential source. When the source of exposure is
known, the drug-susceptibility pattern of the M. tuberculosis isolated
from the source should be identified so that the correct curative or
preventive therapy can be initiated for the HCW with the PPD test
conversion. The drug-susceptibility pattern should be recorded in
the HCW’s medical record, where it will be available if the HCW sub-
sequently develops active TB and needs therapy specific for the
drug-susceptibility pattern.
• All HCWs, including those with histories of positive PPD test results,
should be reminded periodically about the symptoms of TB and the
need for prompt evaluation of any pulmonary symptoms suggestive
of TB.
b. Routine and follow-up chest radiographs
• Routine chest radiographs are not required for asymptomatic, PPD-
negative HCWs. HCWs with positive PPD test results should have a
chest radiograph as part of the initial evaluation of their PPD test; if
negative, repeat chest radiographs are not needed unless symptoms
develop that could be attributed to TB (58 ). However, more frequent
monitoring for symptoms of TB may be considered for recent con-
verters and other PPD-positive HCWs who are at increased risk for
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• HCWs with pulmonary or laryngeal TB pose a risk to patients and
other HCWs while they are infectious, and they should be ex-
cluded from the workplace until they are noninfectious. The same
work restrictions apply to all HCWs regardless of their immune
status.
• Before the HCW who has TB can return to the workplace, the
health-care facility should have documentation from the HCW’s
health-care provider that the HCW is receiving adequate therapy,
the cough has resolved, and the HCW has had three consecutive
negative sputum smears collected on different days. After work
duties are resumed and while the HCW remains on anti-TB ther-
apy, facility staff should receive periodic documentation from the
HCW’s health-care provider that the HCW is being maintained on
effective drug therapy for the recommended time period and that
the sputum AFB smears continue to be negative.
• HCWs with active laryngeal or pulmonary TB who discontinue
treatment before they are cured should be evaluated promptly for
infectiousness. If the evaluation determines that they are still in-
fectious, they should be excluded from the workplace until
treatment has been resumed, an adequate response to therapy
has been documented, and three more consecutive sputum AFB
smears collected on different days have been negative.
• HCWs who have TB at sites other than the lung or larynx usually
do not need to be excluded from the workplace if a diagnosis of
concurrent pulmonary TB has been ruled out.
2) Latent TB infection
• HCWs receiving preventive treatment for latent TB infection
should not be restricted from their usual work activities.
• HCWs with latent TB infection who cannot take or who do not ac-
cept or complete a full course of preventive therapy should not be
excluded from the workplace. These HCWs should be counseled
about the risk for developing active TB and instructed regularly to
seek prompt evaluation if signs or symptoms develop that could
be caused by TB.
K. Problem Evaluation
Epidemiologic investigations may be indicated for several situations. These
include, but are not limited to, a) the occurrence of PPD test conversions or
active TB in HCWs; b) the occurrence of possible person-to-person transmis-
sion of M. tuberculosis; and c) situations in which patients or HCWs with
active TB are not promptly identified and isolated, thus exposing other
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persons in the facility to M. tuberculosis. The general objectives of the epi-
demiologic investigations in these situations are as follows:
1) to determine the likelihood that transmission of and infection with M. tu-
berculosis has occurred in the facility;
2) to determine the extent to which M. tuberculosis has been transmitted;
3) to identify those persons who have been exposed and infected, enabling
them to receive appropriate clinical management;
4) to identify factors that could have contributed to transmission and infec-
tion and to implement appropriate interventions; and
5) to evaluate the effectiveness of any interventions that are implemented
and to ensure that exposure to and transmission of M. tuberculosis have
been terminated.
The exact circumstances of these situations are likely to vary considerably,
and the associated epidemiologic investigations should be tailored to the in-
dividual circumstances. The following sections provide general guidance for
conducting these investigations.
1. Investigating PPD test conversions and active TB in HCWs
a. Investigating PPD test conversions in HCWs
PPD test conversions may be detected in HCWs as a result of a contact
investigation, in which case the probable source of exposure and trans-
mission is already known (Section II.K.3.), or as a result of routine
screening, in which case the probable source of exposure and infection
is not already known and may not be immediately apparent.
If a skin-test conversion in an HCW is identified as part of routine
screening, the following steps should be considered (Figure 2):
• The HCW should be evaluated promptly for active TB. The initial
evaluation should include a thorough history, physical examination,
and chest radiograph. On the basis of the initial evaluation, other di-
agnostic procedures (e.g., sputum examination) may be indicated.
• If appropriate, the HCW should be placed on preventive or curative
therapy in accordance with current guidelines (Suppl. 2) (5 ).
• A history of possible exposure to M. tuberculosis should be obtained
from the HCW to determine the most likely source of infection. When
the source of infection is known, the drug-susceptibility pattern of
the M. tuberculosis isolate from the source patient should be identi-
fied to determine appropriate preventive or curative therapy
regimens.
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• If the history suggests that the HCW was exposed to and infected
with M. tuberculosis outside the facility, no further epidemiologic in-
vestigation to identify a source in the facility is necessary.
• If the history does not suggest that the HCW was exposed and in-
fected outside the facility but does identify a probable source of
exposure in the facility, contacts of the suspected source patient
should be identified and evaluated. Possible reasons for the expo-
sure and transmission should be evaluated (Table 4), interventions
should be implemented to correct these causes, and PPD testing of
PPD-negative HCWs should be performed immediately and repeated
after 3 months.
If no additional PPD test conversions are detected on follow-up test-
ing, the investigation can be terminated.
If additional PPD test conversions are detected on follow-up testing,
the possible reasons for exposure and transmission should be reas-
sessed, the appropriateness of and degree of adherence to the
interventions implemented should be evaluated, and PPD testing of
PPD-negative HCWs should be repeated after another 3 months.
If no additional PPD test conversions are detected on the second
round of follow-up testing, the investigation can be terminated. How-
ever, if additional PPD conversions are detected on the second round
of follow-up testing, a high-risk protocol should be implemented in
the affected area or occupational group, and the public health de-
partment or other persons with expertise in TB infection control
should be consulted.
• If the history does not suggest that the HCW was exposed to and
infected with M. tuberculosis outside the facility and does not iden-
tify a probable source of exposure in the facility, further investigation
to identify the probable source patient in the facility is warranted.
The interval during which the HCW could have been infected should
be estimated. Generally, this would be the interval from 10 weeks
before the most recent negative PPD test through 2 weeks before the
first positive PPD test (i.e., the conversion).
Laboratory and infection-control records should be reviewed to iden-
tify all patients or HCWs who have suspected or confirmed infectious
TB and who could have transmitted M. tuberculosis to the HCW.
If this process does identify a likely source patient, contacts of the
suspected source patient should be identified and evaluated, and
possible reasons for the exposure and transmission should be evalu-
ated (Table 4). Interventions should be implemented to correct these
causes, and PPD testing of PPD-negative HCWs should be repeated
after 3 months. However, if this process does not identify a probable
source case, PPD screening results of other HCWs in the same area
or occupational group should be reviewed for additional evidence of
M. tuberculosis transmission. If sufficient additional PPD screening
results are not available, appropriate personnel should consider con-
ducting additional PPD screening of other HCWs in the same area or
occupational group.








PPD test conversion in HCW
1.  Evaluate HCW for active tuberculosis (TB).
2.  Determine need for preventive or curative therapy.
3.  Obtain history of possible TB exposure.





Probable exposure to Mycobacterium tuberculosis outside of facility?
Recognized exposure to M. tuberculosis in facility?
Review laboratory and infection control
records to identify patients who have TB.
1.  Identify and evaluate contacts of
the suspected source patient.
2.  Evaluate possible reasons for
exposure and transmission.
3.  Implement interventions.
4.  Repeat PPDs and evaluation
after 3 mos.
Match patients who have TB and HCW
PPD conversion, by time and location.
1.  Review PPD screening results of other
HCWs in same area (or occupational group).
2.  Consider additional PPD testing.
Probable source patient(s) identified?
No further investigation
necessary in facility.
FIGURE 2. Protocol for investigating purified protein derivative (PPD)-tuberculin skin-test conversions in health-care
workers (HCWs)
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Other PPD conversions detected?
Potential problem identified?
1.  Implement intervention(s) to
correct problem.
2.  Repeat PPDs and evaluation
after 3 mos.
1.  Reassess possible reasons for
exposure and transmission.
2.  Reassess interventions.
3.  Repeat PPDs and evaluation
after 3 mos.
1.  Implement high-risk protocol for area (or occupational group).
2.  Obtain consultation.





Nosocomial transmission more likely: evaluate
patient detection process, TB infection control
practices,  and engineering controls.
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TABLE 4. Examples of potential problems that can occur when identifying or isolating patients who may have infectious
tuberculosis (TB)
Situation Potential problem Intervention
Patient with signs or symptoms not identified. Review triage procedures, facilities, and practices.
Patient had no symptoms listed in triage protocol. Reevaluate triage protocol.
Positive smear: results available >24 hours* after
submitted.
Change laboratory practices. Assess potential barriers. Explore
alternatives.
Positive smear: results available but action not taken
promptly.
Educate appropriate personnel. Review protocol for
management of positive smear results.
Positive culture: results not available for >3 weeks.* Change laboratory practices. Assess potential barriers. Explore
alternatives.
Positive culture: results available but action not taken
promptly.
Educate appropriate personnel. Review protocol for
management of positive culture results.
Positive culture: susceptibility results not available
for >6 weeks.*
Change laboratory practices. Assess potential barriers. Explore
alternatives.
Positive culture: susceptibility results available but
action not taken promptly.
Educate appropriate personnel. Review protocol for
management of positive culture susceptibility results.
Patient with signs/symptoms of TB: appropriate tests
not ordered promptly.
Educate appropriate personnel. Evaluate protocols for TB
detection.
Isolation room unavailable. Reassess need for number of isolation rooms.
Isolation not ordered or discontinued too soon, or
isolation policy not followed properly (e.g., patients
going outside of room).
Educate patients and appropriate personnel. Evaluate
institutional barriers to implementation of isolation policy.
Personnel not properly using respiratory protection. Educate appropriate personnel. Evaluate regularly scheduled
re-education. Evaluate institutional barriers to use of
respiratory protection.
Isolation room or procedure room not at negative
pressure relative to surrounding areas.
Make appropriate engineering modifications. Establish
protocols for regularly monitoring and maintaining negative
pressure.
Inadequate air circulation. Make appropriate engineering modifications.
Door left open. Educate appropriate personnel and patients. Evaluate
self-closing doors, comfort levels in the room, and other













*These time intervals are used as examples and should not be considered absolute standards.
If this review and/or screening does not identify additional PPD con-
versions, nosocomial transmission is less likely, and the contact
investigation can probably be terminated. Whether the HCW’s PPD
test conversion resulted from occupational exposure and infection is
uncertain; however, the absence of other data implicating noso-
comial transmission suggests that the conversion could have
resulted from a) unrecognized exposure to M. tuberculosis outside
the facility; b) cross-reactivity with another antigen (e.g., nontubercu-
lous mycobacteria); c) errors in applying, reading, or interpreting the
test; d) false positivity caused by the normal variability of the test; or
e) false positivity caused by a defective PPD preparation.
If this review and/or screening does identify additional PPD test con-
versions, nosocomial transmission is more likely. In this situation,
the patient identification (i.e., triage) process, TB infection-control
policies and practices, and engineering controls should be evaluated
to identify problems that could have led to exposure and transmis-
sion (Table 4).
If no such problems are identified, a high-risk protocol should be im-
plemented in the affected area or occupational group, and the public
health department or other persons with expertise in TB infection
control should be consulted.
If such problems are identified, appropriate interventions should be
implemented to correct the problem(s), and PPD skin testing of PPD-
negative HCWs should be repeated after 3 months.
If no additional PPD conversions are detected on follow-up testing,
the investigation can be terminated.
If additional PPD conversions are detected on follow-up testing, the
possible reasons for exposure and transmission should be reas-
sessed, the appropriateness of and adherence to the interventions
implemented should be evaluated, and PPD skin testing of PPD-
negative HCWs should be repeated after another 3 months.
If no additional PPD test conversions are detected on this second
round of follow-up testing, the investigation can be terminated. How-
ever, if additional PPD test conversions are detected on the second
round of follow-up testing, a high-risk protocol should be imple-
mented in the affected area or occupational group, and the public
health department or other persons with expertise in TB infection
control should be consulted.
b. Investigating cases of active TB in HCWs
If an HCW develops active TB, the following steps should be taken:
• The case should be evaluated epidemiologically, in a manner similar
to PPD test conversions in HCWs, to determine the likelihood that it
resulted from occupational transmission and to identify possible
causes and implement appropriate interventions if the evaluation
suggests such transmission.
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• Contacts of the HCW (e.g., other HCWs, patients, visitors, and others
who have had intense exposure to the HCW) should be identified and
evaluated for TB infection and disease (Section II.K.3; Suppl. 2). The
public health department should be notified immediately for consul-
tation and to allow for investigation of community contacts who
were not exposed in the health-care facility.
• The public health department should notify facilities when HCWs
with TB are reported by physicians so that an investigation of con-
tacts can be conducted in the facility. The information provided by
the health department to facilities should be in accordance with state
or local laws to protect the confidentiality of the HCW.
2. Investigating possible patient-to-patient transmission of M. tuberculosis
Surveillance of active TB cases in patients should be conducted. If this sur-
veillance suggests the possibility of patient-to-patient transmission of
M. tuberculosis (e.g., a high proportion of TB patients had prior admis-
sions during the year preceding onset of their TB, the number of patients
with drug-resistant TB increased suddenly, or isolates obtained from mul-
tiple patients had identical and characteristic drug-susceptibility or DNA
fingerprint patterns), the following steps should be taken:
• Review the HCW PPD test results and patient surveillance data for the
suspected areas to detect additional patients or HCWs with PPD test
conversions or active disease.
• Look for possible exposures that patients with newly diagnosed TB
could have had to other TB patients during previous admissions. For
example, were the patients admitted to the same room or area, or did
they receive the same procedure or go to the same treatment area on
the same day?
If the evaluation thus far suggests transmission has occurred, the follow-
ing steps should be taken:
• Evaluate possible causes of the transmission (e.g., problem with patient
detection, institutional barriers to implementing appropriate isolation
practices, or inadequate engineering controls) (Table 4).
• Ascertain whether other patients or HCWs could have been exposed; if
so, evaluate these persons for TB infection and disease (Section II.K.3;
Suppl. 2).
• Notify the public health department so they can begin a community
contact investigation if necessary.
3. Investigating contacts of patients and HCWs who have infectious TB
If a patient who has active TB is examined in a health-care facility and the
illness is not diagnosed correctly, resulting in failure to apply appropriate
precautions, or if an HCW develops active TB and exposes other persons
in the facility, the following steps should be taken when the illness is later
diagnosed correctly:
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• To identify other patients and HCWs who were exposed to the source
patient before isolation procedures were begun, interview the source
patient and all applicable personnel and review that patient’s medical
record. Determine the areas of the facility in which the source patient
was hospitalized, visited, or worked before being placed in isolation
(e.g., outpatient clinics, hospital rooms, treatment rooms, radiology and
procedure areas, and patient lounges) and the HCWs who may have
been exposed during that time (e.g., persons providing direct care,
therapists, clerks, transportation personnel, housekeepers, and social
workers).
• The contact investigation should first determine if M. tuberculosis
transmission has occurred from the source patient to those persons
with whom the source patient had the most intense contact.
• Administer PPD tests to the most intensely exposed HCWs and patients
as soon as possible after the exposure has occurred. If transmission did
occur to the most intensely exposed persons, then those persons with
whom the patient had less contact should be evaluated. If the initial PPD
test result is negative, a second test should be administered 12 weeks
after the exposure was terminated.
• Those persons who were exposed to M. tuberculosis and who have
either a PPD test conversion or symptoms suggestive of TB should re-
ceive prompt clinical evaluation and, if indicated, chest radiographs and
bacteriologic studies should be performed (Suppl. 2). Those persons
who have evidence of newly acquired infection or active disease should
be evaluated for preventive or curative therapy (Suppl. 2). Persons who
have previously had positive PPD test results and who have been ex-
posed to an infectious TB patient do not require a repeat PPD test or a
chest radiograph unless they have symptoms suggestive of TB.
• In addition to PPD testing those HCWs and patients who have been ex-
posed to M. tuberculosis because a patient was not isolated promptly or
an HCW with active TB was not identified promptly, the investigation
should determine why the diagnosis of TB was delayed. If the correct
diagnosis was made but the patient was not isolated promptly, the rea-
sons for the delay need to be defined so that corrective actions can be
taken.
L. Coordination with the Public Health Department
• As soon as a patient or HCW is known or suspected to have active TB, the
patient or HCW should be reported to the public health department so that
appropriate follow-up can be arranged and a community contact investi-
gation can be performed. The health department should be notified well
before patient discharge to facilitate follow-up and continuation of ther-
apy. A discharge plan coordinated with the patient or HCW, the health
department, and the inpatient facility should be implemented.
• The public health department should protect the confidentiality of the pa-
tient or HCW in accordance with state and local laws.
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• Health-care facilities and health departments should coordinate their ef-
forts to perform appropriate contact investigations on patients and HCWs
who have active TB.
• In accordance with state and local laws and regulations, results of all AFB-
positive sputum smears, cultures positive for M. tuberculosis, and drug-
susceptibility results on M. tuberculosis isolates should be reported to the
public health department as soon as these results are available.
• The public health department may be able to assist facilities with planning
and implementing various aspects of a TB infection-control program (e.g.,
surveillance, screening activities, and outbreak investigations). In addition,
the state health department may be able to provide names of experts to
assist with the engineering aspects of TB infection control.
M. Additional Considerations for Selected Areas in Health-Care
Facilities and Other Health-Care Settings
This section contains additional information for selected areas in health-care
facilities and for other health-care settings.
1. Selected areas in health-care facilities
a. Operating rooms
• Elective operative procedures on patients who have TB should be
delayed until the patient is no longer infectious.
• If operative procedures must be performed, they should be done, if
possible, in operating rooms that have anterooms. For operating
rooms without anterooms, the doors to the operating room should
be closed, and traffic into and out of the room should be minimal to
reduce the frequency of opening and closing the door. Attempts
should be made to perform the procedure at a time when other pa-
tients are not present in the operative suite and when a minimum
number of personnel are present (e.g., at the end of day).
• Placing a bacterial filter on the patient endotracheal tube (or at the
expiratory side of the breathing circuit of a ventilator or anesthesia
machine if these are used) when operating on a patient who has con-
firmed or suspected TB may help reduce the risk for contaminating
anesthesia equipment or discharging tubercle bacilli into the ambi-
ent air.
• During postoperative recovery, the patient should be monitored and
should be placed in a private room that meets recommended stan-
dards for ventilating TB isolation rooms.
• When operative procedures (or other procedures requiring a sterile
field) are performed on patients who may have infectious TB, respi-
ratory protection worn by the HCW must protect the field from the
respiratory secretions of the HCW and protect the HCW from the
infectious droplet nuclei generated by the patient. Valved or positive-
pressure respirators do not protect the sterile field; therefore, a
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respirator that does not have a valve and that meets the criteria in
Section II.G should be used.
b. Autopsy rooms
• Because infectious aerosols are likely to be present in autopsy
rooms, such areas should be at negative pressure with respect to
adjacent areas (Suppl. 3), and the room air should be exhausted di-
rectly to the outside of the building. ASHRAE recommends that
autopsy rooms have ventilation that provides an airflow of 12 ACH
(47 ), although the effectiveness of this ventilation level in reducing
the risk for M. tuberculosis transmission has not been evaluated.
Where possible, this level should be increased by means of ventila-
tion system design or by auxiliary methods (e.g., recirculation of air
within the room through HEPA filters) (Suppl. 3).
• Respiratory protection should be worn by personnel while perform-
ing autopsies on deceased persons who may have had TB at the time
of death (Section II.G; Suppl. 4).
• Recirculation of HEPA-filtered air within the room or UVGI may be
used as a supplement to the recommended ventilation (Suppl. 3).
c. Laboratories
• Laboratories in which specimens for mycobacteriologic studies (e.g.,
AFB smears and cultures) are processed should be designed to con-
form with criteria specified by CDC and the National Institutes of
Health (59 ).
2. Other health-care settings
TB precautions may be appropriate in a number of other types of health-
care settings. The specific precautions that are applied will vary depending
on the setting. At a minimum, a risk assessment should be performed
yearly for these settings; a written TB infection-control plan should be de-
veloped, evaluated, and revised on a regular basis; protocols should be in
place for identifying and managing patients who may have active TB;
HCWs should receive appropriate training, education, and screening; pro-
tocols for problem evaluation should be in place; and coordination with
the public health department should be arranged when necessary. Other
recommendations specific to certain of these settings follow.
a. Emergency medical services
• When EMS personnel or others must transport patients who have
confirmed or suspected active TB, a surgical mask should be placed,
if possible, over the patient’s mouth and nose. Because administra-
tive and engineering controls during emergency transport situations
cannot be ensured, EMS personnel should wear respiratory protec-
tion when transporting such patients. If feasible, the windows of the
vehicle should be kept open. The heating and air-conditioning sys-
tem should be set on a nonrecirculating cycle.
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• EMS personnel should be included in a comprehensive PPD screen-
ing program and should receive a baseline PPD test and follow-up
testing as indicated by the risk assessment. They should also be in-
cluded in the follow-up of contacts of a patient with infectious TB.*
b. Hospices
• Hospice patients who have confirmed or suspected TB should be
managed in the manner described in this document for management
of TB patients in hospitals. General-use and specialized areas (e.g.,
treatment or TB isolation rooms) should be ventilated in the same
manner as described for similar hospital areas.
c. Long-term care facilities
• Recommendations published previously for preventing and control-
ling TB in long-term care facilities should be followed (60 ).
• Long-term care facilities should also follow the recommendations
outlined in this document.
d. Correctional facilities
• Recommendations published previously for preventing and control-
ling TB in correctional facilities should be followed (61 ).
• Prison medical facilities should also follow the recommendations
outlined in this document.
e. Dental settings
In general, the symptoms for which patients seek treatment in a dental-
care setting are not likely to be caused by infectious TB. Unless a patient
requiring dental care coincidentally has TB, it is unlikely that infectious
TB will be encountered in the dental setting. Furthermore, generation of
droplet nuclei containing M. tuberculosis during dental procedures has
not been demonstrated (62 ). Therefore, the risk for transmission of
M. tuberculosis in most dental settings is probably quite low. Neverthe-
less, during dental procedures, patients and dental workers share the
same air for varying periods of time. Coughing may be stimulated occa-
sionally by oral manipulations, although no specific dental procedures
have been classified as “cough-inducing.” In some instances, the popu-
lation served by a dental-care facility, or the HCWs in the facility, may be
at relatively high risk for TB. Because the potential exists for transmis-
sion of M. tuberculosis in dental settings, the following recom-
mendations should be followed:
• A risk assessment (Section II.B) should be done periodically, and TB
infection-control policies for each dental setting should be based on
the risk assessment. The policies should include provisions for de-
tection and referral of patients who may have undiagnosed active
*The Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resource Emergency Act of 1990, P.L. 101-381, mandates
notification of EMS personnel after they have been exposed to infectious pulmonary TB
(42 U.S.C. §300ff-82.54 Fed. Reg. 13417 [March 21, 1994]).
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TB; management of patients with active TB, relative to provision of
urgent dental care; and employer-sponsored HCW education, coun-
seling, and screening.
• While taking patients’ initial medical histories and at periodic up-
dates, dental HCWs should routinely ask all patients whether they
have a history of TB disease and symptoms suggestive of TB.
• Patients with a medical history or symptoms suggestive of undiag-
nosed active TB should be referred promptly for medical evaluation
of possible infectiousness. Such patients should not remain in the
dental-care facility any longer than required to arrange a referral.
While in the dental-care facility, they should wear surgical masks and
should be instructed to cover their mouths and noses when cough-
ing or sneezing.
• Elective dental treatment should be deferred until a physician con-
firms that the patient does not have infectious TB. If the patient is
diagnosed as having active TB, elective dental treatment should be
deferred until the patient is no longer infectious.
• If urgent dental care must be provided for a patient who has, or is
strongly suspected of having, infectious TB, such care should be pro-
vided in facilities that can provide TB isolation (Sections II.E and G).
Dental HCWs should use respiratory protection while performing
procedures on such patients. 
• Any dental HCW who has a persistent cough (i.e., a cough lasting
≥3 weeks), especially in the presence of other signs or symptoms
compatible with active TB (e.g., weight loss, night sweats, bloody
sputum, anorexia, and fever), should be evaluated promptly for TB.
The HCW should not return to the workplace until a diagnosis of TB
has been excluded or until the HCW is on therapy and a determina-
tion has been made that the HCW is noninfectious.
• In dental-care facilities that provide care to populations at high risk
for active TB, it may be appropriate to use engineering controls simi-
lar to those used in general-use areas (e.g., waiting rooms) of
medical facilities that have a similar risk profile.
f. Home-health–care settings
• HCWs who provide medical services in the homes of patients who
have suspected or confirmed infectious TB should instruct such pa-
tients to cover their mouths and noses with a tissue when coughing
or sneezing. Until such patients are no longer infectious, HCWs
should wear respiratory protection when entering these patients’
homes (Suppl. 4).
• Precautions in the home may be discontinued when the patient is no
longer infectious (Suppl. 1).
• HCWs who provide health-care services in their patients’ homes can
assist in preventing transmission of M. tuberculosis by educating
their patients regarding the importance of taking medications as pre-
scribed and by administering DOT.
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• Cough-inducing procedures performed on patients who have infec-
tious TB should not be done in the patients’ homes unless absolutely
necessary. When medically necessary cough-inducing procedures
(e.g., AFB sputum collection for evaluation of therapy) must be per-
formed on patients who may have infectious TB, the procedures
should be performed in a health-care facility in a room or booth that
has the recommended ventilation for such procedures. If these pro-
cedures must be performed in a patient’s home, they should be
performed in a well-ventilated area away from other household
members. If feasible, the HCW should consider opening a window to
improve ventilation or collecting the specimen while outside the
dwelling. The HCW collecting these specimens should wear respira-
tory protection during the procedure (Section II.G).
• HCWs who provide medical services in their patients’ homes should
be included in comprehensive employer-sponsored TB training, edu-
cation, counseling, and screening programs. These programs should
include provisions for identifying HCWs who have active TB, base-
line PPD skin testing, and follow-up PPD testing at intervals
appropriate to the degree of risk.
• Patients who are at risk for developing active TB and the HCWs who
provide medical services in the homes of such patients should be
reminded periodically of the importance of having pulmonary symp-
toms evaluated promptly to permit early detection of and treatment
for TB.
g. Medical offices
In general, the symptoms of active TB are symptoms for which patients
are likely to seek treatment in a medical office. Furthermore, the popu-
lations served by some medical offices, or the HCWs in the office, may
be at relatively high risk for TB. Thus, it is likely that infectious TB will be
encountered in a medical office. Because of the potential for M. tuber-
culosis transmission, the following recommendations should be ob-
served:
• A risk assessment should be conducted periodically, and TB infec-
tion-control policies based on results of the risk assessment should
be developed for the medical office. The policies should include pro-
visions for identifying and managing patients who may have
undiagnosed active TB; managing patients who have active TB; and
educating, training, counseling, and screening HCWs.
• While taking patients’ initial medical histories and at periodic up-
dates, HCWs who work in medical offices should routinely ask all
patients whether they have a history of TB disease or have had
symptoms suggestive of TB.
• Patients with a medical history and symptoms suggestive of active
TB should receive an appropriate diagnostic evaluation for TB and be
evaluated promptly for possible infectiousness. Ideally, this evalu-
ation should be done in a facility that has TB isolation capability. At a
minimum, the patient should be provided with and asked to wear a
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surgical mask, instructed to cover the mouth and nose with a tissue
when coughing or sneezing, and separated as much as possible from
other patients.
• Medical offices that provide evaluation or treatment services for TB
patients should follow the recommendations for managing patients
in ambulatory-care settings (Section II.D).
• If cough-inducing procedures are to be administered in a medical of-
fice to patients who may have active TB, appropriate precautions
should be followed (Section II.H).
• Any HCW who has a persistent cough (i.e., a cough lasting ≥3 weeks),
especially in the presence of other signs or symptoms compatible
with active TB (e.g., weight loss, night sweats, bloody sputum, ano-
rexia, or fever) should be evaluated promptly for TB. HCWs with such
signs or symptoms should not return to the workplace until a diagno-
sis of TB has been excluded or until they are on therapy and a
determination has been made that they are noninfectious.
• HCWs who work in medical offices in which there is a likelihood of
exposure to patients who have infectious TB should be included in
employer-sponsored education, training, counseling, and PPD test-
ing programs appropriate to the level of risk in the office.
• In medical offices that provide care to populations at relatively high
risk for active TB, use of engineering controls as described in this
document for general-use areas (e.g., waiting rooms) may be appro-
priate (Section II.F; Suppl. 3).
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Supplement 1: Determining the Infectiousness of a TB Patient
The infectiousness of patients with TB correlates with the number of organisms ex-
pelled into the air, which, in turn, correlates with the following factors: a) disease in
the lungs, airways, or larynx; b) presence of cough or other forceful expiratory meas-
ures; c) presence of acid-fast bacilli (AFB) in the sputum; d) failure of the patient to
cover the mouth and nose when coughing; e) presence of cavitation on chest radio-
graph; f) inappropriate or short duration of chemotherapy; and g) administration of
procedures that can induce coughing or cause aerosolization of M. tuberculosis (e.g.,
sputum induction).
The most infectious persons are most likely those who have not been treated for TB
and who have either a) pulmonary or laryngeal TB and a cough or are undergoing
cough-inducing procedures, b) a positive AFB sputum smear, or c) cavitation on chest
radiograph. Persons with extrapulmonary TB usually are not infectious unless they
have a) concomitant pulmonary disease; b) nonpulmonary disease located in the res-
piratory tract or oral cavity; or c) extrapulmonary disease that includes an open
abscess or lesion in which the concentration of organisms is high, especially if drain-
age from the abscess or lesion is extensive (20,22 ). Coinfection with HIV does not
appear to affect the infectiousness of TB patients (63–65 ).
In general, children who have TB may be less likely than adults to be infectious; how-
ever, transmission from children can occur. Therefore, children with TB should be
evaluated for infectiousness using the same parameters as for adults (i.e., pulmonary
or laryngeal TB, presence of cough or cough-inducing procedures, positive sputum
AFB smear, cavitation on chest radiograph, and adequacy and duration of therapy).
Pediatric patients who may be infectious include those who a) are not on therapy,
b) have just been started on therapy, or c) are on inadequate therapy, and who a) have
laryngeal or extensive pulmonary involvement, b) have pronounced cough or are un-
dergoing cough-inducing procedures, c) have positive sputum AFB smears, or d) have
cavitary TB. Children who have typical primary tuberculous lesions and do not have
any of the indicators of infectiousness listed previously usually do not need to be
placed in isolation. Because the source case for pediatric TB patients often occurs in a
member of the infected child’s family (45 ), parents and other visitors of all pediatric
TB patients should be evaluated for TB as soon as possible.
Infection is most likely to result from exposure to persons who have unsuspected
pulmonary TB and are not receiving anti-TB therapy or from persons who have diag-
nosed TB and are not receiving adequate therapy. Administration of effective anti-TB
therapy has been associated with decreased infectiousness among persons who have
active TB (66 ). Effective therapy reduces coughing, the amount of sputum produced,
and the number of organisms in the sputum. However, the period of time a patient
must take effective therapy before becoming noninfectious varies between patients
(67 ). For example, some TB patients are never infectious, whereas those with unrec-
ognized or inadequately treated drug-resistant TB may remain infectious for weeks or
months (24 ). Thus, decisions about infectiousness should be made on an individual
basis.
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In general, patients who have suspected or confirmed active TB should be considered
infectious if they a) are coughing, b) are undergoing cough-inducing procedures, or
c) have positive AFB sputum smears, and if they a) are not on chemotherapy, b) have
just started chemotherapy, or c) have a poor clinical or bacteriologic response to
chemotherapy. A patient who has drug-susceptible TB and who is on adequate che-
motherapy and has had a significant clinical and bacteriologic response to therapy
(i.e., reduction in cough, resolution of fever, and progressively decreasing quantity
of bacilli on smear) is probably no longer infectious. However, because drug-
susceptibility results are not usually known when the decision to discontinue isolation
is made, all TB patients should remain in isolation while hospitalized until they have
had three consecutive negative sputum smears collected on different days and they
demonstrate clinical improvement.
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Supplement 2: Diagnosis and Treatment of 
Latent TB Infection and Active TB
I. Diagnostic Procedures for TB Infection and Disease
A diagnosis of TB may be considered for any patient who has a persistent cough
(i.e., a cough lasting ≥3 weeks) or other signs or symptoms compatible with TB
(e.g., bloody sputum, night sweats, weight loss, anorexia, or fever). However, the
index of suspicion for TB will vary in different geographic areas and will depend
on the prevalence of TB and other characteristics of the population served by the
facility. The index of suspicion for TB should be very high in areas or among
groups of patients in which the prevalence of TB is high (Section I.B). Persons for
whom a diagnosis of TB is being considered should receive appropriate diagnos-
tic tests, which may include PPD skin testing, chest radiography, and bacteriologic
studies (e.g., sputum microscopy and culture).
A. PPD Skin Testing and Anergy Testing
1. Application and reading of PPD skin tests
The PPD skin test is the only method available for demonstrating infection
with M. tuberculosis. Although currently available PPD tests are <100%
sensitive and specific for detection of infection with M. tuberculosis, no
better diagnostic methods have yet been devised. Interpretation of PPD
test results requires knowledge of the antigen used, the immunologic ba-
sis for the reaction to this antigen, the technique used to administer and
read the test, and the results of epidemiologic and clinical experience with
the test (2,5,6 ). The PPD test, like all medical tests, is subject to variability,
but many of the variations in administering and reading PPD tests can be
avoided by proper training and careful attention to details.
The intracutaneous (Mantoux) administration of a measured amount of
PPD-tuberculin is currently the preferred method for doing the test. One-
tenth milliliter of PPD (5 TU) is injected just beneath the surface of the skin
on either the volar or dorsal surface of the forearm. A discrete, pale eleva-
tion of the skin (i.e., a wheal) that is 6–10 mm in diameter should be
produced.
PPD test results should be read by designated, trained personnel between
48 and 72 hours after injection. Patient or HCW self-reading of PPD test
results should not be accepted (68 ). The result of the test is based on the
presence or absence of an induration at the injection site. Redness or
erythema should not be measured. The transverse diameter of induration
should be recorded in millimeters.
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2. Interpretation of PPD skin tests
a. General
The interpretation of a PPD reaction should be influenced by the pur-
pose for which the test was given (e.g., epidemiologic versus diagnostic
purposes), by the prevalence of TB infection in the population being
tested, and by the consequences of false classification. Errors in classi-
fication can be minimized by establishing an appropriate definition of a
positive reaction (Table S2-1).
The positive-predictive value of PPD tests (i.e, the probability that a per-
son with a positive PPD test is actually infected with M. tuberculosis) is
dependent on the prevalence of TB infection in the population being
tested and the specificity of the test (69,70 ). In populations with a low
prevalence of TB infection, the probability that a positive PPD test rep-
resents true infection with M. tuberculosis is very low if the cut-point is
set too low (i.e., the test is not adequately specific). In populations with
a high prevalence of TB infection, the probability that a positive PPD test
using the same cut-point represents true infection with M. tuberculosis
is much higher. To ensure that few persons infected with tubercle bacilli
will be misclassified as having negative reactions and few persons not
infected with tubercle bacilli will be misclassified as having positive re-
actions, different cut-points are used to separate positive reactions from
negative reactions for different populations, depending on the risk for
TB infection in that population.
A lower cut-point (i.e., 5 mm) is used for persons in the highest risk
groups, which include HIV-infected persons, recent close contacts of
persons with TB (e.g., in the household or in an unprotected occupa-
tional exposure similar in intensity and duration to household contact),
and persons who have abnormal chest radiographs with fibrotic
changes consistent with inactive TB. A higher cut-point (i.e., 10 mm) is
used for persons who are not in the highest risk group but who have
other risk factors (e.g., injecting-drug users known to be HIV seronega-
tive; persons with certain medical conditions that increase the risk for
progression from latent TB infection to active TB [Table S2-1]); medi-
cally underserved, low-income populations; persons born in foreign
countries that have a high prevalence of TB; and residents of correc-
tional institutions and nursing homes). An even higher cut-point (i.e.,
15 mm) is used for all other persons who have none of the above risk
factors.
Recent PPD converters are considered members of a high-risk group. A
≥10 mm increase in the size of the induration within a 2-year period is
classified as a conversion from a negative to a positive test result for
persons <35 years of age. An increase of induration of ≥15 mm within a
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2-year period is classified as a conversion for persons ≥35 years of age
(5 ).
b. HCWs
In general, HCWs should have their skin-test results interpreted accord-
ing to the recommendations in this supplement and in sections 1, 2, 3,
and 5 of Table S2-1. However, the prevalence of TB in the facility should
be considered when choosing the appropriate cut-point for defining a
positive PPD reaction. In facilities where there is essentially no risk for
exposure to TB patients (i.e., minimal- or very low-risk facilities [Section
II.B]), an induration ≥15 mm may be an appropriate cut-point for HCWs
who have no other risk factors. In other facilities where TB patients re-
ceive care, the appropriate cut-point for HCWs who have no other risk
factors may be ≥10 mm.
A recent PPD test conversion in an HCW should be defined generally as
an increase of ≥10 mm in the size of induration within a 2-year period.
For HCWs in facilities where exposure to TB is very unlikely (e.g.,
minimal-risk facilities), an increase of ≥15 mm within a 2-year period
may be more appropriate for defining a recent conversion because of
the lower positive-predictive value of the test in such groups.
3. Anergy testing
HIV-infected persons may have suppressed reactions to PPD skin tests be-
cause of anergy, particularly if their CD4+ T-lymphocyte counts decline
(71 ). Persons with anergy will have a negative PPD test regardless of infec-
tion with M. tuberculosis. HIV-infected persons should be evaluated for
anergy in conjunction with PPD testing (72 ). Two companion antigens
(e.g., Candida antigen and tetanus toxoid) should be administered in addi-
tion to PPD. Persons with ≥3 mm of induration to any of the skin tests
(including tuberculin) are considered not anergic. Reactions of ≥5 mm to
PPD are considered to be evidence of TB infection in HIV-infected persons
regardless of the reactions to the companion antigens. If there is no reac-
tion (i.e., <3 mm induration) to any of the antigens, the person being tested
is considered anergic. Determination of whether such persons are likely to
be infected with M. tuberculosis must be based on other epidemiologic
factors (e.g., the proportion of other persons with the same level of expo-
sure who have positive PPD test results and the intensity or duration of
exposure to infectious TB patients that the anergic person experienced).
4. Pregnancy and PPD skin testing
Although thousands (perhaps millions) of pregnant women have been
PPD skin tested since the test was devised, thus far no documented epi-
sodes of fetal harm have resulted from use of the tuberculin test (73 ).
Pregnancy should not exclude a female HCW from being skin tested as
part of a contact investigation or as part of a regular skin-testing program.
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1. An induration of ≥5 mm is classified as positive in:
• persons who have human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection or risk factors
for HIV infection but unknown HIV status;
• persons who have had recent close contact* with persons who have active tuber-
culosis (TB);
• persons who have fibrotic chest radiographs (consistent with healed TB).
2. An induration of ≥10 mm is classified as positive in all persons who do not meet any of
the criteria above but who have other risk factors for TB, including:
High-risk groups —
• injecting-drug users known to be HIV seronegative;
• persons who have other medical conditions that reportedly increase the risk for
progressing from latent TB infection to active TB (e.g.,  silicosis; gastrectomy or
jejuno-ileal bypass; being ≥10% below ideal body weight; chronic renal failure
with renal dialysis; diabetes mellitus; high-dose corticosteroid or other immuno-
suppressive therapy; some hematologic disorders, including malignancies such
as leukemias and lymphomas; and other malignancies);
• children <4 years of age.
High-prevalence groups —
• persons born in countries in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America that
have high prevalence of TB;
• persons from medically underserved, low-income populations;
• residents of long-term–care facilities (e.g., correctional institutions and nursing
homes);
• persons from high-risk populations in their communities, as determined by local
public health authorities.
3. An induration of ≥15 mm is classified as positive in persons who do not meet any of the
above criteria.
4. Recent converters are defined on the basis of both size of induration and age of the
person being tested:
• ≥10 mm increase within a 2-year period is classified as a recent conversion for
persons <35 years of age;
• ≥15 mm increase within a 2-year period is classified as a recent conversion for
persons ≥35 years of age.
5. PPD skin-test results in health-care workers (HCWs)
• In general, the recommendations in sections 1, 2, and 3 of this table should be fol-
lowed when interpreting skin-test results in HCWs.
However, the prevalence of TB in the facility should be considered when choosing
the appropriate cut-point for defining a positive PPD reaction.  In facilities where
there is essentially no risk for exposure to Mycobacterium tuberculosis (i.e.,
minimal- or very low-risk facilities [Section II.B]), an induration ≥15 mm may be a
*Recent close contact implies either household or social contact or unprotected occupational
exposure similar in intensity and duration to household contact.
TABLE S2-1. Summary of interpretation of purified protein derivative (PPD)-tuberculin
skin-test results
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5. BCG vaccination and PPD skin testing
BCG vaccination may produce a PPD reaction that cannot be distinguished
reliably from a reaction caused by infection with M. tuberculosis. For a per-
son who was vaccinated with BCG, the probability that a PPD test reaction
results from infection with M. tuberculosis increases a) as the size of the
reaction increases, b) when the person is a contact of a person with TB,
c) when the person’s country of origin has a high prevalence of TB, and
d) as the length of time between vaccination and PPD testing increases.
For example, a PPD test reaction of ≥10 mm probably can be attributed to
M. tuberculosis infection in an adult who was vaccinated with BCG as a
child and who is from a country with a high prevalence of TB (74,75 ).
6. The booster phenomenon
The ability of persons who have TB infection to react to PPD may gradually
wane. For example, if tested with PPD, adults who were infected during
their childhood may have a negative reaction. However, the PPD could
boost the hypersensitivity, and the size of the reaction could be larger on a
subsequent test. This boosted reaction may be misinterpreted as a PPD
test conversion from a newly acquired infection. Misinterpretation of a
boosted reaction as a new infection could result in unnecessary investiga-
tions of laboratory and patient records in an attempt to identify the source
case and in unnecessary prescription of preventive therapy for HCWs.
Although boosting can occur among persons in any age group, the likeli-
hood of the reaction increases with the age of the person being
tested (6,76 ).
When PPD testing of adults is to be repeated periodically (as in HCW skin-
testing programs), two-step testing can be used to reduce the likelihood
that a boosted reaction is misinterpreted as a new infection. Two-step test-
ing should be performed on all newly employed HCWs who have an initial
negative PPD test result at the time of employment and have not had a
documented negative PPD test result during the 12 months preceding the
initial test. A second test should be performed 1–3 weeks after the first test.
If the second test result is positive, this is most likely a boosted reaction,
suitable cut-point for HCWs who have no other risk factors.  In facilities where TB
patients receive care, the cut-point for HCWs with no other risk factors may be
≥10 mm.
• A recent conversion in an HCW should be defined generally as a ≥10 mm increase
in size of induration within a 2-year period.  For HCWs who work in facilities
where exposure to TB is very unlikely (e.g., minimal-risk facilities), an increase of
≥15 mm within a 2-year period may be more appropriate for defining a recent con-
version because of the lower positive-predictive value of the test in such groups.
TABLE S2-1. Summary of interpretation of PPD skin-test results — Continued 
Vol. 43 / No. RR-13 MMWR 63
and the HCW should be classified as previously infected. If the second test
result remains negative, the HCW is classified as uninfected, and a positive
reaction to a subsequent test is likely to represent a new infection with
M. tuberculosis.
B. Chest Radiography
Patients who have positive skin-test results or symptoms suggestive of TB
should be evaluated with a chest radiograph regardless of PPD test results.
Radiographic abnormalities that strongly suggest active TB include upper-
lobe infiltration, particularly if cavitation is seen (77 ), and patchy or nodular
infiltrates in the apical or subapical posterior upper lobes or the superior seg-
ment of the lower lobe. If abnormalities are noted, or if the patient has
symptoms suggestive of extrapulmonary TB, additional diagnostic tests
should be conducted.
The radiographic presentation of pulmonary TB in HIV-infected patients may
be unusual (78 ). Typical apical cavitary disease is less common among such
patients. They may have infiltrates in any lung zone, a finding that is often
associated with mediastinal and/or hilar adenopathy, or they may have a nor-
mal chest radiograph, although this latter finding occurs rarely.
C. Bacteriology
Smear and culture examination of at least three sputum specimens collected
on different days is the main diagnostic procedure for pulmonary TB (6 ).
Sputum smears that fail to demonstrate AFB do not exclude the diagnosis of
TB. In the United States, approximately 60% of patients with positive sputum
cultures have positive AFB sputum smears. HIV-infected patients who have
pulmonary TB may be less likely than immunocompetent patients to have
AFB present on sputum smears, which is consistent with the lower frequency
of cavitary pulmonary disease observed among HIV-infected persons (39,41 ).
Specimens for smear and culture should contain an adequate amount of ex-
pectorated sputum but not much saliva. If a diagnosis of TB cannot be
established from sputum, a bronchoscopy may be necessary (36,37 ). In
young children who cannot produce an adequate amount of sputum, gastric
aspirates may provide an adequate specimen for diagnosis.
A culture of sputum or other clinical specimen that contains M. tuberculosis
provides a definitive diagnosis of TB. Conventional laboratory methods may
require 4–8 weeks for species identification; however, the use of radiometric
culture techniques and nucleic acid probes facilitates more rapid detection
and identification of mycobacteria (79,80 ). Mixed mycobacterial infection,
either simultaneous or sequential, can obscure the identification of M. tuber-
culosis during the clinical evaluation and the laboratory analysis (42 ). The
use of nucleic acid probes for both M. avium complex and M. tuberculosis
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may be useful for identifying mixed mycobacterial infections in clinical speci-
mens.
II. Preventive Therapy for Latent TB Infection and Treatment
of Active TB
A. Preventive Therapy for Latent TB Infection
Determining whether a person with a positive PPD test reaction or conversion
is a candidate for preventive therapy must be based on a) the likelihood that
the reaction represents true infection with M. tuberculosis (as determined by
the cut-points), b) the estimated risk for progression from latent infection to
active TB, and c) the risk for hepatitis associated with taking isoniazid (INH)
preventive therapy (as determined by age and other factors).
HCWs with positive PPD test results should be evaluated for preventive ther-
apy regardless of their ages if they a) are recent converters, b) are close
contacts of persons who have active TB, c) have a medical condition that in-
creases the risk for TB, d) have HIV infection, or e) use injecting drugs (5 ).
HCWs with positive PPD test results who do not have these risk factors should
be evaluated for preventive therapy if they are <35 years of age.
Preventive therapy should be considered for anergic persons who are known
contacts of infectious TB patients and for persons from populations in which
the prevalence of TB infection is very high (e.g., a prevalence of >10%).
Because the risk for INH-associated hepatitis may be increased during the
peripartum period, the decision to use preventive therapy during pregnancy
should be made on an individual basis and should depend on the patient’s
estimated risk for progression to active disease. In general, preventive ther-
apy can be delayed until after delivery. However, for pregnant women who
were probably infected recently or who have high-risk medical conditions,
especially HIV infection, INH preventive therapy should begin when the infec-
tion is documented (81–84 ). No evidence suggests that INH poses a
carcinogenic risk to humans (85–87 ).
The usual preventive therapy regimen is oral INH 300 mg daily for adults
and 10 mg/kg/day for children (88 ). The recommended duration of therapy is
12 months for persons with HIV infection and 9 months for children. Other
persons should receive INH therapy for 6–12 months. For persons who have
silicosis or a chest radiograph demonstrating inactive fibrotic lesions and
who have no evidence of active TB, acceptable regimens include a) 4 months
of INH plus rifampin or b) 12 months of INH, providing that infection with
INH-resistant organisms is unlikely (33 ). For persons likely to be infected with
MDR-TB, alternative multidrug preventive therapy regimens should be con-
sidered (89 ).
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All persons placed on preventive therapy should be educated regarding the
possible adverse reactions associated with INH use, and they should be
questioned carefully at monthly intervals by qualified personnel for signs
or symptoms consistent with liver damage or other adverse effects
(81–84,88,90,91 ). Because INH-associated hepatitis occurs more frequently
among persons >35 years of age, a transaminase measurement should be
obtained from persons in this age group before initiation of INH therapy and
then obtained monthly until treatment has been completed. Other factors as-
sociated with an increased risk for hepatitis include daily alcohol use, chronic
liver disease, and injecting-drug use. In addition, postpubertal black and His-
panic women may be at greater risk for hepatitis or drug interactions (92 ).
More careful clinical monitoring of persons with these risk factors and possi-
bly more frequent laboratory monitoring should be considered. If any of
these tests exceeds three to five times the upper limit of normal, discontinu-
ation of INH should be strongly considered. Liver function tests are not a
substitute for monthly clinical evaluations or for the prompt assessment of
signs or symptoms of adverse reactions that could occur between the regu-
larly scheduled evaluations (33 ).
Persons who have latent TB infection should be advised that they can be re-
infected with another strain of M. tuberculosis (93 ).
B. Treatment of Patients Who Have Active TB
Drug-susceptibility testing should be performed on all initial isolates from pa-
tients with TB. However, test results may not be available for several weeks,
making selection of an initial regimen difficult, especially in areas where
drug-resistant TB has been documented. Current recommendations for ther-
apy and dosage schedules for the treatment of drug-susceptible TB should be
followed (Table S2-2; Table S2-3) (43 ). Streptomycin is contraindicated in the
treatment of pregnant women because of the risk for ototoxicity to the fetus.
In geographic areas or facilities in which drug-resistant TB is highly prevalent,
the initial treatment regimen used while results of drug-susceptibility tests
are pending may need to be expanded. This decision should be based on
analysis of surveillance data.
When results from drug-susceptibility tests become available, the regimen
should be adjusted appropriately (94–97 ). If drug resistance is present, clini-
cians unfamiliar with the management of patients with drug-resistant TB
should seek expert consultation.
For any regimen to be effective, adherence to the regimen must be ensured.
The most effective method of ensuring adherence is the use of DOT after the
patient has been discharged from the hospital (43,91 ). This practice should
be coordinated with the public health department.
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• EMB or SM should be continued until
susceptibility to INH and RIF is
demonstrated.
In areas where primary INH resistance is
<4%, EMB or SM may not be necessary
for patients with no individual risk
factors for drug resistance.
2 Pulmonary and
extrapulmonary















• Regimen should be directly observed.
After the initial phase, EMB or SM should
be continued until susceptibility to INH










3 times wkly† for 6 mos§ • Regimen should be directly observed.
Continue all four drugs for 6 mos.¶
This regimen has been shown to be




















• Continue all four drugs for 4 mos.
If drug resistance is unlikely (primary INH
resistance <4% and patient has no
individual risk factors for drug
resistance), EMB or SM may not be

















• EMB or SM should be continued until
susceptibility to INH and RIF is
demonstrated.
In areas where primary INH resistance is
<4%, EMB or SM may not be necessary
for patients with no individual risk












 * EMB=ethambutol; INH=isoniazid; PZA=pyrazinamide; RIF=rifampin; SM=streptomycin.
† All regimens administered intermittently should be directly observed.
§ For infants and children with miliary TB, bone and joint TB, or TB meningitis, treatment should last at least 12 months. For adults with these forms of
extrapulmonary TB, response to therapy should be monitored closely. If response is slow or suboptimal, treatment may be prolonged on a case-by-case
basis.
¶ Some evidence suggests that SM may be discontinued after 4 months if the isolate is susceptible to all drugs.
** Avoid treating pregnant women with SM because of the risk for ototoxicity to the fetus.
Note: For all patients, if drug-susceptibility results show resistance to any of the first-line drugs, or if the patient remains symptomatic or smear- or








TABLE S2-3. Dosage recommendations for the initial treatment of tuberculosis in children* and adults




Two doses per week
(maximum dose)
Three doses per week
(maximum dose)
Children Adults Children Adults Children Adults
Isoniazid 10–20 mg/kg 5 mg/kg 20–40 mg/kg 15 mg/kg 20–40 mg/kg 15 mg/kg
(300 mg) (300 mg) (900 mg) (900 mg) (900 mg) (900 mg)
Rifampin 10–20 mg/kg 10 mg/kg 10–20 mg/kg 10 mg/kg 10–20 mg/kg 10 mg/kg
(600 mg) (600 mg) (600 mg) (600 mg) (600 mg) (600 mg)
Pyrazinamide 15–30 mg/kg 15–30 mg/kg 50–70 mg/kg 50–70 mg/kg 50–70 mg/kg 50–70 mg/kg
(2 gm) (2 gm) (4 gm) (4 gm) (3 gm) (3 gm)
Ethambutol 15–25 mg/kg 15–25 mg/kg 50 mg/kg 50 mg/kg 25–30 mg/kg 25–30 mg/kg
Streptomycin 20–40 mg/kg 15 mg/kg 20–40 mg/kg 20–40 mg/kg 20–40 mg/kg 20–40 mg/kg
(1 gm) (1 gm) (1.5 gm) (1.5 gm) (1.5 gm) (1.5 gm)
*Persons ≤12 years of age.
Supplement 3: Engineering Controls
I. Introduction
This supplement provides information regarding the use of ventilation (Section II)
and UVGI (Section III) for preventing the transmission of M. tuberculosis in
health-care facilities. The information provided is primarily conceptual and is in-
tended to educate staff in the health-care facility concerning engineering controls
and how these controls can be used as part of the TB infection-control program.
This supplement should not be used in place of consultation with experts, who
can assume responsibility for advising on ventilation system design and selec-
tion, installation, and maintenance of equipment.
The recommendations for engineering controls include a) local exhaust ventila-
tion (i.e., source control), b) general ventilation, and c) air cleaning. General
ventilation considerations include a) dilution and removal of contaminants, b) air-
flow patterns within rooms, c) airflow direction in facilities, d) negative pressure
in rooms, and e) TB isolation rooms. Air cleaning or disinfection can be accom-
plished by filtration of air (e.g., through HEPA filters) or by UVGI.
II. Ventilation
Ventilation systems for health-care facilities should be designed, and modified
when necessary, by ventilation engineers in collaboration with infection-control
and occupational health staff. Recommendations for designing and operating
ventilation systems have been published by ASHRAE (47 ), AIA (48 ), and the
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, Inc. (98 ).
As part of the TB infection-control plan, health-care facility personnel should de-
termine the number of TB isolation rooms, treatment rooms, and local exhaust
devices (i.e., for cough-inducing or aerosol-generating procedures) that the facil-
ity needs. The locations of these rooms and devices will depend on where in the
facility the ventilation conditions recommended in this document can be
achieved. Grouping isolation rooms together in one area of the facility may facili-
tate the care of TB patients and the installation and maintenance of optimal
engineering controls (particularly ventilation).
Periodic evaluations of the ventilation system should review the number of TB
isolation rooms, treatment rooms, and local exhaust devices needed and the
regular maintenance and monitoring of the local and general exhaust systems
(including HEPA filtration systems if they are used).
The various types and conditions of ventilation systems in health-care facilities
and the individual needs of these facilities preclude the ability to provide specific
instructions regarding the implementation of these recommendations. Engineer-
ing control methods must be tailored to each facility on the basis of need and the
feasibility of using the ventilation and air-cleaning concepts discussed in this sup-
plement.
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A. Local Exhaust Ventilation
Purpose: To capture airborne contaminants at or near their source (i.e., the
source control method) and remove these contaminants without exposing
persons in the area to infectious agents (98 ).
Source control techniques can prevent or reduce the spread of infectious
droplet nuclei into the general air circulation by entrapping infectious droplet
nuclei as they are being emitted by the patient (i.e., the source). These tech-
niques are especially important when performing procedures likely to
generate aerosols containing infectious particles and when infectious TB pa-
tients are coughing or sneezing.
Local exhaust ventilation is a preferred source control technique, and it is
often the most efficient way to contain airborne contaminants because it cap-
tures these contaminants near their source before they can disperse.
Therefore, the technique should be used, if feasible, wherever aerosol-
generating procedures are performed. Two basic types of local exhaust de-
vices use hoods: a) the enclosing type, in which the hood either partially or
fully encloses the infectious source; and b) the exterior type, in which the
infectious source is near but outside the hood. Fully enclosed hoods, booths,
or tents are always preferable to exterior types because of their superior abil-
ity  to prevent contaminants from escaping into the HCW’s breathing zone.
Descriptions of both enclosing and exterior devices have been published pre-
viously (98 ).
1. Enclosing devices
The enclosing type of local exhaust ventilation device includes laboratory
hoods used for processing specimens that could contain viable infectious
organisms, booths used for sputum induction or administration of
aerosolized medications (e.g., aerosolized pentamidine) (Figure S3-1), and
tents or hoods made of vinyl or other materials used to enclose and isolate
a patient. These devices are available in various configurations. The most
simple of these latter devices is a tent that is placed over the patient; the
tent has an exhaust connection to the room discharge exhaust system. The
most complex device is an enclosure that has a sophisticated self-
contained airflow and recirculation system.
Both tents and booths should have sufficient airflow to remove at least
99% of airborne particles during the interval between the departure of one
patient and the arrival of the next (99 ). The time required for removing a
given percentage of airborne particles from an enclosed space depends on
several factors. These factors include the number of ACH, which is deter-
mined by the number of cubic feet of air in the room or booth and the rate
at which air is entering the room or booth at the intake source; the location
of the ventilation inlet and outlet; and the physical configuration of the
room or booth (Table S3-1).
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2. Exterior devices
The exterior type of local exhaust ventilation device is usually a hood very
near, but not enclosing, the infectious patient. The airflow produced by
these devices should be sufficient to prevent cross-currents of air near the
patient’s face from causing escape of droplet nuclei. Whenever possible,
the patient should face directly into the hood opening so that any cough-
ing or sneezing is directed into the hood, where the droplet nuclei are
captured. The device should maintain an air velocity of ≥200 feet per min-
ute at the patient’s breathing zone to ensure capture of droplet nuclei.
3. Discharge exhaust from booths, tents, and hoods
Air from booths, tents, and hoods may be discharged into the room in
which the device is located or it may be exhausted to the outside. If the air
is discharged into the room, a HEPA filter should be incorporated at the
discharge duct or vent of the device. The exhaust fan should be located on
the discharge side of the HEPA filter to ensure that the air pressure in the
filter housing and booth is negative with respect to adjacent areas. Uncon-







*Passage of air directly from the air supply to the exhaust (i.e., short-circuiting of air) is pre-
vented by the structure on which patients sit and the wall on which patients rest their backs.
FIGURE S3-1. An enclosing booth designed to sweep air past a patient who has
active tuberculosis and entrap the infectious droplet nuclei in a high-efficiency
particulate air (HEPA) filter
Vol. 43 / No. RR-13 MMWR 71
TABLE S3-1. Air changes per hour (ACH) and time in minutes required for removal
efficiencies of 90%, 99%, and 99.9% of airborne contaminants*
ACH
Minutes required for a removal efficiency of:
90% 99% 99.9%
 1 138 276 414
 2  69 138 207
 3  46  92 138
 4  35  69 104
 5  28  55  83
 6  23  46  69
 7  20  39  59
 8  17  35  52
 9  15  31  46
10  14  28  41
11  13  25  38
12  12  23  35
13  11  21  32
14  10  20  30
15   9  18  28
16   9  17  26
17   8  16  24
18   8  15  23
19   7  15  22
20   7  14  21
25   6  11  17
30   5   9  14
35   4   8  12
40   3   7  10
45   3   6   9
50   3   6   8
*This table has been adapted from the formula for the rate of purging airborne contaminants
(99 ). Values have been derived from the formula t1 = [In (C2 ÷ C1) ÷ (Q ÷ V)] × 60, with T1 = 0
and C2 ÷ C1 − (removal efficiency ÷ 100), and where:
t1 =  initial timepoint
C1 =  initial concentration of contaminant
C2 =  final concentration of contaminants
Q =  air flow rate (cubic feet per hour)
V =  room volume (cubic feet)
Q ÷ V =  ACH
The times given assume perfect mixing of the air within the space (i.e., mixing factor = 1).
However, perfect mixing usually does not occur, and the mixing factor could be as high as 10
if air distribution is very poor (98 ). The required time is derived by multiplying the appropriate
time from the table by the mixing factor that has been determined for the booth or room. The
factor and required time should be included in the operating instructions provided by the
manufacturer of the booth or enclosure, and these instructions should be followed.
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thus preventing infectious droplet nuclei in the booth from escaping into
the room. Most commercially available booths, tents, and hoods are fitted
with HEPA filters, in which case additional HEPA filtration is not needed.
If the device does not incorporate a HEPA filter, the air from the device
should be exhausted to the outside in accordance with recommendations
for isolation room exhaust (Suppl. 3, Section II.B.5). (See Supplement 3,
Section II.C, for information regarding recirculation of exhaust air.)
B. General Ventilation
General ventilation can be used for several purposes, including diluting and
removing contaminated air, controlling airflow patterns within rooms, and
controlling the direction of airflow throughout a facility. Information on these
topics is contained in the following sections.
1. Dilution and removal
Purpose: To reduce the concentration of contaminants in the air.
General ventilation maintains air quality by two processes: dilution and
removal of airborne contaminants. Uncontaminated supply (i.e., incom-
ing) air mixes with the contaminated room air (i.e., dilution), which is
subsequently removed from the room by the exhaust system (i.e., re-
moval). These processes reduce the concentration of droplet nuclei in the
room air.
a. Types of general ventilation systems
Two types of general ventilation systems can be used for dilution and
removal of contaminated air: the single-pass system and the recirculat-
ing system. In a single-pass system, the supply air is either outside air
that has been appropriately heated and cooled or air from a central sys-
tem that supplies a number of areas. After air passes through the room
(or area), 100% of that air is exhausted to the outside. The single-pass
system is the preferred choice in areas where infectious airborne drop-
let nuclei are known to be present (e.g., TB isolation rooms or treatment
rooms) because it prevents contaminated air from being recirculated to
other areas of the facility.
In a recirculating system, a small portion of the exhaust air is dis-
charged to the outside and is replaced with fresh outside air, which
mixes with the portion of exhaust air that was not discharged to the
outside. The resulting mixture, which can contain a large proportion of
contaminated air, is then recirculated to the areas serviced by the sys-
tem. This air mixture could be recirculated into the general ventilation,
in which case contaminants may be carried from contaminated areas to
uncontaminated areas. Alternatively, the air mixture could also be recir-
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culated within a specific room or area, in which case other areas of the
facility will not be affected (Suppl. 3, Section II.C.3).
b. Ventilation rates
Recommended general ventilation rates for health-care facilities are
usually expressed in number of ACH. This number is the ratio of the
volume of air entering the room per hour to the room volume and is
equal to the exhaust airflow (Q [cubic feet per minute]) divided by the
room volume (V [cubic feet]) multiplied by 60 (i.e., ACH = Q ÷ V × 60).
The feasibility of achieving specific ventilation rates depends on the
construction and operational requirements of the ventilation system
(e.g., the energy requirements to move and to heat or cool the air). The
feasibility of achieving specific ventilation rates may also be different
for retrofitted facilities and newly constructed facilities. The expense
and effort of achieving specific higher ventilation rates for new con-
struction may be reasonable, whereas retrofitting an existing facility to
achieve similar ventilation rates may be more difficult. However, achiev-
ing higher ventilation rates by using auxiliary methods (e.g., room-air
recirculation) in addition to exhaust ventilation may be feasible in exist-
ing facilities (Suppl. 3, Section II.C).
2. Airflow patterns within rooms (air mixing)
Purpose: To provide optimum airflow patterns and prevent both stagna-
tion and short-circuiting of air.
General ventilation systems should be designed to provide optimal pat-
terns of airflow within rooms and prevent air stagnation or short-circuiting
of air from the supply to the exhaust (i.e., passage of air directly from the
air supply to the air exhaust). To provide optimal airflow patterns, the air
supply and exhaust should be located such that clean air first flows to
parts of the room where HCWs are likely to work, and then flows across the
infectious source and into the exhaust. In this way, the HCW is not posi-
tioned between the infectious source and the exhaust location. Although
this configuration may not always be possible, it should be used whenever
feasible. One way to achieve this airflow pattern is to supply air at the side
of the room opposite the patient and exhaust it from the side where the
patient is located. Another method, which is most effective when the sup-
ply air is cooler than the room air, is to supply air near the ceiling and
exhaust it near the floor (Figure S3-2). Airflow patterns are affected by
large air temperature differentials, the precise location of the supply and
exhausts, the location of furniture, the movement of HCWs and patients,
and the physical configuration of the space. Smoke tubes can be used to
visualize airflow patterns in a manner similar to that described for estimat-
ing room air mixing.
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Adequate air mixing, which requires that an adequate number of ACH be
provided to a room (Suppl. 3, Section II.B.1), must be ensured to prevent
air stagnation within the room. However, the air will not usually be
changed the calculated number of times per hour because the airflow pat-
terns in the room may not permit complete mixing of the supply and room
air in all parts of the room. This results in an “effective” airflow rate in
which the supplied airflow may be less than required for proper ventila-
tion. To account for this variation, a mixing factor (which ranges from 1 for
perfect mixing to 10 for poor mixing) is applied as a multiplier to determine
the actual supply airflow (i.e., the recommended ACH multiplied by the
mixing factor equals the actual required ACH) (51,98 ). The room air supply
and exhaust system should be designed to achieve the lowest mixing fac-
tor possible. The mixing factor is determined most accurately by
experimentally testing each space configuration, but this procedure is
complex and time-consuming. A reasonably good qualitative measure of
mixing can be estimated by an experienced ventilation engineer who re-
leases smoke from smoke tubes at a number of locations in the room and
observes the movement of the smoke. Smoke movement in all areas of the












† Air should be exhausted to the outside (or through high-efficiency particulate air [HEPA] filters,
if recirculated).
FIGURE S3-2. Room airflow patterns designed to provide mixing of air and prevent
passage of air directly from the air supply to the exhaust*
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indicates poor mixing, and movement of the supply and exhaust openings
or redirection of the supply air is necessary.
3. Airflow direction in the facility
Purpose: To contain contaminated air in localized areas in a facility and
prevent its spread to uncontaminated areas.
a. Directional airflow
The general ventilation system should be designed and balanced so
that air flows from less contaminated (i.e., more clean) to more con-
taminated (less clean) areas (47,48 ). For example, air should flow from
corridors (cleaner areas) into TB isolation rooms (less clean areas) to
prevent spread of contaminants to other areas. In some special treat-
ment rooms in which operative and invasive procedures are performed,
the direction of airflow is from the room to the hallway to provide
cleaner air during these procedures. Cough-inducing or aerosol-
generating procedures (e.g., bronchoscopy and irrigation of tubercu-
lous abscesses) should not be performed in rooms with this type of
airflow on patients who may have infectious TB.
b. Negative pressure for achieving directional airflow
The direction of airflow is controlled by creating a lower (negative) pres-
sure in the area into which the flow of air is desired. For air to flow from
one area to another, the air pressure in the two areas must be different.
Air will flow from a higher pressure area to a lower pressure area. The
lower pressure area is described as being at negative* pressure relative
to the higher pressure area. Negative pressure is attained by exhausting
air from an area at a higher rate than air is being supplied. The level of
negative pressure necessary to achieve the desired airflow will depend
on the physical configuration of the ventilation system and area, includ-
ing the airflow path and flow openings, and should be determined on
an individual basis by an experienced ventilation engineer.
4. Achieving negative pressure in a room
Purpose: To control the direction of airflow between the room and adjacent
areas, thereby preventing contaminated air from escaping from the room
into other areas of the facility.
a. Pressure differential
The minimum pressure difference necessary to achieve and maintain
negative pressure that will result in airflow into the room is very
small (0.001 inch of water). Higher pressures (≥0.001 inch of water) are
satisfactory; however, these higher pressures may be difficult to
*Negative is defined relative to the air pressure in the area from which air is to flow.
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achieve. The actual level of negative pressure achieved will depend on
the difference in the ventilation exhaust and supply flows and the physi-
cal configuration of the room, including the airflow path and flow
openings. If the room is well sealed, negative pressures greater than the
minimum of 0.001 inch of water may be readily achieved. However, if
rooms are not well sealed, as may be the case in many facilities (espe-
cially older facilities), achieving higher negative pressures may require
exhaust/supply flow differentials beyond the capability of the ventila-
tion system.
To establish negative pressure in a room that has a normally function-
ing ventilation system, the room supply and exhaust airflows are first
balanced to achieve an exhaust flow of either 10% or 50 cubic feet per
minute (cfm) greater than the supply (whichever is the greater). In most
situations, this specification should achieve a negative pressure of at
least 0.001 inch of water. If the minimum 0.001 inch of water is not
achieved and cannot be achieved by increasing the flow differential
(within the limits of the ventilation system), the room should be in-
spected for leakage (e.g., through doors, windows, plumbing, and
equipment wall penetrations), and corrective action should be taken to
seal the leaks.
Negative pressure in a room can be altered by changing the ventilation
system operation or by the opening and closing of the room’s doors,
corridor doors, or windows. When an operating configuration has been
established, it is essential that all doors and windows remain properly
closed in the isolation room and other areas (e.g., doors in corridors
that affect air pressure) except when persons need to enter or leave the
room or area.
b. Alternate methods for achieving negative pressure
Although an anteroom is not a substitute for negative pressure in a
room, it may be used to reduce escape of droplet nuclei during opening
and closing of the isolation room door. Some anterooms have their own
air supply duct, but others do not. The TB isolation room should have
negative pressure relative to the anteroom, but the air pressure in the
anteroom relative to the corridor may vary depending on the building
design. This should be determined, in accordance with applicable regu-
lations, by a qualified ventilation engineer.
If the existing ventilation system is incapable of achieving the desired
negative pressure because the room lacks a separate ventilation system
or the room’s system cannot provide the proper airflow, steps should be
taken to provide a means to discharge air from the room. The amount
of air to be exhausted will be the same as discussed previously
(Suppl. 3, Section II.B.4.a).
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Fixed room-air recirculation systems (i.e., systems that recirculate the
air in an entire room) may be designed to achieve negative pressure by
discharging air outside the room (Suppl. 3, Section II.C.3).
Some portable room-air recirculation units (Suppl. 3, Section II.C.3.b.)
are designed to discharge air to the outside to achieve negative pres-
sure. Air cleaners that can accomplish this must be designed spe-
cifically for this purpose.
A small centrifugal blower (i.e., exhaust fan) can be used to exhaust air
to the outside through a window or outside wall. This approach may be
used as an interim measure to achieve negative pressure, but it pro-
vides no fresh air and suboptimal dilution.
Another approach to achieving the required pressure difference is to
pressurize the corridor. Using this method, the corridor’s general venti-
lation system is balanced to create a higher air pressure in the corridor
than in the isolation room; the type of balancing necessary depends on
the configuration of the ventilation system. Ideally, the corridor air sup-
ply rate should be increased while the corridor exhaust rate is not
increased. If this is not possible, the exhaust rate should be decreased
by resetting appropriate exhaust dampers. Caution should be exer-
cised, however, to ensure that the exhaust rate is not reduced below
acceptable levels. This approach requires that all settings used to
achieve the pressure balance, including doors, be maintained. This
method may not be desirable if the corridor being pressurized has
rooms in which negative pressure is not desired. In many situations,
this system is difficult to achieve, and it should be considered only after
careful review by ventilation personnel.
c. Monitoring negative pressure 
The negative pressure in a room can be monitored by visually observ-
ing the direction of airflow (e.g., using smoke tubes) or by measuring
the differential pressure between the room and its surrounding area.
Smoke from a smoke tube can be used to observe airflow between ar-
eas or airflow patterns within an area. To check the negative pressure in
a room by using a smoke tube, hold the smoke tube near the bottom of
the door and approximately 2 inches in front of the door, or at the face
of a grille or other opening if the door has such a feature, and generate
a small amount of smoke by gently squeezing the bulb (Figure S3-3).
The smoke tube should be held parallel to the door, and the smoke
should be issued from the tube slowly to ensure the velocity of the
smoke from the tube does not overpower the air velocity. The smoke
will travel in the direction of airflow. If the room is at negative pressure,
the smoke will travel under the door and into the room (e.g., from
higher to lower pressure). If the room is not at negative pressure, the
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smoke will be blown outward or will stay stationary. This test must be
performed while the door is closed. If room air cleaners are being used
in the room, they should be running. The smoke is irritating if inhaled,
and care should be taken not to inhale it directly from the smoke tube.
However, the quantity of smoke issued from the tube is minimal and is
not detectable at short distances from the tube.
Differential pressure-sensing devices also can be used to monitor
negative pressure; they can provide either periodic (noncontinuous)
pressure measurements or continuous pressure monitoring. The con-
tinuous monitoring component may simply be a visible and/or audible
warning signal that air pressure is low. In addition, it may also provide
a pressure readout signal, which can be recorded for later verification or
used to automatically adjust the facility’s ventilation control system.
Pressure-measuring devices should sense the room pressure just inside
the airflow path into the room (e.g., at the bottom of the door). Unusual
airflow patterns within the room can cause pressure variations; for ex-







*Smoke flowing into the room indicates the room is at negative pressure relative to the corridor,
and smoke flowing out of the room indicates the room is at positive pressure relative to the
corridor. The anemometer, if used, is placed with the sensor in the airflow path at the bottom
of the door.
FIGURE S3-3. Smoke-tube testing and anemometer placement to determine the
direction of airflow into and out of a room*
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positive pressure at the bottom of the same door (Figure S3-4). If the
pressure-sensing ports of the device cannot be located directly across
the airflow path, it will be necessary to validate that the negative pres-
sure at the sensing point is and remains the same as the negative
pressure across the flow path.
Pressure-sensing devices should incorporate an audible warning with a
time delay to indicate that a door is open. When the door to the room is
opened, the negative pressure will decrease. The time-delayed signal
should allow sufficient time for persons to enter or leave the room with-
out activating the audible warning.
A potential problem with using pressure-sensing devices is that the
pressure differentials used to achieve the low negative pressure neces-
sitate the use of very sensitive mechanical devices, electronic devices,
or pressure gauges to ensure accurate measurements. Use of devices
that cannot measure these low pressures (i.e., pressures as low as
0.001 inch of water) will require setting higher negative pressures that
may be difficult and, in some instances, impractical to achieve (Suppl. 3,
Section II.B.4).
Periodic checks are required to ensure that the desired negative pres-
sure is present and that the continuous monitoring devices, if used, are
operating properly. If smoke tubes or other visual checks are used, TB
isolation rooms and treatment rooms should be checked frequently




Airflow pressure at Position 1 may differ from Position 2.
Measure pressure at Position 2 to correctly identify negative pressure.
P2
*Located on door frame.
FIGURE S3-4. Cross-sectional view of a room showing the location of negative
pressure measurement
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system should be checked daily. TB isolation rooms should be checked
daily for negative pressure while being used for TB isolation. If these
rooms are not being used for patients who have suspected or con-
firmed TB but potentially could be used for such patients, the negative
pressure in the rooms should be checked monthly. If pressure-sensing
devices are used, negative pressure should be verified at least once a
month by using smoke tubes or taking pressure measurements.
C. HEPA filtration
Purpose: To remove contaminants from the air.
HEPA filtration can be used as a method of air cleaning that supplements
other recommended ventilation measures. For the purposes of these
guidelines, HEPA filters are defined as air-cleaning devices that have a dem-
onstrated and documented minimum removal efficiency of 99.97% of
particles ≥0.3 µm in diameter. HEPA filters have been shown to be effective in
reducing the concentration of Aspergillus spores (which range in size from
1.5 µm to 6 µm) to below measurable levels (100–102 ). The ability of HEPA
filters to remove tubercle bacilli from the air has not been studied, but M. tu-
berculosis droplet nuclei probably range from 1 µm to 5 µm in diameter (i.e.,
approximately the same size as Aspergillus spores). Therefore, HEPA filters
can be expected to remove infectious droplet nuclei from contaminated air.
HEPA filters can be used to clean air before it is exhausted to the outside,
recirculated to other areas of a facility, or recirculated within a room. If the
device is not completely passive (e.g., it utilizes techniques such as electro-
statics) and the failure of the electrostatic components permits loss of
filtration efficiency to <99.97%, the device should not be used in systems that
recirculate air back into the general facility ventilation system from TB isola-
tion rooms and treatment rooms in which procedures are performed on
patients who may have infectious TB (Suppl. 3, Section II.C.2).
HEPA filters can be used in a number of ways to reduce or eliminate infectious
droplet nuclei from room air or exhaust. These methods include placement of
HEPA filters a) in exhaust ducts to remove droplet nuclei from air being dis-
charged to the outside, either directly or through ventilation equipment; b) in
ducts discharging room air into the general ventilation system; and c) in fixed
or portable room-air cleaners. The effectiveness of portable HEPA room-air
cleaning units has not been evaluated adequately, and there is probably con-
siderable variation in their effectiveness. HEPA filters can also be used in
exhaust ducts or vents that discharge air from booths or enclosures into the
surrounding room (Suppl. 3, Section II.A.3). In any application, HEPA filters
should be installed carefully and maintained meticulously to ensure adequate
function.
Manufacturers of room-air cleaning equipment should provide documenta-
tion of the HEPA filter efficiency and the efficiency of the installed device in
lowering room-air contaminant levels.
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1. Use of HEPA filtration when exhausting air to the outside
HEPA filters can be used as an added safety measure to clean air from
isolation rooms and local exhaust devices (i.e., booths, tents, or hoods
used for cough-inducing procedures) before exhausting it directly to the
outside, but such use is unnecessary if the exhaust air cannot re-enter the
ventilation system supply. The use of HEPA filters should be considered
wherever exhaust air could possibly reenter the system.
In many instances, exhaust air is not discharged directly to the outside;
rather, the air is directed through heat-recovery devices (e.g., heat wheels).
Heat wheels are often used to reduce the costs of operating ventilation
systems (103 ). If such units are used with the system, a HEPA filter should
also be used. As the wheel rotates, energy is transferred into or removed
from the supply inlet air stream. The HEPA filter should be placed up-
stream from the heat wheel because of the potential for leakage across the
seals separating the inlet and exhaust chambers and the theoretical possi-
bility that droplet nuclei could be impacted on the wheel by the exhaust air
and subsequently stripped off into the supply air. 
2. Recirculation of HEPA-filtered air to other areas of a facility
Air from TB isolation rooms and treatment rooms used to treat patients
who have confirmed or suspected infectious TB should be exhausted to
the outside in accordance with applicable federal, state, and local regula-
tions. The air should not be recirculated into the general ventilation. In
some instances, recirculation of air into the general ventilation system
from such rooms is unavoidable (i.e., in existing facilities in which the ven-
tilation system or facility configuration makes venting the exhaust to the
outside impossible). In such cases, HEPA filters should be installed in the
exhaust duct leading from the room to the general ventilation system to
remove infectious organisms and particulates the size of droplet nuclei
from the air before it is returned to the general ventilation system (Section
II.F; Suppl. 3). Air from TB isolation rooms and treatment rooms in new or
renovated facilities should not be recirculated into the general ventilation
system.
3. Recirculation of HEPA-filtered air within a room
Individual room-air recirculation can be used in areas where there is no gen-
eral ventilation system, where an existing system is incapable of providing
adequate airflow, or where an increase in ventilation is desired without
affecting the fresh air supply or negative pressure system already in place.
Recirculation of HEPA-filtered air within a room can be achieved in several
ways: a) by exhausting air from the room into a duct, filtering it through a
HEPA filter installed in the duct, and returning it to the room (Figure S3-5);
b) by filtering air through HEPA recirculation systems mounted on the wall
or ceiling of the room (Figure S3-6); or c) by filtering air through portable
HEPA recirculation systems. In this document, the first two of these
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HEPA filter
and blower
10% Exhaust to outside for negative
pressure if room has no ventilation
*Such a system can be used to increase the room ventilation rate.
FIGURE S3-5. Fixed, ducted room-air recirculation system using a high-efficiency








Position the HEPA unit one third of the room’s length from the patient’s end of the room.
*Such a system can be used to increase the room ventilation rate. Position the HEPA unit one
third of the room’s length from the patient’s end of the room.
FIGURE S3-6. Fixed ceiling-mounted room-air recirculation system using a high-
efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter*
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approaches are referred to as fixed room-air recirculation systems, be-
cause the HEPA filter devices are fixed in place and are not easily movable.
a. Fixed room-air recirculation systems
The preferred method of recirculating HEPA-filtered air within a room is
a built-in system, in which air is exhausted from the room into a duct,
filtered through a HEPA filter, and returned to the room (Figure S3-5).
This technique may be used to add air changes in areas where there is
a recommended minimum ACH that is difficult to meet with general
ventilation alone. The air does not have to be conditioned, other than by
the filtration, and this permits higher airflow rates than the general ven-
tilation system can usually achieve. An alternative is the use of HEPA
filtration units that are mounted on the wall or ceiling of the room
(Figure S3-7). Fixed recirculation systems are preferred over portable
(free-standing) units because they can be installed and maintained with
a greater degree of reliability.
b. Portable room-air recirculation units
Portable HEPA filtration units may be considered for recirculating air
within rooms in which there is no general ventilation system, where the
system is incapable of providing adequate airflow, or where increased
effectiveness in room airflow is desired. Effectiveness depends on cir-
culating as much of the air in the room as possible through the HEPA
filter, which may be difficult to achieve and evaluate. The effectiveness
of a particular unit can vary depending on the room’s configuration, the
furniture and persons in the room, and placement of the HEPA filtration
unit and the supply and exhaust grilles. Therefore, the effectiveness of
the portable unit may vary considerably in rooms with different con-
figurations or in the same room if moved from one location to another
in the room. If portable units are used, caution should be exercised to
ensure they can recirculate all or nearly all of the room air through the
HEPA filter. Some commercially available units may not be able to meet
this requirement because of design limitations or insufficient airflow ca-
pacity. In addition, units should be designed and operated to ensure
that persons in the room cannot interfere with or otherwise compro-
mise the functioning of the unit. Portable HEPA filtration units have not
been evaluated adequately to determine their role in TB infection-
control programs.
Portable HEPA filtration units should be designed to achieve the equiva-
lent of ≥12 ACH. They should also be designed to ensure adequate air
mixing in all areas of the hospital rooms in which they are used, and
they should not interfere with the current ventilation system.
Some HEPA filtration units employ UVGI for disinfecting air after HEPA
filtration. However, whether exposing the HEPA-filtered air to UV
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irradiation further decreases the concentration of contaminants is not
known.
c. Evaluation of room-air recirculation systems and units
Detailed and accurate evaluations of room-air recirculation systems and
units require the use of sophisticated test equipment and lengthy test
procedures that are not practical. However, an estimate of the unit’s
ability to circulate the air in the room can be made by visualizing airflow
patterns as was described previously for estimating room air mixing
(Suppl. 3, Section II.B.1). If the air movement is good in all areas of the
room, the unit should be effective.
4. Installing, maintaining, and monitoring HEPA filters
Proper installation and testing and meticulous maintenance are critical if a
HEPA filtration system is used (104 ), especially if the system used recircu-
lates air to other parts of the facility. Improper design, installation, or
maintenance could allow infectious particles to circumvent filtration and
escape into the general ventilation system (47 ). HEPA filters should be in-
stalled to prevent leakage between filter segments and between the filter
bed and its frame. A regularly scheduled maintenance program is required
to monitor the HEPA filter for possible leakage and for filter loading. A
quantitative leakage and filter performance test (e.g., the dioctal phthalate
[DOP] penetration test [105 ]) should be performed at the initial installation
and every time the filter is changed or moved. The test should be repeated
every 6 months for filters in general-use areas and in areas with systems
that exhaust air that is likely to be contaminated with M. tuberculosis (e.g,
TB isolation rooms).
A manometer or other pressure-sensing device should be installed in the
filter system to provide an accurate and objective means of determining
the need for filter replacement. Pressure drop characteristics of the filter
are supplied by the manufacturer of the filter. Installation of the filter
should allow for maintenance that will not contaminate the delivery sys-
tem or the area served. For general infection-control purposes, special
care should be taken to not jar or drop the filter element during or after
removal.
The scheduled maintenance program should include procedures for instal-
lation, removal, and disposal of filter elements. HEPA filter maintenance
should be performed only by adequately trained personnel. Appropriate
respiratory protection should be worn while performing maintenance and
testing procedures. In addition, filter housing and ducts leading to the
housing should be labelled clearly with the words “Contaminated Air” (or
a similar warning).
When a HEPA filter is used, one or more lower efficiency disposable prefil-
ters installed upstream will extend the useful life of the HEPA filter. A
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disposable filter can increase the life of a HEPA filter by 25%. If the dispos-
able filter is followed by a 90% extended surface filter, the life of the HEPA
filter can be extended almost 900% (98 ). These prefilters should be han-
dled and disposed of in the same manner as the HEPA filter.
D. TB Isolation Rooms and Treatment Rooms
Purpose: To separate patients who are likely to have infectious TB from other
persons, to provide an environment that will allow reduction of the concen-
tration of droplet nuclei through various engineering methods, and to prevent
the escape of droplet nuclei from such rooms into the corridor and other
areas of the facility using directional airflow.
A hierarchy of ventilation methods used to achieve a reduction in the concen-
tration of droplet nuclei and to achieve directional airflow using negative
pressure has been developed (Table S3-2). The methods are listed in order
from the most desirable to the least desirable. The method selected will de-
pend on the configuration of the isolation room and the ventilation system in
the facility; the determination should be made in consultation with a ventila-
tion engineer.
TABLE S3-2. Hierarchy of ventilation methods for tuberculosis (TB) isolation rooms
and treatment rooms
Reducing concentration 
of airborne tubercle bacilli*
Achieving directional airflow 
using negative pressure†
1. Facility heating, ventilation, and
air-conditioning (HVAC) system.
2. Fixed room-air high-efficiency
particulate air (HEPA) recirculation
system.
3. Wall- or ceiling-mounted room-air
HEPA recirculation system.
4. Portable room-air HEPA recirculation
unit.¶
1. Facility HVAC system.
2. Bleed air§ from fixed room-air HEPA
recirculation system.
3. Bleed air from wall- or
ceiling-mounted room-air HEPA
recirculation system.
4. Bleed air from portable room-air
HEPA recirculation unit.¶
5. Exhaust air from room through
window-mounted fan.**
 *Ventilation methods are used to reduce the concentration of airborne tubercle bacilli. If the
facility HVAC system cannot achieve the recommended ventilation rate, auxiliary room-air
recirculation methods may be used. These methods are listed in order from the most
desirable to the least desirable. Ultraviolet germicidal irradiation may be used as a
supplement to any of the ventilation methods for air cleaning.
†Directional airflow using negative pressure can be achieved with the facility HVAC system
and/or the auxiliary air-recirculation–cleaning systems. These methods are listed in order
from the most desirable to the least desirable.
§To remove the amount of return air necessary to achieve negative pressure.
¶The effectiveness of portable room-air HEPA recirculation units can vary depending on the
room’s configuration, the furniture and persons in the room, the placement of the unit, the
supply and exhaust grilles, and the achievable ventilation rates and air mixing. Units should
be designed and operated to ensure that persons in the room cannot interfere with or
otherwise compromise the function of the unit. Fixed recirculating systems are preferred
over portable units in TB isolation rooms of facilities in which services are provided regularly
to TB patients.
**This method simply achieves negative pressure and should be used only as a temporary
measure.
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1. Preventing the escape of droplet nuclei from the room
Rooms used for TB isolation should be single-patient rooms with negative
pressure relative to the corridor or other areas connected to the room.
Doors between the isolation room and other areas should remain closed
except for entry into or exit from the room. The room’s openings (e.g., win-
dows and electrical and plumbing entries) should be sealed as much as
possible. However, a small gap of 1⁄8 to 1⁄2 inch should be at the bottom of
the door to provide a controlled airflow path. Proper use of negative pres-
sure will prevent contaminated air from escaping the room.
2. Reducing the concentration of droplet nuclei in the room
ASHRAE (47 ), AIA (48 ), and the Health Resources and Services Admini-
stration (49 ) recommend a minimum of 6 ACH for TB isolation rooms and
treatment rooms. This ventilation rate is based on comfort- and odor-
control considerations. The effectiveness of this level of airflow in reduc-
ing the concentration of droplet nuclei in the room, thus reducing the
transmission of airborne pathogens, has not been evaluated directly or
adequately.
Ventilation rates >6 ACH are likely to produce an incrementally greater re-
duction in the concentration of bacteria in a room than are lower rates
(50–52 ). However, accurate quantitation of decreases in risk that would
result from specific increases in general ventilation levels has not been
performed and may not be possible. 
To reduce the concentration of droplet nuclei, TB isolation rooms and
treatment rooms in existing health-care facilities should have an airflow of
≥6 ACH. Where feasible, this airflow rate should be increased to ≥12 ACH
by adjusting or modifying the ventilation system or by using auxiliary
means (e.g., recirculation of air through fixed HEPA filtration units or
portable air cleaners) (Suppl. 3, Section II.C) (53 ). New construction or
renovation of existing health-care facilities should be designed so that TB
isolation rooms achieve an airflow of ≥12 ACH.
3. Exhaust from TB isolation rooms and treatment rooms
Air from TB isolation rooms and treatment rooms in which patients with
infectious TB may be examined should be exhausted directly to the out-
side of the building and away from air-intake vents, persons, and animals
in accordance with federal, state, and local regulations concerning
environmental discharges. (See Suppl. 3, Section II.C, for information re-
garding recirculation of exhaust air.) Exhaust ducts should not be located
near areas that may be populated (e.g., near sidewalks or windows that
could be opened). Ventilation system exhaust discharges and inlets should
be designed to prevent reentry of exhausted air. Wind blowing over a
building creates a highly turbulent recirculation zone, which can cause ex-
hausted air to reenter the building (Figure S3-7). Exhaust flow should be
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discharged above this zone (Suppl. 3, Section II.C.1). Design guidelines for
proper placement of exhaust ducts can be found in the 1989 ASHRAE Fun-
damentals Handbook (106 ). If recirculation of air from such rooms into the
general ventilation system is unavoidable, the air should be passed
through a HEPA filter before recirculation (Suppl. 3, Section II.C.2).
4. Alternatives to TB isolation rooms
Isolation can also be achieved by use of negative-pressure enclosures (e.g,
tents or booths) (Suppl. 3, Section II.A.1). These can be used to provide
patient isolation in areas such as emergency rooms and medical testing
and treatment areas and to supplement isolation in designated isolation
rooms.
III. UVGI
Purpose: To kill or inactivate airborne tubercle bacilli.
Research has demonstrated that UVGI is effective in killing or inactivating
tubercle bacilli under experimental conditions (66,107–110 ) and in reducing
transmission of other infections in hospitals (111 ), military housing (112 ), and






*Height of air recirculation zone may be variable. Air should be exhausted above this zone to
prevent re-entrainment.
FIGURE S3-7. Air recirculation zone* created by wind blowing over a building
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the experiences of TB clinicians and mycobacteriologists during the past several
decades, the use of UVGI has been recommended as a supplement to other TB
infection-control measures in settings where the need for killing or inactivating
tubercle bacilli is important (2,4,121–125 ).
UV radiation is defined as that portion of the electromagnetic spectrum described
by wavelengths from 100 to 400 nm. For convenience of classification, the UV
spectrum has been separated into three different wavelength bands: UV-A (long
wavelengths, range: 320–400 nm), UV-B (midrange wavelengths, range: 290–
320 nm), and UV-C (short wavelengths, range: 100–290 nm) (126 ). Commercially
available UV lamps used for germicidal purposes are low-pressure mercury vapor
lamps (127 ) that emit radiant energy in the UV-C range, predominantly at a wave-
length of 253.7 nm (128 ).
A. Applications
UVGI can be used as a method of air disinfection to supplement other engi-
neering controls. Two systems of UVGI can be used for this purpose: duct
irradiation and upper-room air irradiation.
1. Duct irradiation
Purpose: To inactivate tubercle bacilli without exposing persons to UVGI.
In duct irradiation systems, UV lamps are placed inside ducts that remove
air from rooms to disinfect the air before it is recirculated. When UVGI duct
systems are properly designed, installed, and maintained, high levels of
UV radiation may be produced in the duct work. The only potential for hu-
man exposure to this radiation occurs during maintenance operations.
Duct irradiation may be used:
• In a TB isolation room or treatment room to recirculate air from the
room, through a duct containing UV lamps, and back into the room.
This recirculation method can increase the overall room airflow but
does not increase the supply of fresh outside air to the room.
• In other patients’ rooms and in waiting rooms, emergency rooms, and
other general-use areas of a facility where patients with undiagnosed
TB could potentially contaminate the air, to recirculate air back into the
general ventilation.
Duct-irradiation systems are dependent on airflow patterns within a
room that ensure that all or nearly all of the room air circulates through
the duct.
2. Upper-room air irradiation
Purpose: To inactivate tubercle bacilli in the upper part of the room, while
minimizing radiation exposure to persons in the lower part of the room. 
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In upper-room air irradiation, UVGI lamps are suspended from the ceiling
or mounted on the wall. The bottom of the lamp is shielded to direct the
radiation upward but not downward. The system depends on air mixing to
take irradiated air from the upper to the lower part of the room, and non-
irradiated air from the lower to the upper part. The irradiated air space is
much larger than that in a duct system.
UVGI has been effective in killing bacteria under conditions where air mix-
ing was accomplished mainly by convection. For example, BCG was
atomized in a room that did not have supplemental ventilation (120 ), and
in another study a surrogate bacteria, Serratia marcesens, was aerosolized
in a room with a ventilation rate of 6 ACH (129 ). These reports estimated
the effect of UVGI to be equivalent to 10 and 39 ACH, respectively, for the
organisms tested, which are less resistant to UVGI than M. tuberculosis
(120 ). The addition of fans or some heating/air conditioning arrangements
may double the effectiveness of UVGI lamps (130–132 ). Greater rates of
ventilation, however, may decrease the length of time the air is irradiated,
thus decreasing the killing of bacteria (117,129 ). The optimal relationship
between ventilation and UVGI is not known. Air irradiation lamps used in
corridors have been effective in killing atomized S. marcesens (133 ). Use
of UVGI lamps in an outpatient room has reduced culturable airborne
bacteria by 14%–19%. However, the irradiation did not reduce the con-
centration of gram-positive, rod-shaped bacteria; although fast-growing
mycobacteria were cultured, M. tuberculosis could not be recovered from
the room’s air samples because of fungal overgrowth of media plates
(134 ).
Upper-room air UVGI irradiation may be used:
• In isolation or treatment rooms as a supplemental method of air clean-
ing.
• In other patients’ rooms and in waiting rooms, emergency rooms, corri-
dors, and other central areas of a facility where patients with un-
diagnosed TB could potentially contaminate the air.
Determinants of UVGI effectiveness include room configuration, UV
lamp placement, and the adequacy of airflow patterns in bringing con-
taminated air into contact with the irradiated upper-room space. Air
mixing may be facilitated by supplying cool air near the ceiling in rooms
where warmer air (or a heating device) is present below. The ceiling
should be high enough for a large volume of upper-room air to be irra-
diated without HCWs and patients being overexposed to UV radiation.
B. Limitations
Because the clinical effectiveness of UV systems varies, and because of the
risk for transmission of M. tuberculosis if a system malfunctions or is main-
tained improperly, UVGI is not recommended for the following specific
applications:
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1. Duct systems using UVGI are not recommended as a substitute for HEPA
filters if air from isolation rooms must be recirculated to other areas of a
facility.
2. UVGI alone is not recommended as a substitute for HEPA filtration or
local exhaust of air to the outside from booths, tents, or hoods used for
cough-inducing procedures.
3. UVGI is not a substitute for negative pressure. 
The use of UV lamps and HEPA filtration in a single unit would not be ex-
pected to have any infection-control benefits not provided by use of the HEPA
filter alone.
The effectiveness of UVGI in killing airborne tubercle bacilli depends on the
intensity of UVGI, the duration of contact the organism has with the irradia-
tion, and the relative humidity (66,108,111 ). Humidity can have an adverse
effect on UVGI effectiveness at levels >70% relative humidity for S. marces-
cens (135 ). The interaction of these factors has not been fully defined,
however, making precise recommendations for individual UVGI installations
difficult to develop.
Old lamps or dust-covered UV lamps are less effective; therefore, regular
maintenance of UVGI systems is crucial.
C. Safety Issues
Short-term overexposure to UV radiation can cause erythema and keratocon-
junctivitis (136,137 ). Broad-spectrum UV radiation has been associated with
increased risk for squamous and basal cell carcinomas of the skin (138 ). UV-C
was recently classified by the International Agency for Research on Cancer as
“probably carcinogenic to humans (Group 2A)” (138 ). This classification is
based on studies suggesting that UV-C radiation can induce skin cancers in
animals; DNA damage, chromosomal aberrations and sister chromatid ex-
change and transformation in human cells in vitro; and DNA damage in
mammalian skin cells in vivo. In the animal studies, a contribution of UV-B to
the tumor effects could not be excluded, but the effects were greater than
expected for UV-B alone (138 ). Although some recent studies have demon-
strated that UV radiation can activate HIV gene promoters (i.e., the genes in
HIV that prompt replication of the virus) in laboratory samples of human
cells (139–144 ), the implications of these in vitro findings for humans are un-
known.
In 1972, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
published a recommended exposure limit (REL) for occupational exposure to
UV radiation (136 ). The REL is intended to protect workers from the acute
effects of UV exposure (e.g., erythema and photokeratoconjunctivitis). How-
ever, photosensitive persons and those exposed concomitantly to photo-
active chemicals may not be protected by the recommended standard.
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If proper procedures are not followed, HCWs performing maintenance on
such fixtures are at risk for exposure to UV radiation. Because UV fixtures
used for upper-room air irradiation are present in rooms, rather than hidden
in ducts, safety may be much more difficult to achieve and maintain. Fixtures
must be designed and installed to ensure that UV exposure to persons in the
room (including HCWs and inpatients) are below current safe exposure lev-
els. Recent health hazard evaluations conducted by CDC have noted
problems with overexposure of HCWs to UVGI and with inadequate mainte-
nance, training, labelling, and use of personal protective equipment
(145–147 ).
The current number of persons who are properly trained in UVGI system de-
sign and installation is limited. CDC strongly recommends that a competent
UVGI system designer be consulted to address safety considerations before
such a system is procured and installed. Experts who might be consulted in-
clude industrial hygienists, engineers, and health physicists. Principles for the
safe installation of UV lamp fixtures have been developed and can be used as
guidelines (148,149 ).
If UV lamps are being used in a facility, the general TB education of HCWs
should include:
1. The basic principles of UVGI systems (i.e., how they work and what their
limitations are).
2. The potential hazardous effects of UVGI if overexposure occurs.
3. The potential for photosensitivity associated with certain medical condi-
tions or use of some medications.
4. The importance of general maintenance procedures for UVGI fixtures.
Exposure to UV intensities above the REL should be avoided. Lightweight
clothing made of tightly woven fabric and UV-absorbing sunscreens with
solar-protection factors (SPFs) ≥15 may help protect photosensitive persons.
HCWs should be advised that any eye or skin irritation that develops after UV
exposure should be examined by occupational health staff.
D. Exposure Criteria for UV Radiation
The NIOSH REL for UV radiation is wavelength dependent because different
wavelengths of UV radiation have different adverse effects on the skin and
eyes (136 ). Relative spectral effectiveness (Sλ) is used to compare various UV
sources with a source producing UV radiation at 270 nm, the wavelength of
maximum ocular sensitivity. For example, the Sλ at 254 nm is 0.5; therefore,
twice as much energy is required at 254 nm to produce an identical biologic
effect at 270 nm (136 ). Thus, at 254 nm, the NIOSH REL is 0.006 joules per
square centimeter (J/cm2); and at 270 nm, it is 0.003 J/cm2.
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For germicidal lamps that emit radiant energy predominantly at a wavelength
of 254 nm, proper use of the REL requires that the measured irradiance level
(E) in microwatts per square centimeter (µW/cm2) be multiplied by the rela-
tive spectral effectiveness at 254 nm (0.5) to obtain the effective irradiance
(Eeff). The maximum permissible exposure time can then be determined for
selected values of Eeff (Table S3-3), or it can be calculated (in seconds) by
dividing 0.003 J/cm2 (the NIOSH REL at 270 nm) by Eeff in µW/cm2 (136,150 ).
To protect HCWs who are exposed to germicidal UV radiation for 8 hours per
workday, the measured irradiance (E) should be ≤0.2 µW/cm2. This is calcu-
lated by obtaining Eeff (0.1 µW/cm2) (Table S3-3) and then dividing this value
by Sλ (0.5).
E. Maintenance and Monitoring
1. Labelling and posting
Warning signs should be posted on UV lamps and wherever high-intensity
(i.e., UV exposure greater than the REL) germicidal UV irradiation is pres-
ent (e.g., upper-room air space and accesses to ducts [if duct irradiation is
TABLE S3-3. Maximum permissible exposure times* for selected values of effective
irradiance
Permissible exposure time per day
Effective irradiance (Eeff)†
(µW/cm2)
8 hrs   0.1
4 hrs   0.2
2 hrs   0.4
1 hr   0.8
30 min   1.7
15 min   3.3
10 min   5.0
5 min  10.0
1 min  50.0
30 sec  100.0
*Permissible exposure times are designed to prevent acute effects of irradiation to skin and
eyes (136 ). These recommended limits are wavelength dependent because different wave-
lengths of ultraviolet (UV) radiation have different adverse effects on these organs.
† Relative spectral effectiveness (Sλ) is used to compare various UV sources with a source
producing UV radiation at 270 nm, the wavelength of maximum ocular sensitivity.  For exam-
ple, the relative spectral effectiveness at 254 nm is 0.5; therefore, twice as much energy is
required at 254 nm to produce an identical biologic effect at 270 nm. At 254 nm, the NIOSH
REL is 0.006 joules per square centimeter (J/cm2); and at 270 nm, it is 0.003 J/cm2. For ger-
micidal lamps that emit radiant energy predominantly at a wavelength of 254 nm, proper use
of the REL requires that the measured irradiance level (E) in microwatts per square centimeter
(µW/cm2) be multiplied by the relative spectral effectiveness at 254 nm (0.5) to obtain Eeff. The
maximum permissible exposure time can be calculated (in seconds) by dividing 0.003 J/cm2
(the NIOSH REL at 270 nm) by Eeff in µW/cm2 (136,150 ). To protect health-care workers who
are exposed to germicidal UV radiation for 8 hours per work day, the measured irradiance (E)
should be ≤0.2 µW/cm2, which is calculated by obtaining Eeff (0.1 µW/cm2), then dividing this
value by Sλ (0.5).
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used]) to alert maintenance staff or other HCWs of the hazard. Some exam-
ples are shown below:
2. Maintenance
Because the intensity of UV lamps fluctuates as they age, a schedule for
replacing the lamps should be developed. The schedule can be deter-
mined from either a time/use log or a system based on cumulative time.
The tube should be checked periodically for dust build-up, which lessens
the output of UVGI. If the tube is dirty, it should be allowed to cool, then
cleaned with a damp cloth. Tubes should be replaced if they stop glowing
or if they flicker to an objectionable extent. Maintenance personnel must
turn off all UV tubes before entering the upper part of the room or before
accessing ducts for any purpose. Only a few seconds of direct exposure to
the intense UV radiation in the upper-room air space or in ducts can
cause burns. Protective equipment (e.g., gloves and goggles [and/or face
shields]) should be worn if exposure greater than the recommended
standard is anticipated.
Banks of UVGI tubes can be installed in ventilating ducts. Safety devices
should be used on access doors to eliminate hazard to maintenance per-
sonnel. For duct irradiation systems, the access door for servicing the
lamps should have an inspection window* through which the lamps are
checked periodically for dust build-up and malfunctioning. The access
door should have a warning sign written in languages appropriate for
maintenance personnel to alert them to the health hazard of looking di-
rectly at bare tubes. The lock for this door should have an automatic
electric switch or other device that turns off the lamps when the door is
opened.
Two types of fixtures are used in upper-room air irradiation: wall-mounted
fixtures that have louvers to block downward radiation and ceiling-
mounted fixtures that have baffles to block radiation below the horizontal
plane of the UV tube. The actual UV tube in either type of fixture must not
be visible from any normal position in the room. Light switches that can be
locked should be used, if possible, to prevent injury to personnel who
might unintentionally turn the lamps on during maintenance procedures.
*Ordinary glass (not quartz) is sufficient to filter out UV radiation.
CAUTION
ULTRAVIOLET ENERGY:




PROTECT EYES & SKIN
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In most applications, properly shielding the UV lamps to provide protec-
tion from most, if not all, of the direct UV radiation is not difficult. However,
radiation reflected from glass, polished metal, and high-gloss ceramic
paints can be harmful to persons in the room, particularly if more than one
UV lamp is in use. Surfaces in irradiated rooms that can reflect UVGI into
occupied areas of the room should be covered with non-UV reflecting ma-
terial.
3. Monitoring
A regularly scheduled evaluation of the UV intensity to which HCWs, pa-
tients, and others are exposed should be conducted.
UV measurements should be made in various locations within a room us-
ing a detector designed to be most sensitive at 254 nm. Equipment used to
measure germicidal UV radiation should be maintained and calibrated on
a regular schedule.
A new UV installation must be carefully checked for hot spots (i.e., areas of
the room where the REL is exceeded) by an industrial hygienist or other
person knowledgeable in making UV measurements. UV radiation levels
should not exceed those in the recommended guidelines.
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Supplement 4: Respiratory Protection
I. Considerations for Selection of Respirators
Personal respiratory protection should be used by a) persons entering rooms
where patients with known or suspected infectious TB are being isolated, b) per-
sons present during cough-inducing or aerosol-generating procedures performed
on such patients, and c) persons in other settings where administrative and engi-
neering controls are not likely to protect them from inhaling infectious airborne
droplet nuclei. These other settings should be identified on the basis of the facil-
ity’s risk assessment.
Although data regarding the effectiveness of respiratory protection from many
hazardous airborne materials have been collected, the precise level of effective-
ness in protecting HCWs from M. tuberculosis transmission in health-care
settings has not been determined. Information concerning the transmission of
M. tuberculosis is incomplete. Neither the smallest infectious dose of M. tubercu-
losis nor the highest level of exposure to M. tuberculosis at which transmission
will not occur has been defined conclusively (59,151,152 ). Furthermore, the size
distribution of droplet nuclei and the number of particles containing viable M. tu-
berculosis that are expelled by infectious TB patients have not been defined
adequately, and accurate methods of measuring the concentration of infectious
droplet nuclei in a room have not been developed.
Nevertheless, in certain settings the administrative and engineering controls may
not adequately protect HCWs from airborne droplet nuclei (e.g., in TB isolation
rooms, treatment rooms in which cough-inducing or aerosol-generating proce-
dures are performed, and ambulances during the transport of infectious TB
patients). Respiratory protective devices used in these settings should have char-
acteristics that are suitable for the organism they are protecting against and the
settings in which they are used.
A. Performance Criteria for Personal Respirators for Protection Against
Transmission of M. tuberculosis
Respiratory protective devices used in health-care settings for protection
against M. tuberculosis should meet the following standard criteria. These
criteria are based on currently available information, including a) data on the
effectiveness of respiratory protection against noninfectious hazardous mate-
rials in workplaces other than health-care settings and on an interpretation of
how these data can be applied to respiratory protection against M. tuberculo-
sis; b) data on the efficiency of respirator filters in filtering biological aerosols;
c) data on face-seal leakage; and d) data on the characteristics of respirators
that were used in conjunction with administrative and engineering controls in
outbreak settings where transmission to HCWs and patients was terminated.
1. The ability to filter particles 1 µm in size in the unloaded state with a filter
efficiency of ≥95% (i.e., filter leakage of ≤5%), given flow rates of up to 50 L
per minute.
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Available data suggest that infectious droplet nuclei range in size from
1 µm to 5 µm; therefore, respirators used in health-care settings should be
able to efficiently filter the smallest particles in this range. Fifty liters
per minute is a reasonable estimate of the highest airflow rate an HCW is
likely to achieve during breathing, even while performing strenuous work
activities.
2. The ability to be qualitatively or quantitatively fit tested in a reliable
way to obtain a face-seal leakage of ≤10% (54,55 ).
3. The ability to fit the different facial sizes and characteristics of HCWs,
which can usually be met by making the respirators available in at least
three sizes.
4. The ability to be checked for facepiece fit, in accordance with OSHA
standards and good industrial hygiene practice, by HCWs each time they
put on their respirators (54,55 ). 
In some settings, HCWs may be at risk for two types of exposure: a) inhalation
of M. tuberculosis and b) mucous membrane exposure to fluids that may con-
tain bloodborne pathogens. In these settings, protection against both types of
exposure should be used.
When operative procedures (or other procedures requiring a sterile field) are
performed on patients who may have infectious TB, respiratory protection
worn by the HCW should serve two functions: a) it should protect the surgical
field from the respiratory secretions of the HCW and b) it should protect the
HCW from infectious droplet nuclei that may be expelled by the patient or
generated by the procedure. Respirators with expiration valves and positive-
pressure respirators do not protect the sterile field; therefore, a respirator that
does not have a valve and that meets the criteria in Supplement 4, Sec-
tion I.A, should be used.
B. Specific Respirators
The OSHA respiratory protection standard requires that all respiratory protec-
tive devices used in the workplace be certified by NIOSH.* NIOSH-approved
HEPA respirators are the only currently available air-purifying respirators that
meet or exceed the standard performance criteria stated above. However, the
NIOSH certification procedures are currently being revised (153 ). Under the
proposed revision, filter materials would be tested at a flow rate of 85 L/min
for penetration by particles with a median aerodynamic diameter of 0.3 µm
and, if certified, would be placed in one of the following categories: type A,
which has ≥99.97% efficiency (similar to current HEPA filter media); type B,
≥99% efficiency; or type C, ≥95% efficiency. According to this proposed
scheme, type C filter material would meet or exceed the standard perform-
ance criteria specified in this document.
*29 CFR Part 1910.134.
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The facility’s risk assessment may identify a limited number of selected set-
tings (e.g., bronchoscopy performed on patients suspected of having TB or
autopsy performed on deceased persons suspected of having had active TB
at the time of death) where the estimated risk for transmission of M. tubercu-
losis may be such that a level of respiratory protection exceeding the
standard criteria is appropriate. In such circumstances, a level of respiratory
protection exceeding the standard criteria and compatible with patient-care
delivery (e.g., negative-pressure respirators that are more protective; pow-
ered air-purifying particulate respirators [PAPRs]; or positive-pressure air-
line, half-mask respirators) should be provided by employers to HCWs who
are exposed to M. tuberculosis. Information on these and other respirators
may be found in the NIOSH Guide to Industrial Respiratory Protection (55 ).
C. The Effectiveness of Respiratory Protective Devices
The following information, which is based on experience with respiratory
protection in the industrial setting, summarizes the available data about the
effectiveness of respiratory protection against hazardous airborne materials.
Data regarding protection against transmission of M. tuberculosis are not
available.
The parameters used to determine the effectiveness of a respiratory protec-
tive device are face-seal efficacy and filter efficacy.
1. Face-seal leakage
Face-seal leakage compromises the ability of particulate respirators to pro-
tect HCWs from airborne materials (154–156 ). A proper seal between the
respirator’s sealing surface and the face of the person wearing the res-
pirator is essential for effective and reliable performance of any negative-
pressure respirator. This seal is less critical, but still important, for
positive-pressure respirators. Face-seal leakage can result from various
factors, including incorrect facepiece size or shape, incorrect or defective
facepiece sealing-lip, beard growth, perspiration or facial oils that can
cause facepiece slippage, failure to use all the head straps, incorrect posi-
tioning of the facepiece on the face, incorrect head strap tension or
position, improper respirator maintenance, and respirator damage.
Every time a person wearing a negative-pressure particulate respirator in-
hales, a negative pressure (relative to the workplace air) is created inside
the facepiece. Because of this negative pressure, air containing contami-
nants can take a path of least resistance into the respirator—through leaks
at the face-seal interface—thus avoiding the higher-resistance filter mate-
rial. Currently available, cup-shaped, disposable particulate respirators
have from 0 to 20% face-seal leakage (55,154 ). This face-seal leakage re-
sults from the variability of the human face and from limitations in the
respirator’s design, construction, and number of sizes available. The face-
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seal leakage is probably higher if the respirator is not fitted properly to the
HCW’s face, tested for an adequate fit by a qualified person, and then
checked for fit by the HCW every time the respirator is put on. Face-seal
leakage may be reduced to <10% with improvements in design, a greater
variety in available sizes, and appropriate fit testing and fit checking.
In comparison with negative-pressure respirators, positive-pressure respi-
rators produce a positive pressure inside the facepiece under most
conditions of use. For example, in a PAPR, a blower forcibly draws ambient
air through HEPA filters, then delivers the filtered air to the facepiece. This
air is blown into the facepiece at flow rates that generally exceed the ex-
pected inhalation flow rates. The positive pressure inside the facepiece
reduces face-seal leakage to low levels, particularly during the relatively
low inhalation rates expected in health-care settings. PAPRs with a tight-
fitting facepiece have <2% face-seal leakage under routine conditions (55 ).
Powered-air respirators with loose-fitting facepieces, hoods, or helmets
have <4% face-seal leakage under routine conditions (55 ). Thus, a PAPR
may offer lower levels of face-seal leakage than nonpowered, half-mask
respirators. Full facepiece, nonpowered respirators have the same leakage
(i.e., <2%) as PAPRs.
Another factor contributing to face-seal leakage of cup-shaped, disposable
respirators is that some of these respirators are available in only one size.
A single size may produce higher leakage for persons who have smaller or
difficult-to-fit faces (157 ). The facepieces used for some reusable (in-
cluding HEPA and replaceable filter, negative-pressure) and all positive-
pressure particulate air-purifying respirators are available in as many as
three different sizes.
2. Filter leakage
Aerosol leakage through respirator filters depends on at least five inde-
pendent variables: a) the filtration characteristics for each type of filter,
b) the size distribution of the droplets in the aerosol, c) the linear velocity
through the filtering material, d) the filter loading (i.e., the amount of con-
taminant deposited on the filter), and e) any electrostatic charges on the
filter and on the droplets in the aerosol (158 ).
When HEPA filters are used in particulate air-purifying respirators, filter
efficiency is so high (i.e., effectively 100%) that filter leakage is not a con-
sideration. Therefore, for all HEPA-filter respirators, virtually all inward
leakage of droplet nuclei occurs at the respirator’s face seal.
3. Fit testing
Fit testing is part of the respiratory protection program required by OSHA
for all respiratory protective devices used in the workplace. A fit test deter-
mines whether a respiratory protective device adequately fits a particular
HCW. The HCW may need to be fit tested with several devices to determine
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which device offers the best fit. However, fit tests can detect only the leak-
age that occurs at the time of the fit testing, and the tests cannot
distinguish face-seal leakage from filter leakage.
Determination of facepiece fit can involve qualitative or quantitative
tests (55 ). A qualitative test relies on the subjective response of the HCW
being fit tested. A quantitative test uses detectors to measure inward leak-
age.
Disposable, negative-pressure particulate respirators can be qualitatively
fit tested with aerosolized substances that can be tasted, although the re-
sults of this testing are limited because the tests depend on the subjective
response of the HCW being tested. Quantitative fit testing of disposable
negative-pressure particulate respirators can best be performed if the
manufacturer provides a test respirator with a probe for this purpose.
Replaceable filter, negative-pressure particulate respirators and all posi-
tive-pressure particulate respirators can be fit tested reliably, both
qualitatively and quantitatively, when fitted with HEPA filters.
4. Fit checking
A fit check is a maneuver that an HCW performs before each use of the
respiratory protective device to check the fit. The fit check can be per-
formed according to the manufacturer’s facepiece fitting instructions by
using the applicable negative-pressure or positive-pressure test.
Some currently available cup-shaped, disposable negative-pressure par-
ticulate respirators cannot be fit checked reliably by persons wearing the
devices because occluding the entire surface of the filter is difficult. Strate-
gies for overcoming these limitations are being developed by respirator
manufacturers.
5. Reuse of respirators
Conscientious respirator maintenance should be an integral part of an
overall respirator program. This maintenance applies both to respirators
with replaceable filters and respirators that are classified as disposable but
that are reused. Manufacturers’ instructions for inspecting, cleaning, and
maintaining respirators should be followed to ensure that the respirator
continues to function properly (55 ).
When respirators are used for protection against noninfectious aerosols
(e.g., wood dust), which may be present in the air in heavy concentrations,
the filter material may become occluded with airborne material. This
occlusion may result in an uncomfortable breathing resistance. In health-
care settings where respirators are used for protection against biological
aerosols, the concentration of infectious particles in the air is probably
low; thus, the filter material in a respirator is very unlikely to become oc-
cluded with airborne material. In addition, there is no evidence that
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particles impacting on the filter material in a respirator are re-aerosolized
easily. For these reasons, the filter material used in respirators in the
health-care setting should remain functional for weeks to months. Respira-
tors with replaceable filters are reusable, and a respirator classified as
disposable may be reused by the same HCW as long as it remains func-
tional.
Before each use, the outside of the filter material should be inspected. If
the filter material is physically damaged or soiled, the filter should be
changed (in the case of respirators with replaceable filters) or the respira-
tor discarded (in the case of disposable respirators). Infection-control
personnel should develop standard operating procedures for storing,
reusing, and disposing of respirators that have been designated as dispos-
able and for disposing of replaceable filter elements.
II. Implementing a Personal Respiratory Protection Program
If personal respiratory protection is used in a health-care setting, OSHA requires
that an effective personal respiratory protection program be developed, imple-
mented, administered, and periodically reevaluated (54,55 ).
All HCWs who need to use respirators for protection against infection with M. tu-
berculosis should be included in the respiratory protection program. Visitors to
TB patients should be given respirators to wear while in isolation rooms, and they
should be given general instructions on how to use their respirators.
The number of HCWs included in the respiratory protection program in each facil-
ity will vary depending on a) the number of potentially infectious TB patients,
b) the number of rooms or areas to which patients with suspected or confirmed
infectious TB are admitted, and c) the number of HCWs needed in these rooms or
areas. Where respiratory protection programs are required, they should include
enough HCWs to provide adequate care for a patient with known or suspected TB
should such a patient be admitted to the facility. However, administrative meas-
ures should be used to limit the number of HCWs who need to enter these rooms
or areas, thus limiting the number of HCWs who need to be included in the respi-
ratory protection program.
Information regarding the development and management of a respiratory protec-
tion program is available in technical training courses that cover the basics of
personal respiratory protection. Such courses are offered by various organiza-
tions, such as NIOSH, OSHA, and the American Industrial Hygiene Association.
Similar courses are available from private contractors and universities.
To be effective and reliable, respiratory protection programs must contain at least
the following elements (55,154 ):
1. Assignment of responsibility. Supervisory responsibility for the respira-
tory protection program should be assigned to designated persons who have
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expertise in issues relevant to the program, including infectious diseases and
occupational health.
2. Standard operating procedures. Written standard operating procedures
should contain information concerning all aspects of the respiratory protec-
tion program.
3. Medical screening. HCWs should not be assigned a task requiring use of
respirators unless they are physically able to perform the task while wearing
the respirator. HCWs should be screened for pertinent medical conditions at
the time they are hired, then rescreened periodically (55 ). The screening
could occur as infrequently as every 5 years. The screening process should
begin with a general screening (e.g., a questionnaire) for pertinent medical
conditions, and the results of the screening should then be used to identify
HCWs who need further evaluation. Routine physical examination or testing
with chest radiographs or spirometry is not necessary or required.
Few medical conditions preclude the use of most negative-pressure particu-
late respirators. HCWs who have mild pulmonary or cardiac conditions may
report discomfort with breathing when wearing negative-pressure particulate
respirators, but these respirators are unlikely to have adverse health effects
on the HCWs. Those HCWs who have more severe cardiac or pulmonary con-
ditions may have more difficulty than HCWs with similar but milder
conditions if performing duties while wearing negative-pressure respirators.
Furthermore, these HCWs may be unable to use some PAPRs because of the
added weight of these respirators.
4. Training. HCWs who wear respirators and the persons who supervise them
should be informed about the necessity for wearing respirators and the po-
tential risks associated with not doing so. This training should also include at
a minimum:
• The nature, extent, and specific hazards of M. tuberculosis transmission in
their respective health-care facility.
• A description of specific risks for TB infection among persons exposed to
M. tuberculosis, of any subsequent treatment with INH or other chemopro-
phylactic agents, and of the possibility of active TB disease.
• A description of engineering controls and work practices and the reasons
why they do not eliminate the need for personal respiratory protection.
• An explanation for selecting a particular type of respirator, how the respi-
rator is properly maintained and stored, and the operation, capabilities,
and limitations of the respirator provided.
• Instruction in how the HCW wearing the respirator should inspect, put on,
fit check, and correctly wear the provided respirator (i.e., achieve and
maintain proper face-seal fit on the HCW’s face).
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• An opportunity to handle the provided respirator and learn how to put it
on, wear it properly, and check the important parts.
• Instruction in how to recognize an inadequately functioning respirator.
5. Face-seal fit testing and fit checking. HCWs should undergo fit testing to
identify a respirator that adequately fits each individual HCW. The HCW
should receive fitting instructions that include demonstrations and practice in
how the respirator should be worn, how it should be adjusted, and how to
determine if it fits properly. The HCW should be taught to check the facepiece
fit before each use.
6. Respirator inspection, cleaning, maintenance, and storage. Conscientious
respirator maintenance should be an integral part of an overall respirator pro-
gram. This maintenance applies both to respirators with replaceable filters
and respirators that are classified as disposable but that are reused. Manufac-
turers’ instructions for inspecting, cleaning, and maintaining respirators
should be followed to ensure that the respirator continues to function prop-
erly (55 ).
7. Periodic evaluation of the personal respiratory protection program. The
program should be evaluated completely at least once a year, and both the
written operating procedures and program administration should be revised
as necessary based on the results of the evaluation. Elements of the program
that should be evaluated include work practices and employee acceptance of
respirator use (i.e., subjective comments made by employees concerning
comfort during use and interference with duties).
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Supplement 5: Decontamination—
Cleaning, Disinfecting, and Sterilizing
of Patient-Care Equipment
Equipment used on patients who have TB is usually not involved in the transmission
of M. tuberculosis, although transmission by contaminated bronchoscopes has been
demonstrated (159,160 ). Guidelines for cleaning, disinfecting, and sterilizing equip-
ment have been published (161,162 ). The rationale for cleaning, disinfecting, or
sterilizing patient-care equipment can be understood more readily if medical devices,
equipment, and surgical materials are divided into three general categories. These
categories—critical, semicritical, and noncritical items—are defined by the potential
risk for infection associated with their use (163,164 ).
Critical items are instruments that are introduced directly into the bloodstream or into
other normally sterile areas of the body (e.g., needles, surgical instruments, cardiac
catheters, and implants). These items should be sterile at the time of use.
Semicritical items are those that may come in contact with mucous membranes but
do not ordinarily penetrate body surfaces (e.g., noninvasive flexible and rigid fiberop-
tic endoscopes or bronchoscopes, endotracheal tubes, and anesthesia breathing
circuits). Although sterilization is preferred for these instruments, high-level disinfec-
tion that destroys vegetative microorganisms, most fungal spores, tubercle bacilli,
and small nonlipid viruses may be used. Meticulous physical cleaning of such items
before sterilization or high-level disinfection is essential.
Noncritical items are those that either do not ordinarily touch the patient or touch only
the patient’s intact skin (e.g., crutches, bedboards, blood pressure cuffs, and various
other medical accessories). These items are not associated with direct transmission of
M. tuberculosis, and washing them with detergent is usually sufficient.
Health-care facility policies should specify whether cleaning, disinfecting, or sterilizing
an item is necessary to decrease the risk for infection. Decisions about decontamina-
tion processes should be based on the intended use of the item, not on the diagnosis
of the patient for whom the item was used. Selection of chemical disinfectants de-
pends on the intended use, the level of disinfection required, and the structure and
material of the item to be disinfected.
Although microorganisms are ordinarily found on walls, floors, and other environ-
mental surfaces, these surfaces are rarely associated with transmission of infections
to patients or HCWs. This is particularly true with organisms such as M. tuberculosis,
which generally require inhalation by the host for infection to occur. Therefore, ex-
traordinary attempts to disinfect or sterilize environmental surfaces are not indicated.
If a detergent germicide is used for routine cleaning, a hospital-grade, EPA-approved
germicide/disinfectant that is not tuberculocidal can be used. The same routine daily
cleaning procedures used in other rooms in the facility should be used to clean TB
isolation rooms, and personnel should follow isolation practices while cleaning these
rooms. For final cleaning of the isolation room after a patient has been discharged,
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personal protective equipment is not necessary if the room has been ventilated for the
appropriate amount of time (Table S3-1).
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Glossary
This glossary contains many of the terms used in the guidelines, as well as others that
are encountered frequently by persons who implement TB infection-control pro-
grams. The definitions given are not dictionary definitions but are those most
applicable to usage relating to TB.
Acid-fast bacilli (AFB): Bacteria that retain certain dyes after being washed in an acid
solution. Most acid-fast organisms are mycobacteria. When AFB are seen on a
stained smear of sputum or other clinical specimen, a diagnosis of TB should be
suspected; however, the diagnosis of TB is not confirmed until a culture is grown
and identified as M. tuberculosis.
Adherence: Refers to the behavior of patients when they follow all aspects of the treat-
ment regimen as prescribed by the medical provider, and also refers to the
behavior of HCWs and employers when they follow all guidelines pertaining to in-
fection control.
Aerosol: The droplet nuclei that are expelled by an infectious person (e.g., by cough-
ing or sneezing); these droplet nuclei can remain suspended in the air and can
transmit M. tuberculosis to other persons.
AIA: The American Institute of Architects, a professional body that develops standards
for building ventilation.
Air changes: The ratio of the volume of air flowing through a space in a certain period
of time (i.e., the airflow rate) to the volume of that space (i.e., the room volume);
this ratio is usually expressed as the number of air changes per hour (ACH).
Air mixing: The degree to which air supplied to a room mixes with the air already in
the room, usually expressed as a mixing factor. This factor varies from 1 (for per-
fect mixing) to 10 (for poor mixing), and it is used as a multiplier to determine the
actual airflow required (i.e., the recommended ACH multiplied by the mixing factor
equals the actual ACH required).
Alveoli: The small air sacs in the lungs that lie at the end of the bronchial tree; the site
where carbon dioxide in the blood is replaced by oxygen from the lungs and where
TB infection usually begins.
Anergy: The inability of a person to react to skin-test antigens (even if the person is
infected with the organisms tested) because of immunosuppression.
Anteroom: A small room leading from a corridor into an isolation room; this room can
act as an airlock, preventing the escape of contaminants from the isolation room
into the corridor.
Area: A structural unit (e.g., a hospital ward or laboratory) or functional unit (e.g., an
internal medicine service) in which HCWs provide services to and share air with a
specific patient population or work with clinical specimens that may contain viable
M. tuberculosis organisms. The risk for exposure to M. tuberculosis in a given area
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depends on the prevalence of TB in the population served and the characteristics of
the environment.
ASHRAE: The American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engi-
neers, Inc., a professional body that develops standards for building ventilation.
Asymptomatic: Without symptoms, or producing no symptoms.
Bacillus of Calmette and Guérin (BCG) vaccine: A TB vaccine used in many parts of the
world.
BACTEC®: One of the most often used radiometric methods for detecting the early
growth of mycobacteria in culture. It provides rapid growth (in 7–14 days) and rapid
drug-susceptibility testing (in 5–6 days). When BACTEC® is used with rapid species
identification methods, M. tuberculosis can be identified within 10–14 days of
specimen collection.
Booster phenomenon: A phenomenon in which some persons (especially older
adults) who are skin tested many years after infection with M. tuberculosis have a
negative reaction to an initial skin test, followed by a positive reaction to a sub-
sequent skin test. The second (i.e., positive) reaction is caused by a boosted
immune response. Two-step testing is used to distinguish new infections from
boosted reactions (see Two-step testing).
Bronchoscopy: A procedure for examining the respiratory tract that requires inserting
an instrument (a bronchoscope) through the mouth or nose and into the trachea.
The procedure can be used to obtain diagnostic specimens.
Capreomycin: An injectable, second-line anti-TB drug used primarily for the treatment
of drug-resistant TB.
Cavity: A hole in the lung resulting from the destruction of pulmonary tissue by TB or
other pulmonary infections or conditions. TB patients who have cavities in their
lungs are referred to as having cavitary disease, and they are often more infectious
than TB patients without cavitary disease.
Chemotherapy: Treatment of an infection or disease by means of oral or injectable
drugs.
Cluster: Two or more PPD skin-test conversions occurring within a 3-month period
among HCWs in a specific area or occupational group, and epidemiologic evidence
suggests occupational (nosocomial) transmission.
Contact: A person who has shared the same air with a person who has infectious TB
for a sufficient amount of time to allow possible transmission of M. tuberculosis.
Conversion, PPD: See PPD test conversion.
Culture: The process of growing bacteria in the laboratory so that organisms can be
identified.
Cycloserine: A second-line, oral anti-TB drug used primarily for treating drug-resistant
TB.
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Directly observed therapy (DOT): An adherence-enhancing strategy in which an HCW
or other designated person watches the patient swallow each dose of medication.
DNA probe: A technique that allows rapid and precise identification of mycobacteria
(e.g., M. tuberculosis and M. bovis ) that are grown in culture. The identification
can often be completed in 2 hours.
Droplet nuclei: Microscopic particles (i.e., 1–5 µm in diameter) produced when a per-
son coughs, sneezes, shouts, or sings. The droplets produced by an infectious TB
patient can carry tubercle bacilli and can remain suspended in the air for prolonged
periods of time and be carried on normal air currents in the room.
Drug resistance, acquired: A resistance to one or more anti-TB drugs that develops
while a patient is receiving therapy and which usually results from the patient’s
nonadherence to therapy or the prescription of an inadequate regimen by a health-
care provider. 
Drug resistance, primary: A resistance to one or more anti-TB drugs that exists before
a patient is treated with the drug(s). Primary resistance occurs in persons exposed
to and infected with a drug-resistant strain of M. tuberculosis.
Drug-susceptibility pattern: The anti-TB drugs to which the tubercle bacilli cultured
from a TB patient are susceptible or resistant based on drug-susceptibility tests.
Drug-susceptibility tests: Laboratory tests that determine whether the tubercle bacilli
cultured from a patient are susceptible or resistant to various anti-TB drugs.
Ethambutol: A first-line, oral anti-TB drug sometimes used concomitantly with INH,
rifampin, and pyrazinamide.
Ethionamide: A second-line, oral anti-TB drug used primarily for treating drug-
resistant TB.
Exposure: The condition of being subjected to something (e.g., infectious agents) that
could have a harmful effect. A person exposed to M. tuberculosis does not neces-
sarily become infected (see Transmission).
First-line drugs: The most often used anti-TB drugs (i.e., INH, rifampin, pyrazinamide,
ethambutol, and streptomycin).
Fixed room-air HEPA recirculation systems: Nonmobile devices or systems that re-
move airborne contaminants by recirculating air through a HEPA filter. These may
be built into the room and permanently ducted or may be mounted to the wall or
ceiling within the room. In either situation, they are fixed in place and are not easily
movable.
Fluorochrome stain: A technique for staining a clinical specimen with fluorescent dyes
to perform a microscopic examination (smear) for mycobacteria. This technique is
preferable to other staining techniques because the mycobacteria can be seen eas-
ily and the slides can be read quickly.
Fomites: Linens, books, dishes, or other objects used or touched by a patient. These
objects are not involved in the transmission of M. tuberculosis.
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Gastric aspirate: A procedure sometimes used to obtain a specimen for culture when
a patient cannot cough up adequate sputum. A tube is inserted through the mouth
or nose and into the stomach to recover sputum that was coughed into the throat
and then swallowed. This procedure is particularly useful for diagnosis in children,
who are often unable to cough up sputum.
High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter: A specialized filter that is capable of re-
moving 99.97% of particles ≥0.3 µm in diameter and that may assist in controlling
the transmission of M. tuberculosis. Filters may be used in ventilation systems to
remove particles from the air or in personal respirators to filter air before it is in-
haled by the person wearing the respirator. The use of HEPA filters in ventilation
systems requires expertise in installation and maintenance.
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection: Infection with the virus that causes
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). HIV infection is the most important
risk factor for the progression of latent TB infection to active TB.
Immunosuppressed: A condition in which the immune system is not functioning nor-
mally (e.g., severe cellular immunosuppression resulting from HIV infection or
immunosuppressive therapy). Immunosuppressed persons are at greatly in-
creased risk for developing active TB after they have been infected with
M. tuberculosis. No data are available regarding whether these persons are also at
increased risk for infection with M. tuberculosis after they have been exposed to
the organism.
Induration: An area of swelling produced by an immune response to an antigen. In
tuberculin skin testing or anergy testing, the diameter of the indurated area is
measured 48–72 hours after the injection, and the result is recorded in millimeters.
Infection: The condition in which organisms capable of causing disease (e.g., M. tu-
berculosis) enter the body and elicit a response from the host’s immune defenses.
TB infection may or may not lead to clinical disease.
Infectious: Capable of transmitting infection. When persons who have clinically active
pulmonary or laryngeal TB disease cough or sneeze, they can expel droplets con-
taining M. tuberculosis into the air. Persons whose sputum smears are positive for
AFB are probably infectious.
Injectable: A medication that is usually administered by injection into the muscle (in-
tramuscular [IM]) or the bloodstream (intravenous [IV]).
Intermittent therapy: Therapy administered either two or three times per week, rather
than daily. Intermittent therapy should be administered only under the direct super-
vision of an HCW or other designated person (see Directly observed therapy
[DOT]).
Intradermal: Within the layers of the skin.
Isoniazid (INH): A first-line, oral drug used either alone as preventive therapy or in
combination with several other drugs to treat TB disease.
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Kanamycin: An injectable, second-line anti-TB drug used primarily for treatment of
drug-resistant TB.
Latent TB infection: Infection with M. tuberculosis, usually detected by a positive PPD
skin-test result, in a person who has no symptoms of active TB and who is not
infectious.
Mantoux test: A method of skin testing that is performed by injecting 0.1 mL of PPD-
tuberculin containing 5 tuberculin units into the dermis (i.e., the second layer of
skin) of the forearm with a needle and syringe. This test is the most reliable and
standardized technique for tuberculin testing (see Tuberculin skin test and Purified
protein derivative [PPD]-tuberculin test).
Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB): Active TB caused by M. tuberculosis or-
ganisms that are resistant to more than one anti-TB drug; in practice, often refers to
organisms that are resistant to both INH and rifampin with or without resistance to
other drugs (see Drug resistance, acquired and Drug resistance, primary).
M. tuberculosis complex: A group of closely related mycobacterial species that can
cause active TB (e.g., M. tuberculosis, M. bovis, and M. africanum); most TB in the
United States is caused by M. tuberculosis.
Negative pressure: The relative air pressure difference between two areas in a health-
care facility. A room that is at negative pressure has a lower pressure than adjacent
areas, which keeps air from flowing out of the room and into adjacent rooms or
areas.
Nosocomial: An occurrence, usually an infection, that is acquired in a hospital or as a
result of medical care.
Para-aminosalicylic acid: A second-line, oral anti-TB drug used for treating drug-
resistant TB.
Pathogenesis: The pathologic, physiologic, or biochemical process by which a disease
develops.
Pathogenicity: The quality of producing or the ability to produce pathologic changes
or disease. Some nontuberculous mycobacteria are pathogenic (e.g., Mycobac-
terium kansasii ), and others are not (e.g., Mycobacterium phlei ).
Portable room-air HEPA recirculation units: Free-standing portable devices that re-
move airborne contaminants by recirculating air through a HEPA filter.
Positive PPD reaction: A reaction to the purified protein derivative (PPD)-tuberculin
skin test that suggests the person tested is infected with M. tuberculosis. The per-
son interpreting the skin-test reaction determines whether it is positive on the basis
of the size of the induration and the medical history and risk factors of the person
being tested.
Preventive therapy: Treatment of latent TB infection used to prevent the progression
of latent infection to clinically active disease.
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Purified protein derivative (PPD)-tuberculin: A purified tuberculin preparation that
was developed in the 1930s and that was derived from old tuberculin. The standard
Mantoux test uses 0.1 mL of PPD standardized to 5 tuberculin units.
Purified protein derivative (PPD)-tuberculin test: A method used to evaluate the likeli-
hood that a person is infected with M. tuberculosis. A small dose of tuberculin
(PPD) is injected just beneath the surface of the skin, and the area is examined
48–72 hours after the injection. A reaction is measured according to the size of the
induration. The classification of a reaction as positive or negative depends on the
patient’s medical history and various risk factors (see Mantoux test).
Purified protein derivative (PPD)-tuberculin test conversion: A change in PPD test re-
sults from negative to positive. A conversion within a 2-year period is usually
interpreted as new M. tuberculosis infection, which carries an increased risk for
progression to active disease. A booster reaction may be misinterpreted as a new
infection (see Booster phenomenon and Two-step testing).
Pyrazinamide: A first-line, oral anti-TB drug used in treatment regimens.
Radiography: A method of viewing the respiratory system by using radiation to trans-
mit an image of the respiratory system to film. A chest radiograph is taken to view
the respiratory system of a person who is being evaluated for pulmonary TB. Ab-
normalities (e.g., lesions or cavities in the lungs and enlarged lymph nodes) may
indicate the presence of TB.
Radiometric method: A method for culturing a specimen that allows for rapid detec-
tion of bacterial growth by measuring production of CO2 by viable organisms; also
a method of rapidly performing susceptibility testing of M. tuberculosis.
Recirculation: Ventilation in which all or most of the air that is exhausted from an area
is returned to the same area or other areas of the facility.
Regimen: Any particular TB treatment plan that specifies which drugs are used, in
what doses, according to what schedule, and for how long.
Registry: A record-keeping method for collecting clinical, laboratory, and radiographic
data concerning TB patients so that the data can be organized and made available
for epidemiologic study.
Resistance: The ability of some strains of bacteria, including M. tuberculosis, to grow
and multiply in the presence of certain drugs that ordinarily kill them; such strains
are referred to as drug-resistant strains.
Rifampin: A first-line, oral anti-TB drug that, when used concomitantly with INH and
pyrazinamide, provides the basis for short-course therapy.
Room-air HEPA recirculation systems and units: Devices (either fixed or portable) that
remove airborne contaminants by recirculating air through a HEPA filter.
Second-line drugs: Anti-TB drugs used when the first-line drugs cannot be used (e.g.,
for drug-resistant TB or because of adverse reactions to the first-line drugs). Exam-
ples are cycloserine, ethionamide, and capreomycin.
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Single-pass ventilation: Ventilation in which 100% of the air supplied to an area is
exhausted to the outside.
Smear (AFB smear): A laboratory technique for visualizing mycobacteria. The speci-
men is smeared onto a slide and stained, then examined using a microscope.
Smear results should be available within 24 hours. In TB, a large number of myco-
bacteria seen on an AFB smear usually indicates infectiousness. However, a
positive result is not diagnostic of TB because organisms other than M. tuberculo-
sis may be seen on an AFB smear (e.g., nontuberculous mycobacteria).
Source case: A case of TB in an infectious person who has transmitted M. tuberculosis
to another person or persons.
Source control: Controlling a contaminant at the source of its generation, which pre-
vents the spread of the contaminant to the general work space.
Specimen: Any body fluid, secretion, or tissue sent to a laboratory where smears and
cultures for M. tuberculosis will be performed (e.g., sputum, urine, spinal fluid, and
material obtained at biopsy).
Sputum: Phlegm coughed up from deep within the lungs. If a patient has pulmonary
disease, an examination of the sputum by smear and culture can be helpful in
evaluating the organism responsible for the infection. Sputum should not be con-
fused with saliva or nasal secretions.
Sputum induction: A method used to obtain sputum from a patient who is unable to
cough up a specimen spontaneously. The patient inhales a saline mist, which
stimulates a cough from deep within the lungs.
Sputum smear, positive: AFB are visible on the sputum smear when viewed under a
microscope. Persons with a sputum smear positive for AFB are considered more
infectious than those with smear-negative sputum.
Streptomycin: A first-line, injectable anti-TB drug.
Symptomatic: Having symptoms that may indicate the presence of TB or another dis-
ease (see Asymptomatic).
TB case: A particular episode of clinically active TB. This term should be used only to
refer to the disease itself, not the patient with the disease. By law, cases of TB must
be reported to the local health department.
TB infection: A condition in which living tubercle bacilli are present in the body but the
disease is not clinically active. Infected persons usually have positive tuberculin
reactions, but they have no symptoms related to the infection and are not infec-
tious. However, infected persons remain at lifelong risk for developing disease
unless preventive therapy is given.
Transmission: The spread of an infectious agent from one person to another. The like-
lihood of transmission is directly related to the duration and intensity of exposure
to M. tuberculosis (see Exposure).
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Treatment failures: TB disease in patients who do not respond to chemotherapy and
in patients whose disease worsens after having improved initially.
Tubercle bacilli: M. tuberculosis organisms.
Tuberculin skin test: A method used to evaluate the likelihood that a person is infected
with M. tuberculosis. A small dose of PPD-tuberculin is injected just beneath the
surface of the skin, and the area is examined 48–72 hours after the injection. A
reaction is measured according to the size of the induration. The classification of a
reaction as positive or negative depends on the patient’s medical history and vari-
ous risk factors (see Mantoux test, PPD test).
Tuberculosis (TB): A clinically active, symptomatic disease caused by an organism in
the M. tuberculosis complex (usually M. tuberculosis or, rarely, M. bovis or M. afri-
canum).
Two-step testing: A procedure used for the baseline testing of persons who will peri-
odically receive tuberculin skin tests (e.g., HCWs) to reduce the likelihood of
mistaking a boosted reaction for a new infection. If the initial tuberculin-test result
is classified as negative, a second test is repeated 1–3 weeks later. If the reaction to
the second test is positive, it probably represents a boosted reaction. If the second
test result is also negative, the person is classified as not infected. A positive reac-
tion to a subsequent test would indicate new infection (i.e., a skin-test conversion)
in such a person.
Ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI): The use of ultraviolet radiation to kill or inac-
tivate microorganisms.
Ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI) lamps: Lamps that kill or inactivate microor-
ganisms by emitting ultraviolet germicidal radiation, predominantly at a
wavelength of 254 nm (intermediate light waves between visible light and X-rays).
UVGI lamps can be used in ceiling or wall fixtures or within air ducts of ventilation
systems.
Ventilation, dilution: An engineering control technique to dilute and remove airborne
contaminants by the flow of air into and out of an area. Air that contains droplet
nuclei is removed and replaced by contaminant-free air. If the flow is sufficient,
droplet nuclei become dispersed, and their concentration in the air is diminished.
Ventilation, local exhaust: Ventilation used to capture and remove airborne contami-
nants by enclosing the contaminant source (i.e., the patient) or by placing an
exhaust hood close to the contaminant source.
Virulence: The degree of pathogenicity of a microorganism as indicated by the sever-
ity of the disease produced and its ability to invade the tissues of a host.
M. tuberculosis is a virulent organism.
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